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DOES THE THEATERGOER NEED MEANING?
To a thus-formulated question most theatergoers would answer in the affirmative.
Their convictions about the function of the theatre notwithstanding, they are normally
keen to know what a performance is about, what a scene signifies, or what meaning the
actions of the heroes convey. Significantly, this sort of curiosity is not indicative of the
recipient’s naive attitude, manifest in asking the most obvious and worn-out of ques-
tions. Ascribing a meaning to a theatrical performance is in most cases a test of its
ultimate value. A beautiful performance about nothing in particular is bound to be
subject to criticism rather than be greeted with critics’ enthusiasm and a positive re-
ception from the audience. And so, although meaning is not solely responsible for the
artistic value of a performance, making sense of the actions on stage is normally pre-
requisite to a favorable verdict on the part of the audience.
On the other hand, however, it is not difficult to notice a cautious attitude towards
considerations about the meaning of theatrical performance in contemporary theater
practice and criticism. The experiments of twentieth-century theater artists gave prior-
ity to actions shaping the relations between actors and the audience, as well as to the
notion of the borderline between art and everyday life. Such actions assumed a differ-
ent form in performances by different directors or theater companies. Spectators were
imposed a particular role to act out, e.g. that of the patients of a mental hospital in
Grotowski’s Kordian. On other occasions it was reality external to the theater that en-
tered the world of fiction, as was the case in Meyerhold’s Jutrznie, where real news
from the front line, read by one of the dramatis personae, at times turned the perform-
ance into an actual revolutionary rally. Similarly, happening performances brought
about situations that made the participants wonder about the borderline between theat-
rical activity and everyday life. For Eugenio Barba, in turn, the most important was the
relationship between a theatrical company and the culture and society within which his
Odin Teatret functioned. One of the most interesting forms of Barba’s actors’ activity
was the so-called barter . Consisting in the exchange of cultural goods, it meant that
a group of spectators, having seen a performance, staged their own to reciprocate.
When Barba’s actors finished their performance, the spectators did not respond with
traditional applause, but presented their own show instead. Also, Odin Teatret paid
attention to the actor’s creative process itself. Carried out at the International School of
Theater Anthropology, research into dramatic techniques stemming from different
cultures bore fruit in performances that, rather than being theatrical presentations, sim-
ply showed how actors work.
Interest in the process of dramatic creation in twentieth-century theater was never-
theless still more common, as evidenced by rehearsals open to the public, numerous
workshops and joint performances by professional actors and amateurs. The bases for
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such developments were varied. Co-operation between actors and people attending
a workshop (or usually a series of workshops) could mean the practical implementation
of the principles of political theater, create a psychodrama or evoke the ritual origins of
the theater. In each case, however, the basic method of activity adopted so as to
achieve the goal was the inclusion of the people coming to the theater in the process of
performance preparation. Creative activity per se thus became more important than the
final result in the shape of theatrical performance that could be staged and seen. The
treatment of a theatrical creation as a finite and closed presentation was rejected even
more strongly by the originators of performance art. The spectators did not in this case
take an active part in theatrical activity: rather, what they were presented with limited
itself to ephemeral and unfinished activities showing the process of constantly renew-
ing the artistic means used by the performer.
The few above-mentioned examples of searching for the nature of theatrical art by
no means exhaust either the richness of experiments or the variety of performative
patterns defining new frontiers for the theatrical event. Importantly for the present con-
siderations, however, the popularity of such performances, especially in the 1960’s and
1970’s, resulted in there originating an alternative for conventional theater, where the
spectator’s main task is to understand and interpret the events of the world presented
on stage. And so, despite the fact that everyday theater practice – as Ratajczak (1988)
rightly observes – “still consists mainly in staging dramas”, the popularity of attempts
at ritualizing theater or looking at it from the viewpoint of anthropology, sociology or
politics has for many created an opportunity to question the value and aim of reflec-
tions on the meaning of the events on stage. Apparently, such reflections should be
treated as secondary to the study of the nature of the theater itself. The rejection of
meaning and concentration on common experience, direct actions or the state of man in
society, can be accepted as a kind of aesthetics. At the same time, however, question-
ing the need for reflection on the meaning of theatrical actions is contrary to the as-
sumptions posited by the artists themselves who had been seeking new directions in
twentieth-century theater. In many cases, reflection on meaning was after all an im-
portant part of the theatrical explorations taking place since the 1950’s. What is more,
it seems that only focusing on issues to do with the organization and affective reception
of a performance, as well as its function in society, often constitutes not an alternative,
but rather an alibi that frees the spectator from the effort involved in having to interpret
the actions on stage. A handy alibi at that, for criticism of the need to reflect on the
possible meanings in most cases does not result from the aesthetic attitude of the re-
cipient, but from the specificity of theatrical experience itself. It is so because if we
reject a situation in which a given theatrical aesthetics questions on principle the func-
tion meaning plays in the reception of a performance, it turns out that doubts over the
value of an analysis or interpretation of a performance come as a result of a trite obser-
vation. Namely, asked for opinion about a performance, the spectator often finds it
difficult to describe clearly what it was about. On the other hand, he/she is keen to
express his/her elation or disapproval, and sometimes also willing to talk about the
emotional experiences caused by the actors’ interpretation of their roles or by the stage
scenery. Yet, such a basis is not enough to form the conclusion that spectators watch
plays without actually understanding them. What seems to be certain is that, just after
watching a performance, they often have problems verbalizing their reflections in
a way that would demonstrate their understanding of what they have seen a short while
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back. Yet the reasons for such problems do not lie with lack of comprehension, but
rather with problems the spectators have remembering the developments on stage, their
inability to verbalize their observations and corresponding emotions, as well as diffi-
culty with interpreting the sense of the performance as a whole. When speaking of
understanding a performance, we in most cases mean the interpretation of its global
sense. At the same time, the process of understanding the actions on stage is normally
fragmentary in nature and it is often only after the spectator left the theater that a re-
flection is born that allows to capture the sense of the performance as a whole. How-
ever, the inability to consolidate particular emotions and form conclusions does not
mean that the spectator has not understood a single scene. Therefore, if one wants to
define the function of comprehension processes in the reception process of a theatrical
performance, it is necessary to concentrate on interpretations of fragments of a play
only. Unfortunately, also in this case problems appear to do with the aforementioned
unreliability of human memory and inability to verbalize one’s observations and corre-
sponding emotions.
Let us take a scene from Shakespeare’s Macbeth: Duncan expresses his delight at
the beauty of the surroundings of Macbeth’s castle. It is easy for the spectator to notice
irony of the situation: in the next scene of the play the hosts, Lady Macbeth and her
husband, plot to murder the king. After that Duncan’s delight can be forgotten with no
consequences for the understanding of the unfolding developments of the tragedy. And
so, if the spectator cannot interpret a given scene after the performance has finished, it
does not mean that he/she was watching it without comprehension. What is more, un-
derstanding the irony present in Macbeth does not have to be on a par with the ability
to describe or name the technique used by the author of the play. The spectator can be
aware of the opposition between Duncan’s positive reception of reality and the tragic
fate that has been planned for him, and at the same time be unable to verbalize his/her
emotions and observations.
The situation gets more complicated when apart from the plot we consider a number
of significant elements of the staging. Any attempt at interpreting a fragment of a per-
formance requires not only capturing the sense of the events on stage, but also the abil-
ity to describe both the actions of the dramatis personae and the stage scenery in a way
that would support the interpretations made. Yet, in contrast with literary art, where it
is always possible to use a quotation, in the case of theater, and also cinema, the analy-
sis has to be based on an accurate linguistic characterization of the actions presented on
stage. Thus the difficulty with interpreting those actions appears still at the level of
description of a theatrical performance. Moreover, the unreliability of human memory
impedes any scrupulous analysis of scenes seen some time before. In contrast with the
reception process of literary or cinematic creations, returning to a chosen fragment of
a theatrical performance is considerably more difficult and normally means having to
see the whole of it again.
The problem does not then lie with the fact that spectators do not notice the mean-
ings contained within a performance, but is connected with difficulty in remembering
and describing them after the actors left the stage. Such a situation calls for a specialist
who could explain the global sense of the performance, most probably a semiotician,
for it was semiotics that dominated twentieth-century research into the interpretation
processes to do with theatrical meaning. As practice demonstrates, however, coherent
semiotic analyses and ones that are consistent with the actions presented on stage, are
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not always welcome by the audience, who expects from the theater critic an explana-
tion of just what it is that determines the value of the performance. For many contem-
porary researchers this fact constitutes a basis on which to “criticize the idea of treating
the art of theatrical performance as an ability to express meanings with signs. In place
of semiology they propose intuitive research, which could capture the essence of the
elusive, and so allegedly »nonsemiotic« spheres of a performance treated as a living
presence” (Pavis 1998: 466). At the same time, Derrida’s deconstruction or Lyotard’s
concept of “energetic theater”, both originating from the rejection of semiotic research,
are even more vague to an average spectator than the semiotic approach, and it is
highly debatable whether interpretations based on the analysis of signs are incompre-
hensible to the audience. The reason why solutions provided by traditional semiotics
are rejected does not normally lie with the intricacy of the exposition, but rather with
the lack of connections between the emotions experienced by the recipient and conclu-
sions based on a conventionalized system of meanings.
That is why new theoretical models are looking for a method that would most of all
allow for how a performance affects the spectator. Contemporary semiotics is con-
cerned with the process of constructing meaning by the recipient. An expansion of the
semiotic perspective has been Martin and Sauter’s (1995) idea, based on hermeneutics
and presented in their book Understanding Theatre. The starting point for understand-
ing a performance is the familiarity with relevant codes; this familiarity is examined by
Martin and Sauter within a broader reception perspective. Every spectator, making use
of his/her own experience and knowledge, chooses from among the universe of signs
those elements that he/she feels to constitute the keystones providing a meaning to the
actions on stage. An analysis of the spectator’s inclinations to recognize particular
signs and signification systems constitutes a basis for identifying individual strategies
of decoding and constructing meanings (ibidem).
The attitude of the spectator is analyzed also by Keynar (1998), who, in his model
of reception, makes references to phenomenology. That is why he concentrates on the
intentional aspect of performance as the one that should be captured by the recipient.
At the heart of Keynar’s model are three complementary reception strategies charac-
teristic of an “implied reader”. The first of those, S1, consists in uncovering the con-
ventions responsible for creating the reality on stage, thanks to the hints contained in
the system of relevant techniques used by the authors of a performance. S2, using pre-
dominantly the affective aspects of reception and modifying the assumptions adopted
by the recipient at the S1 stage, makes it possible to identify the intentionally assumed
subject of the performance, which acquires its definitive sense as a result of S3. S3 in
turn consists in capturing the relation of S2 to S1. Keynar’s model thus demonstrates
how the authors of a performance can reinterpret the meanings connected with a dra-
matic text. Characteristic of the model is that it takes into account the affective aspects
of actors’ influence on the audience as well as of stage scenery – according to S2, the
recipient’s understanding of the subject of a performance is closely linked to his/her
emotional attitude towards the reality on stage. Keynar uses the example of Omri Nit-
zan, an Israeli director, who used present-day reality of the Israeli state as a back-
ground in his staging of Goldoni’s The Servant to Two Masters. This rather overused
dramatic method nevertheless acquires a significant sense when considered from the
point of view of the emotions it provoked among the Israeli audience. According to
Keynar’s interpretation, the violent and hostile reality of Goldoni’s commedia
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dell’arte, was an instantiation of the paranoid trauma borne out of the Holocaust expe-
rience and threat of terrorist attacks. True to fact, the spectators aware of the reality of
life in Israeli society could easily identify the director’s staging intention, but never-
theless it would have been difficult for them to get as emotionally involved as those
whose reception of the performance was based not only on the information obtained,
but also the personal, everyday experience of living under the threat of a terrorist attack
as well as on the ever-present memory of the Holocaust.
A further solution has been put forward by the French semiotician Patrice Pavis,
who refers a description of a theatrical performance understood as a set of metaphorical
and metonymical operations to mechanisms characterized in Freud’s psychoanalysis.
Aware of the spectator’s mental activity, Pavis sees the process of performance recep-
tion as functioning within the four mental operations that Freud identified as represen-
tative of the process of fantasizing. The first of them, “condensation”, is based on the
accumulation and combination of images. Pavis mentions Johan Kresnik’s Ulrike
Meinhof, a drama whose ending has a meaning that stems from juxtaposing three par-
allel sets: one where the heroine has been reduced to an old sepia picture from a news-
paper, one in the middle of the stage, where the same heroine stood having struck the
pose of a statue, and finally that of a background filled with the twisted bodies of pris-
oners lying at the foot of the smashed Berlin Wall (Pavis 1992). The second operation,
“displacement”, replaces one element with another not on the basis of similarity, but
a direct spatial connection or temporal sequence. In the ending of Kresnik’s production
one can also notice that the newspaper photograph of the tortured Ulrike suggests
a transfer of the heroine’s historical persona to contemporary mass media reality,
where her body gets reduced to a two-dimensional picture and thus an object whose
only destination is in the archives (ibidem). Another operation described by Pavis and
referred to as “symbolization” consists in showing meanings, playing them out in
a symbolic act. Ulrike’s body shows both metaphorically and metonymically a state of
violence. The heroine’s body is controlled, submitted to the action of machines, tor-
tured and manipulated from the outside. The last of Pavis’s reception operations, that
of “secondary revision”, consists in transforming a fantasy in the process of partly
ordering chaotic associations, thanks to which it assumes a comprehensible form. This
means superimposing a linguistic form on substance without any traces of rational
thinking. In his model, Pavis tries to apply the traditional analytic concepts of meton-
ymy and metaphor within Freud’s idea of dreamwork. Key for Pavis’s considerations is
emotional involvement of the spectator, for whom the processes of image combination
are merely a basis for the formulation of his/her mental reaction.
The necessity of including the recipient’s cognitive activity in the analysis of theat-
rical meaning is signaled also by other contemporary theater scholars, particularly
those advocating sociological theories of theatre. In his Theater and Recipient,
Kowalewicz (1993) writes about research inspired by the calls for rejecting the tradi-
tional model and concentrating on an analysis of meaning production effectuated by
the spectator. Similarly, in her Theatre Audiences Bennett (1990) makes a reference to
the psychoanalytical theory of Norman Holland, who tries to explain the way in which
the recipient ascribes meaning to a text and why he/she needs to do that in the first
place. According to Holland, both the text and recipients are part of a fantasy and the
interaction they enter into determines the meaning of a given work. The fantasy itself
can be a source of both pleasure and anxiety, though giving it a linguistic, conceptual
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form makes it possible to reduce that anxiety (Holland 1968). Determination of mean-
ing is thus connected with the pleasure of curbing free fantasizing, whose outcome can
sometimes provoke apprehension. Holland’s theory does not however account for the
fact that the same text can be, and often is, interpreted differently by different people.
That is why Bennett, speaking of a theatrical performance, points to the pragmatic
context that can modify its meaning. A second important aspect of reception she men-
tions has to do with cultural and social difference, which divide the audience into
a number of groups. At the same time, Bennett stresses that such groups are never ho-
mogeneous, which calls for research into how the individual recipient understands
a performance. Similar ideas can be found in the works of Robert Demarcy, who has
replaced the category “audience” with the concept “spectator”, Marco DeMarinis
(Kowalewicz op.cit.), and Maria Shevtsova, whose research demonstrates that differ-
ences in reception do not necessarily follow the division into social groups (Shevtsova
1993).
The aforementioned concepts and ideas by contemporary theater scholars point to-
wards the necessity of research into the process of reception; such research should
allow for the individual recipient as a co-author of theatrical meanings. A second con-
clusion has to do with determination of the connection between the spectator’s affec-
tive reactions and the meanings assuming shape in his/her mind. Unfortunately, as
Kowalewicz’s (ibidem) examples show, empirical research into the individual specta-
tor’s signification processes has so far been fruitless. The interview situation is too
stressful for the informant and the resulting information about the elements responsible
for reception processes is normally invalid.
Solutions allowing to avoid the uncomfortable situation by replacing the interview
with an informal conversation, still cannot get rid of the distortions that appear in the
process of verbalizing the thoughts in the recipient’s mind after a performance. Also
fruitless have turned out to be attempts at combining psychological reactions with the
process of signification. In line with Kowalewicz’s (ibidem) conclusion, so far it has
been unjustified to claim that any research of the dynamic type has provided a model
for proceeding from empirical data to the world of meanings. Thus, none of the aims
mentioned above of contemporary theater theory has so far been achieved.
The cogni t ive approach to  meaning
Searching for the source of the problems that arise when analyses of a theatrical per-
formance attempt to take into account the audience’s active role, one has to stress the
understanding of meaning that individual approaches have. We tend to equate meaning
with conceptual content, which is why even theoreticians who strive to show the rela-
tions between affective and conceptual aspects of reception make a distinction between
the two areas of the audience’s cognitive activity when looking at individual examples.
Patrice Pavis, for instance, makes a claim that the tension which comes as a result of
watching a performance stems from an interpretation of theatrical signs – and the other
way round (Pavis 1992: 107). Earlier in his work though, when he analyses Ulrike
Meinhof’s self-harming (she cuts off her own tongue), he states that this action requires
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no semiological interpretation, being a representation of pain where rhythm and tension
play a role (ibidem: 106). Even if we concede that in the scene under analysis affective
aspects prevail over meaning ones, the question of the relation between feeling and
meaning that Pavis proposes is still left unanswered. It may seem, therefore, that the
approaches to the category of meaning proposed thus far hinder establishing a relation
between meaning and the recipient’s emotional reactions. Traditional theories of se-
mantics that dominate contemporary science, after all, aimed at excluding the psycho-
logical aspect of reception as a factor beyond objective scholarly formalization.
Cognitive linguistics, which changes our understanding of meaning profoundly by
equating it with conceptualization, is in this light an approach worth a mention. Ronald
Langacker, who proposed the new definition of meaning, sets new standards in seman-
tics. In Elżbieta Tabakowska’s words, he sees a role for semantics in “structural analy-
sis and describing thoughts and concepts, and defines conceptualization in a broad
sense of the word as mental experience, comprising both »new concepts and already
existing ones, sensual and kinetic experiences, emotions, the ability to recognize an
immediate context, social, physical and linguistic, etc.« Conceptual content is thus only
one element of meaning, which complements the way the author of a concept formu-
lates the content” (Tabakowska 1998: 168). Clearly, cognitivists see the psychological
and subjective facets of cognition not so much as influencing the structure of the con-
cept that profiles a sense, but as an integral part of the sense. Langacker tested the va-
lidity of his hypothesis in works that determine the relations that obtain between the
grammar of a language and the ability to think and comprehend based broadly on hu-
man experience. This dissertation is aimed at demonstrating how the findings of cogni-
tive semantics can help describe how the audience profiles the meanings of a theatrical
performance.
In principle, cognitivism stemmed from criticism leveled at the excessive formalism
of Noam Chomsky’s transformational-generative grammar, and as such is rooted
within American linguistics. However, it was an American psychologist, Eleanor
Rosch, who set the grounds for the new type of research. Rosch carried out a series of
psychological experiments that helped to undermine the then cornerstone of the de-
scription of conceptual categories, the traditional categorization. According to it,
boundaries between categories were fixed and not transgressible; each element of
a category had equal rights, so to speak. The research that Rosch did in the 1970’s
proved that, in most cases, the above-mentioned model is not compatible with how the
human mind goes about arranging the world in reality. Most testees thought that the
apple was a more prototypical member of the category “fruit” than, say, the nut. Simi-
larly, the dove was considered to be more representative for the category “bird” than
the ostrich or the penguin. As the experiments progressed, a circular cognitive system
developed. Radial structures contain central elements which are prototypes of a cate-
gory; the other elements are included on the basis of their similarity to the prototype.
Consequently, one could speak of the degree to which an element is part of a category,
depending on how far from the center it is positioned. Thus, cognitive systems started
having the form of a scale; conventionally, language users think that “an apple is more
of a fruit than a nut is”. As an alternative to binary opposition models, the scalar char-
acter of some semantic categories seems to be a more accurate reflection of the contin-
ual nature of the stimuli that we perceive. Our world perception, after all, is not limited
to binary oppositions or elementary particles.
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Another significant discovery that Rosch made was establishing the basic level,
which, in Maria Indyk’s apt words, “is a specific, privileged member of the vertical
hierarchy of categorization levels” (Indyk 1995: 634–635, compare also Lakoff 1987:
46). In the category chain this level is usually a middle one. Thus basic-level categories
are basic in four respects:
 Perception: Overall perceived shape; single mental image; fast identification.
 Function: General motor program.
 Communication: Shortest, most commonly used and contextually neutral words,
first learned by children and first enter the lexicon.
 Knowledge Organization: Most attributes of category members are stored at this
level (Lakoff 1987: 47).
To exemplify, the concept “dog” forms the basic level when compared to its su-
perordinate, that is to say a more general concept (“mammal”) and its subordinate,
a more specific notion (e.g. “poodle”).
The American linguist George Lakoff adopted Rosch’s concepts of “prototype” and
“basic level” in his novel approach to semantic units. Traditional semantics has it that:
1. Each concept is either an elementary unit in itself or made up of other elemen-
tary units in accordance with rules and principles of semantics.
2. A concept’s internal structure is entirely based on the rules and principles of se-
mantics that are applied to it.
3. Only concepts deprived of an internal structure carry a direct meaning.
Lakoff’s cognitive approach practically dismisses these assumptions:
 Direct meaning applies only to those concepts which belong to the basic level or
function as image schemata (both kinds of concepts having an internal struc-
ture).
 The internal structure of concepts characteristic to the basic level and image
schemata is not entirely dependent on applying principles of semantics.
Both approaches, as we can see, postulate different definitions of meaning. The dis-
tinction manifests itself in how elementary units are accounted for. In the traditional
approach these units are determined through theoretical speculations; cognitive seman-
tics examines relations that link the conceptual system with human experience. There-
fore cognitivism helps expand the analysis of meaning creation by including certain
psychological aspects, perception rules and the knowledge possessed by an individual
or shared by a group of recipients; these elements were ignored in previous approaches.
This understanding is in accordance with the assumptions of modern theory of theatre.
Lakoff also expanded on the cognitive theory of metaphor. In a book he published
together with Mark Johnson titled Metaphors We Live By he states that our day-to-day
thinking is largely metaphorical in character, and that reasoning is based on metaphori-
cal implications and conclusions; thus our daily rationalism requires imagination. Sec-
ondly – this is quite aptly put by Tomasz Krzeszowski in his introduction to the Polish
version of Lakoff and Johnson’s work – “thus far nobody had been able to give suffi-
cient grounds to the theory that metaphors are not picked out randomly, but are deeply
rooted in our experience, making up coherent systems centered around certain concepts
that are structured only due to the fact that we understand them through metaphors.
[…] Thirdly, the authors are interested in the kind of language we use instinctively.
»Our metaphors characterize us«, or, to put it even more bluntly, »show me your meta-
phors and I’ll tell you who you are«” (Lakoff, Johnson 1988: 8). This light-hearted
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approach to Lakoff and Johnson’s thesis is indicative of the potential behind a cogni-
tive analysis of metaphorical expressions. In the work under analysis here a shift of
focus is clearly observable, from meaning forms that make up a coherent and objective
system to a mental sphere delineated by everyday existence. In theatre studies, this
shift corresponds to the tendency toward anthropology that we are witnessing at the
moment (Dobrochna Ratajczak comments on it as she discusses historical drama).
Ratajczak notes that “the shift is particularly noticeable in topics dealt with. A contem-
porary historian will study the concepts of paradise, purgatory and hell, discuss the
history of confession, marriage, parenthood, purity, dirt, famine, delve into individual
microstories. What was a non-concept in old-time narratives, or at best perfunctorily
treated in footnotes, tersely described as typical of a society or a historical period, has
developed an identity of its own – and made an impact on the current narrative style
[…] Blood, pain, tears, sperm come to the fore; death is no longer hidden behind
a number or a laconic remark. An upward view complements a downward one; body
and soul unite in descriptions of fare, attire, beliefs, mentalities” (Ratajczak 1999: 12).
Most importantly, though, the microstories that Ratajczak mentions manifest them-
selves in day-to-day metaphors that Lakoff deals with. Thus we have access to what
has so far been “a non-concept or perfunctorily treated in footnotes”.
A third cornerstone of cognitive semantics is what Ronald Langacker proposes.
Langacker, who has already been mentioned, has set the grounds for cognitive gram-
mar. The issue may not be as captivating as the new conceptual system or the theory of
metaphor; however, Langacker’s works have been as exhaustive as possible about the
relations that hold between language (in this case grammar in particular) and mental
processes. Langacker, along with other advocates of cognitive linguistics, has managed
to confirm the hypothesis that language finds motivation in cognitive processes. How-
ever, a complete insight into how meaning is shaped has to take into account the rela-
tions that obtain between reality and human cognition. Thus all the three stages of hu-
man cognitive activity are thoroughly characterized; they can be anthropocentrically
shown as follows:
perception (reality) – conceptualization (cognition) – symbolization (language)
The language-oriented works referred to above emphasize the relations that hold
between conceptualization and language symbolization; perception is of secondary
interest. In turn, studies of the meaning of a theatrical performance consider the other
relation, that is perception – conceptualization, to be the key concept. That is why the
theoretical model presented in this dissertation will be based on Dan Sperber and Dei-
dre Wilson’s (1986) relevance theory; this approach is an alternative to the traditional
model of communication. The traditional approach is founded on encoding and de-
coding a symbolized message; according to Sperber and Wilson, meaning occurs as
a result of inference due to the sender’s ostension. Thus the process of decoding sym-
bols is substituted for by interpretation of data that are highlighted due to acts of osten-
sion, which constitute part of the surrounding reality. Sperber and Wilson’s model is
based on a set of premises that are necessary to formulate our thesis concerning the
ostensive-inferential model of communication. First of all, the authors of the theory of
relevance do not attempt to define communication, but rather to describe how it works.
They claim that communication is based on heuresis rather than infallible algorithms.
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In line with that, communication can hardly be correct or incorrect, but rather success-
ful or unsuccessful. Communication is based on acts of ostension on the part of the
sender, which change the recipient’s cognitive environment in a noticeable way. As os-
tension triggers the process of looking for relevance (according to a fundamental as-
sumption of the theory under analysis), the recipient’s mind initiates inference aimed at
determining which meaning is relevant in a given situation. This, in brief, is how the
ostension-inference model of communication works; we will implement it in this thesis
to demonstrate how a theatrical performance acquires meaning through audience activity.
1. CREATING MEANING IN THE THEATRE
Our theory has it that communication is a process that directly affects the recipient, not
necessarily through a system of symbols. Communicative activities trigger intentional
thought patterns in the recipient’s mind. However, for the recipient communicative
intention is but one context to consider in order to correctly interpret incoming stimuli.
In theatre, the concept becomes even narrower in scope, as the addressee (an actor, the
director, or the whole cast?) cannot be unequivocally determined. It is therefore sensi-
ble to treat a theatrical performance as a set of meaningful facts with the odd signal as
to the addressee’s intention. To investigate the sense of a performance, therefore, is
a little like grasping the meaning of the continual chain of events around us rather than
meticulously interpreting the intention behind the addressee’s action. Naturally, not
every kind of theatre is subject to such reception, which is why I would like to concen-
trate on illusory theatre, where the main objective is to create fictitious reality on stage.
In this research illusory theatre serves as a paragon of theatrical activity. It has to be
noted here that drama based on fiction is for western Europeans the main genre that
shapes their understanding of theatre in general. It is not that a visit to the theatre is
only about experiencing the story shown on stage. However, the importance of stage
events is, in Zbigniew Raszewski’s apt words, that “the only reason why a portraying
world should exist is to produce the portrayed one” (Raszewski 1991: 124). In line with
Raszewski’s reasoning, in order for the audience to appreciate the acting or the aes-
thetic value of the set, they first have to be entangled in the plot shown on stage. Even
if the plot is not the main point behind a given mise en scène, it is largely an attention-
getter. A plot which is unattractive, incomprehensible or not worth the time and effort
of going to see the given play usually means that the other facets of the play will not
suffice to keep the audience on their seats for two hours – the average time of a theatri-
cal performance.
In this work the main interest is the process of giving meaning; in line with the ba-
sic assumptions of cognitivism it comprises all the three aforementioned aspects of
reception, viz: focusing on events shown on stage (through acts of ostension), compre-
hension (through conceptualisation) and regarding conclusions as pertinent (relevance).
These stages have structured the dissertation as it is now, divided into three main sec-
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tions. The first chapter tackles the issue of ostension understood as focusing the audi-
ence’s attention both on the performance as a whole and its individual elements.
Chapter two analyses the function of main cognitive domains in shaping meaning in
the recipient’s mind. The third chapter concerns relevance and metaphor which anchors
a theatrical image in the recipient’s experience. Each chapter starts with an introduc-
tion, tackles the theoretical background behind each of the three issues and sets a con-
ceptual framework. Subsequently, there are analyses where the cognitive mechanisms
under discussion are implemented and the specificity of their functioning as part of
theatrical reality is discussed. The first two chapters are supplemented with methodo-
logical propositions that indicate how the findings can be used in experimental research
into theatrical reception. The model proposed here is largely based on analysing re-
views, by means of which preliminary hypotheses as to features of individual acts of
theatrical comprehension can be formulated. Our critical analysis, though, does not
limit itself merely to direct interpretations; it is hoped that also unconscious meaning-
forming mechanisms can be arrived at. This approach is based on a documented as-
sumption that largely unconscious mental processes lie at the source of language forms
(Lakoff 1999: 13). By and large, reviews by professional critics are under analysis
here. Although professionals and ordinary theatre-goers apply different perspectives
when looking into performances, cognitive mechanisms in both cases are largely the
same.
The arrangement adopted in the thesis is due to its main objective, that is to de-
scribe the process of assigning meaning to elements of a theatrical performance in the
spectator’s mind. A cognitive model of the process in question makes it possible to
supplement the conceptualisation of meaning that we tend to have with psychical and
affective aspects that determine individual reception of a performance. In such
a broader perspective meaning becomes part of the audience’s actual theatrical experi-
ence; thus comprehension and emotional reactions become one. In search of correct
interpretations of performances one cannot rely exclusively on fixed analytical mecha-
nisms and the recipient’s minimum range of knowledge. A mere interpretation of
meanings done by professionals in the field cannot be significant unless it is accompa-
nied by the recipient’s individual impressions and beliefs, as well as his reactions to the
play. The audience need only such meanings that can convince them of the compatibil-
ity of the events on stage and their own experiences; otherwise they will not bother to




Ostension according to theater scholars
Among the stages of the cognitive process mentioned in the previous chapter, one in
particular attracts the attention of the theater scholar: the category of ostension, or
“behavior in which the sender makes clear his/her intention of showing something to
the recipient”, as Sperber and Wilson, the authors of relevance theory, define it. The
emergence of a meaning (semiosis  – in semiotic terms, or conceptualizat ion
– within the cognitive approach) has thus been complemented with extraverbal acts
such as movement or gestures, which constitute a more typical example of behavior
than spoken utterances. In this case, they do not result from the context of an utterance,
but directly create meanings through a form of behavior, which in the theater manifests
itself in the actions of actors on stage.
The singular role of ostension acts in the theater is confirmed by the works of con-
temporary semioticians, who often refer to the concept of ostension as a basic way of
creating meanings on stage. In one of his books, fundamental for the theory of the
theater of the 1980’s, Elam (1980: 29) puts emphasis on the ability of theater to use
“the most »primitive« form of signification”, i.e. ostension. He goes on to explain that
“in order to refer to, indicate or define a given object, one simply picks it up and shows
it to the receiver of the message in question” (ibidem). Apart from defining, the show-
ing of an object can also serve as a communicative act, as in the case of a person or-
dering beer holding up an empty glass. Elam makes it clear that the glass is not the
actual referent, but refers to a class of objects of which it is a member. In this way, the
semiotic rule gets implemented, according to which an object, in order to be identified
as a sign, should provide information about something external to it. By thus incorpo-
rating acts of ostension in semiotization, Elam makes signification through ostension
one of the basic distinctive features of a theatrical performance, one distinguishing
theatrical art from narrative forms. Following Eco, Elam points to the rather obvious
fact that the semiotization of a performance is based mainly on the showing  of ob-
jects and events to the audience, whereas the same function is in narratives played by
description and recounting. The distinction between theatrical performance and narra-
tive bears resemblance to the two representational modes distinguished by Aristotle,
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namely diegesis and mimesis. Drawing from this analogy, Elam concludes that
“mimesis is […] equivalent to definition through ostension” (ibidem: 112). The issue is
treated slightly differently by another well-known semiotician, Patrice Pavis, who
– distinguishing theater from among other art forms making use of fiction – stresses the
fact that on stage the world of a drama is presented by means of imitation (mimesis)
and ostension. Pavis thus dismisses the categorical parity between imitation and osten-
sion as postulated by Elam. The lack of a precise definition of ostension is one reason
why the concept, though often used in research as an important element of the theatri-
cal presentation process, has so far remained largely unexplored in relevant literature.
Theater studies researchers most often follow in Elam’s footsteps and use the term
“ostension” interchangeably with the familiar notions of presentation (showing) and
mimesis, attempting no explanation whatsoever of its special function in the construc-
tion of on-stage reality.
An attempt at incorporating ostension acts in the broader context of communication
process has been made by Eco, who, like Elam, sees ostension as equivalent to show-
ing. Eco, however, at the same time tries to explain its function in the process of com-
munication, including in his analysis the pragmatic context accompanying an act of
ostension. He refers to Charles Peirce’s example of a drunkard put on public display by
the American Salvation Army to commend the benefits of temperance (Eco 1997: 116–
–117). Peirce’s aim was to find out what kind of a sign the drunkard was. Having ex-
plained that – in line with the rules of semiotics – an intoxicated man should not be
treated as a concrete person but a sign of drunkenness, Eco goes on to interpret the
ostentatious presence of the drunk, put on a platform in the middle of town. He takes
into account a number of contexts within which to look into the meaning of such os-
tentatiousness. And so, if the passers-by know that the drunk has been put on the plat-
form by the Salvation Army as a tool of propaganda, aware of the organization’s sys-
tem of values they will have no difficulty understanding that his presence is a warning
against the disastrous effects of intemperance. The necessity of employing a social
context, pointing to the intention of the addresser, stems from the fact that the drunk’s
presence per se does not unequivocally indicate the reason why the event is being
staged, and thus makes it impossible to adopt any unequivocal interpretation (ibidem).
To Eco, the answer lies with the pragmatic context pointing to the Salvation Army as
the author of the street event. If, however, the drunk had been put on the platform by
a revolutionary movement, rather than a symbol of dissipation he could become a pic-
ture showing the consequences of the government’s ineffective social policy. Defining
the context for ostension in each and every case does not of course preclude the possi-
bility of a varied interpretation of a performance, a street event in this case, but it nev-
ertheless unambiguously predefines the domains for such an interpretation, through,
among other things, identifying a system of values constituting an interpretative
framework. Demonstrating how the showing of an object or an event takes on meaning
in connection with a predefined pragmatic context, Eco’s analysis proves that ostension
becomes a significant part of the process of communication. It does not, after all, limit
itself to simple signification through showing (deixis), but is the result of complex
interrelations between the activities performed by a performer and the circumstances
determining the addresser’s intentions.
The issue of the meaning-inducing function of deixis in the theater is also tackled in
Martin Esslin’s The Field of Drama (1987: 38). Esslin views “focusing” as most of all
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the capturing of spectators’ attention and concentrating it on the most important aspects
of the scene. Standing on the balcony, Shakespeare’s Juliet, for instance, is highlighted
as a character high up above the setting of the stage. This obvious example of high-
lighting a character makes evident the role of ostension as a device for selecting those
elements of the setting that are significant for the performance, and for concurrently
arranging stage signs in a hierarchical order indispensable for fully understanding the
performance and its message. The need for hierarchization is not, however, limited to
the arrangement itself of which particular actors or elements of the set are a part. It is
also connected with Tadeusz Kowzan’s broader interpretation of the model of theatri-
cal communication, understood as a group of many different semiotic systems. The
multi-channel nature of the message sent from the stage imposes the need for intro-
ducing some sort of organization that would make it possible to highlight those ele-
ments which – capturing the audience’s reaction – constitute the primary meaning of
a given scene. As Esslin points out, no part of a performance can be analyzed with all
the elements on stage and the interdependence between them being taken into account.
It is up to the director to decide whether any (or which) of the semiotic systems should
preponderate at a given moment (ibidem: 112). According to Esslin, a special role in
this selection process is played by “key” or “cleft” signs. As “signifying elements of
a higher order which determine and affect the way the other sign systems within
a given section or passage of a work are to be read, and thus act as indicators of the
“»level« at which individual signs are to be perceived” (ibidem: 110). A “key” or
“cleft” sign can be for example the form of an utterance, as in Shakespeare’s dramas,
where transition from blank verse to prose indicates a shift onto a more realistic level.
Apart from language, Esslin speaks of five other levels of signs capable of defining the
modality of a performance or its parts (ibidem: 111). These include:
 the general color scheme of a performance,
 the pictorial style of the set, whether realistic or abstract, flat or three-
dimensional,
 the cut and period style of the costumes,
 the acting style, whether realistic or grotesque, deeply serious or comedic,
 the mood of the background music.
The modalities of reception determined by Esslin’s sign levels do not exhaust all
possible interpretative perspectives, for they stem in the main from cultural condition-
ing. One important conclusion is nevertheless that the distinguishment of sign levels
constitutes one of the basic elements of the process of understanding the meanings
presented on stage.
The above outline of the role of ostension in theater theory demonstrates that in
most of the approaches it is viewed as an act characteristic of a theatrical performance,
an act distinguishing a performance from narrative forms of expression. Such an atti-
tude results from equating the act of performing with ostension (whose dictionary defi-
nition identifies it as first of all showing). However, the way in which different schol-
ars use the term ostension  in the more detailed of their analyses, clearly shows the
lack of a uniform understanding of the concept. Elam views ostension as mostly an
indication of mimesis of theatrical art. For Eco, ostension is additionally a manifesta-
tion of communicative intention of necessity taken into account in order to rightly in-
terpret the ambiguous act of “showing” a given object or event. Esslin in turn endeavors
to solve the problem of the ambiguity of theatrical images by introducing a hierarchy into
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the meanings sent from the stage. That is why he concentrates on the act of focusing,
whose task it is to highlight particular elements making up the primary meaning of
a scene. Also related to ostension are Esslin’s “key” or “cleft” signs. In this case, how-
ever, he does not mean the focusing on a real element of on-stage reality, but the selec-
tion of a modality determining to a certain degree the way of interpreting particular
fragments of the performance.
Such a diversity of using the notion of ostension provides much to ponder for, given
the views presented above, we would be in danger of complacency if we merely ac-
cepted Elam’s comment that “theatre is able to draw upon the most »primitive« form of
signification, known in philosophy as »ostension«” (Elam op.cit.: 29). The presence of
ostension in the process of showing a given modality, as well as its functioning within
a pragmatic context demonstrate that it is involved also in more complex communica-
tive acts. That is why, in order to identify the nature of ostension acts, one needs to
look also at those texts which analyze the function of ostension in the broader context
of communication and mental processes.
Ostension according to language philosophers
The notion of ostension does not often appear in works on natural language. It was
investigated by St. Augustine and Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose ideas nevertheless fall
outside the classic model of language thus indirectly confirming the role the category
of ostension plays in the creation of a new model of meaning interpretation. Although
we do not find any specific conclusions in their works, their considerations and exam-
ples are indicative of the fundamental problems regarding ostension, its definition and
place in the communication process. They will be used in the present thesis as a basis
for conclusions within the framework of cognitive semantics, which is why both St
Augustine’s and Wittgenstein’s ideas have been made part of the considerations of
relevance for the final conclusion.
Can one po in t  to  anyth ing e lse but  an ob ject?
In St. Augustine’s dialogues the concept of ostension emerges in deliberations on the
symbolic character of spoken language. The assumption that a word is a sign triggers
the question whether words are capable of “signifying something”. That is why, re-
flecting on particular meanings, Augustine is unhappy with defining one word by
means of another and wants Adeodatus, his interlocutor, to “show [him] the things
themselves of which these are the signs” (St. Augustine 1938: 24). The first example in
the dialogue is “wall”, which rather than described by means of words can be simply
pointed to with the finger. Adeodatus agrees, though raising the objection that such
a way of identifying meaning can only be applied to names signifying physical objects.
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Offered another example, he is forced to refine his conclusion. He agrees that also the
red color, which is “a certain quality of a body, rather than a body” can be shown with
a finger. Adeodatus eventually accepts that one can show “not […] all corporeal things,
but all visible things”, and goes on to explain, “For I confess that sound, odor, taste ,
weight, and others of this sort […] cannot be shown by pointing the finger” (ibidem).
The deliberations quoted above might seem quite superficial in relation to the com-
plexity of the communication process, but it is in St. Augustine’s remarks that one
notices prototypical forms of our thinking about ostension. Adeodatus’s first conclu-
sion about the corporeality of shown objects and the subsequent comment about their
visibility exemplify a prototypical way of perceiving ostension as the showing of
a circumscribed area in visually perceived space. The wall referred to by St. Augustine
is just this: a circumscribed element within perceived space, of concrete texture and
function. If, however, we extend the notion of three-dimensional space to cover regions
of other type, we can assume that we can show anything that constitutes a particular
fragment of space. And so, even though we regard color as a quality of an object, it still
constitutes a circumscribed region in the space of colors. That is why it is important for
an act of showing to be preceded by determination of space within which we want to
operate. The sentence, “That is called sepia” (p. 114), accompanied by an appropriate
gesture, will only be understood rightly if the addressee is aware of the fact that the
noun is to specify a color. Thus, to avoid a misunderstanding, we can say, “This color
is called sepia” (Wittgenstein 1968: 25), by which we make it clear to our interlocutor
that the showing gesture refers to a given region in the space of colors.
If we can show circumscribed areas of various types of space, the question arises in
what way are those regions established. In the case of visual perception of objects it is
justified to assume that the prototypical aspect establishing an object in space (which
acts as background) is its contour (Eco 1971: 162). Eco claims that contour constitutes
merely a graphic convention adopted by people, but he seems to be in error, for, as
neurological research proves, the establishing of contours is one of the basic sensory
functions of the human visual system. A system of nerve connections amplifies signals
from cells located on the border of contrasting light stimuli (Lindsay, Norman 1991:
93). The picture of the world around us is thus divided into regions – separated from
each other by contours – still at the stage of visual perception. And so, although we are
not aware of the existence of contours in our perception, we choose a region that inter-
ests us by showing it. Such a situation demonstrates a typical way of understanding
acts of ostension in sensorially perceived space. Interestingly, St. Augustine – for
whom cognition was after all based primarily on acts of ostension – extended its scope
to mental, i.e. abstract, objects. According to his teachings “[man] is taught […] by
means of the things themselves which God reveals within the soul” (St. Augustine
op.cit.: 64). However, the existence of mental objects need not be related o metaphysi-
cal conditions. As cognitive linguistics posits, “the human mind is capable of placing
objects, also abstract ones, in a mental space characterized by the same features as are
typical of three-dimensional space” (Tabakowska 1995a: 24–25). An interesting vali-
dation of this supposition is provided in the Polish language: whereas one of the
meanings of the word okreslać is that of defining, the verb, derived from kreslić
(“draw”, usually in pencil), can at the same time pertain to contouring itself.
Understood as showing, the process of ostension can thus be treated as an act of
choosing a finished object, be it physical or mental. Such a treatment, nevertheless,
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excludes ostension from the process of cognition: otherwise we would be faced
a situation envisaged by Wittgenstein, who points out that “Augustine describes the
learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not
understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not
this one” (Wittgenstein op.cit.: 27). The function of ostension would thus simply be to
combine a name with an object having been shown; however, in the context of some
other examples analyzed by St. Augustine, this issue does not seem so simple.
“To po in t ”  and “ to  show”
The lexical items “to point” and “to show” are used interchangeably in some contexts.
Yet, in St. Augustine’s considerations their use signals a significant shift in types of
examples. Whereas pointing is connected with “objects”, the word “show” clearly
refers to actions. Among “[the] thousands of […] things […] which can be shown
through themselves and not through signs” Adeodatus mentions “eating, drinking,
sitting, standing, shouting” (St. Augustine op.cit.: 25). A similar distinction can be
found in contemporary studies of ostension. The “showing” viewed by Elam as
equivalent to mimetism, is normally accompanied by such terms as “signification”,
“deixis” or “index”, all of which can be treated as analogous to “pointing”. One prob-
lem is certainly that the analyses of examples used by contemporary scholars do not
enable us to explain just what function a distinction into two types of ostension has in
the description of cognition and communication processes. And although this question
is not addressed also by St. Augustine, his apt comments as well as doubts regarding
the examples he analyses make it possible to draw important conclusions.
Is  i t  enough “ to  show”?
By “showing” St. Augustine understands the performance of an activity in order to
explain the meaning of a word. It would thus seem that “showing” consists in imitating
an activity and therefore Elam’s idea of mimesis being of a piece with defining con-
cepts through ostension cannot be contested. St. Augustine’s examples, however, dem-
onstrate that an act of imitation per se is not enough to formulate a definition of an
ostensive character. What is more, the term “imitation” itself does not make it possible
to define relevant elements of an act of ostension. To clarify, let us look into an excerpt
from St. Augustine’s Dialogues:
“Aug.: Come now, tell me; if I, knowing absolutely nothing of the meaning of the word,
should ask you while you are in the act of walking what walking is, how would you teach me?
Ad.: I should walk somewhat more quickly in order that after your question your attention
might be directed to something new. And yet I should do only what was to be shown.
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Aug.: Do you know that walking is one thing and hurrying another? […] Hence, if after my
question you were to do more quickly what you were doing already, I should think walking to be
merely hurrying. Hurrying would be the new thing added, and so I should be misled by that” (ibi-
dem: 23–24).
It is rather clear that the misunderstanding between Augustine and Adeodatus is not
the result of a faulty imitation of an activity, but stems from conclusions drawn subse-
quent to an interpretation of a change in an activity. And so, despite the fact that the act
of walking was still being carried out, St. Augustine’s attention was directed to most of
all the increase in pace, which he read as an intention of showing what hurrying means.
A crucial element of defining a given meaning is thus not imitation, but rather a change
constituting a point of departure for understanding by the recipient the nature of the act
being presented. A second important function of a change in behavior is made evident
in Adeodatus’s summary of the dialogue: “I admit that we cannot show a thing without
a sign if we are questioned while we are in the act of doing it. For if we add nothing,
the questioner will think that we do not wish to show him and will suppose that, to
ridicule him, we are continuing what we are doing” (ibidem: 26). It is to the change
mentioned earlier that the necessity of “adding something” relates. This time, however,
Adeodatus’s comment, rather than the meaning-inducing function of ostension, centers
on the necessity of signaling the readiness to explain an act that has been enquired
about.
The two functions of ostension have been highlighted in Sperber and Wilson’s work
on relevance theory. They referred to them as an informative and a communicative
intention. The former consists in pointing to a piece of information being part of the
message, whereas the latter in making manifest to an audience one’s intention to give
that information. This means that the showing of an object alone, or the imitation of an
act, will not fulfill the function of ostensive communication unless the sender is suc-
cessful in clearly making manifest his/her communicative intention as well as point to
those pieces of information that are important at a given moment. Certainly, the mean-
ing of the verb “to show” is one of both pointing and the sender’s intention to highlight
a chosen fragment of reality. The problem lies with the fact that the concept of osten-
sion is normally dealt with as being in opposition to natural language. That is why
“showing” as an act of ostension has been contrasted with spoken word, and why the
search for the nature of ostension has been carried out in communication through imi-
tation (mimetism), gestures and images. This distinction is nevertheless not functional,
for ostension constitutes a fundamental element of interpersonal communication, the
form of such communication notwithstanding. Ostension cannot thus be viewed only in
connection with human extraverbal activity. Examples of communicating by means of
visual representation merely facilitate the understanding of significant features of an
act of ostension.
Aspect
A simplification of sorts is also the treatment of ostension as a simple act of pointing to
particular objects. Even if our perception divides the space being perceived into regions
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circumscribed by contours, it does not concurrently make an act of pointing unequivo-
cal, which is owing to the already-mentioned possibility of pointing to different aspects
of an object. How can we be sure that the person pointing to a red square with his/her
finger wants to attract our direct our attention to the shape of the figure rather than its
color? This problem has been addressed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, who enumerated
various types and ways of pointing. And so, for example, “you attend to the shape,
sometimes by tracing it, sometimes by screwing up your eyes so as not to see the color
clearly – you sometimes attend to the color by putting your hand up to keep the outline
from view (Wittgenstein op.cit.: 28)”. Although we cannot be certain whether tracing
the contour of a square with our finger will enable the recipient to understand what we
mean by saying, “this is a square”, Wittgenstein’s example shows a way of dealing
with the problem. Namely, we can highlight the relevant or hide the redundant features
of a concept. The same effect can be achieved by placing an act of ostension in a par-
ticular context. Let us imagine that, pointing to a human being, we say, “This is a hu-
man”. The recipient may understand us in the right way, but might also conclude that
the word “human” means, say, “stomach” – if that was where we pointed our finger to.
A possible precaution against such a turn of events would be to provide some addi-
tional information, e.g. by saying, “This being here is a human”. Should we not wish to
utilize natural language, we could also point to other beings, giving their names. Such
provides an appropriate context, making it possible for the recipient to rightly interpret
an act of ostension. A third way of highlighting a significant feature is its repetition in
different images. Wittgenstein is wary about the fact that “[t]he definition of the num-
ber two, »That is called ‘two’« – pointing to two nuts – is perfectly exact. […]”, in
consequence “the person one gives the definition to doesn’t know what one wants to
call »two«; he will suppose that »two« is the name given to this  group of nuts (ibidem:
23). If, however, the word “two” accompanies the act of pointing to two apples,
houses, glasses, etc., its meaning will eventually get the right shape in the mind of the
recipient. The process of highlighting a given feature through its repetition in subse-
quent images is interesting because, unlike the other two methods, it does not require
any prior knowledge!
Point ing as a prototype of  focus ing one’s  a t tent ion
According to the theories discussed thus far, the “pointing with the finger” to real ob-
jects appears to be the prototypical act of ostension. However, pointing to the shape or
color of an object is not, as Wittgenstein holds, an activity totally different from
“[pointing] to this book (not to that one)” or “[pointing] to the chair, not to the table”
(ibidem: 25), but constitutes a metaphorical extension to the actual act of pointing,
which has merely been transferred to a different type of space. The understanding of
ostension as an operation performed within mental space also allows to treat Esslin’s
“key” or “cleft” signs as ostensive acts, pointing to the modalities of the perception of
a theatrical performance. Similarly treated can be the defining of a particular context
leading to proper interpretation of the function of the drunkard described by Eco. An
act of ostension in this case points to the space of social structure.
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Metaphorical extensions of the prototypical act of ostension are impeded by osten-
sion acts that cannot be described as acts of pointing to a circumscribed region, or at
least its chosen point (“this temperature is just right”), as a representation of a given
meaning. What will be pointed to if, eager to explain the meaning of the word “hurry”,
we begin to walk faster than a moment before? Even if we refer to an inherently ab-
stract conceptual space, we will still be unable to point to the region constituting
a representation of the concept “to hurry”, because its meaning is based on the chang-
ing of a state that can be placed in time and space.
As regards the process of conceptualization, we can speak of choosing a given rela-
tion. Still, in what way does the change in behavior suggest relevant elements of the
relation responsible for the concept “hurrying”? The moment itself of changing from
slow to hurried activity is timeless, and that is why it does not provide timeless
boundaries that would circumscribe a single activity characterizable as a sequence of
particular activities. It focuses the recipient’s attention on both activities and thus
forces him/her to look for similarities and differences between both types of behavior,
which is exactly how the relation responsible for the meaning of “hurrying” gets acti-
vated.
That is why the concept of pointing cannot be treated as a primary act of ostension.
It remains a prototypical, i.e. the best, example of ostensive activity, which is most
often realized by pointing the finger to a given object. However, the fundamental sense
of an ostension act is the concentration of the recipient’s attention, which act should be
understood as both his/her cognitive activeness and the influence of the environment or
the sender’s intentional activities drawing somebody’s attention. Such a definition
covers both the pointing to a region and the focusing of attention around a significant
change in state. “Around” because we are unable to define unequivocal temporal
boundaries of intensified attention, necessary to construct the relevant relation. The
viewer’s attention as an important aspect of the reception of a theatrical performance is
discussed by Esslin, referring to the selection of a performance’s significant elements.
For Pavis, in turn, the viewer’s attention is connected with the nature of ideological and
aesthetic relations. It needs to be stressed, however, that the issue is present in all as-
pects of reception; at the sensory level our attention can be drawn even by such ele-
ments as sound, smell, weight or taste, i.e. qualities that in St. Augustine’s Dialogues
are treated as impossible to be “pointed to with the finger” (St. Augustine op.cit.: 24).
The definition suggested above thus allows us to subordinate to ostension all those
actions, which, going beyond the metaphor of pointing, have a function similar to that
of the gesture of an arm stretched out in a certain direction.
In order to elucidate the considerations above, let us begin with reformulating the
distinction between pointing and showing and replacing it with focusing somebody’s
attention and intensifying one’s attention. Such terms allow for the incorporation of
a concept fundamental within the psychological theory of cognition – the category of
attention. In her book Intelligence and Cognitive Processes, Nęcka (1994: 63–65)
writes about two elements indispensable for the interpretation of meanings:
“maintaining attention” and the related “memory”. Particularly important for the pres-
ent considerations is the crucial role “attention” plays in the process of the selection of
stimuli; from a temporal-spatial perspective that role boils down to the choice of
a given moment or region in space. Most of all, however, the redefined terms make it
possible to give ostension understood as a cognitive category a much broader scope.
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The consequences brought about by the new definitions were to be seen in the example
of “showing” hurry, where the ostension act consisted not so much in performing
(“showing”) an action of fixed temporal boundaries, as in intensifying the recipient’s
attention, which was made possible thanks to a discernible change in the pace of the
activity. Similarly, when describing ostension as “directing attention” the object or
spatial region which we could unequivocally point to need not exist. It can for example
so happen that to the question “What is a frog?” we will answer with the phrase “Look
down”. The object, a frog in this case, has not been pointed to but the direction of the
gaze has been made clear, which leads to the same cognitive effect as pointing to the
frog with the finger. What is more, pointing the finger will not always define the object
unequivocally. After all, we cannot be sure whether a person stretching out their arm in
the direction of the window is explaining the meaning of the words glass, frame or
window, or is pointing to the hole in the wall, not to mention to what is beyond it. That
is why it is difficult to equate ostension with a pointing gesture unequivocally high-
lighting the intended object.
The definition of ostension as “the focusing of somebody’s attention” is also justi-
fied by the etymology of the term itself. But a perfunctory glance at the problem re-
veals a close relation between the terms ostension and ostentation. Whereas dictionary
entries for the former speak of demonstration, presentation and showing, the definitions
of “ostentation” emphasize the aspect of attracting attention since it is defined as a way
of behavior intended to show, display (e.g. wealth or knowledge) and meant to at tract
at tent ion. The existence of a relationship between “ostension” and “attention” is
confirmed upon examining the etymology of the Latin ostensio, which, derived from
ostendere has got the same root – “tendere” – as the Latin attendere, which in turn is
akin to the English attention. What is more, tendere itself means both “stretch, extend”
and “make towards, aim at”. The term thus contains semantic information of both fo-
cusing and directing one’s attention. On the other hand, ostendere – which can signify
both pointing to and showing an object, can also be used in the sense of “displaying”
or, figuratively, “putting before one’s eyes”. In relation to the cognitive processes, it
seems justified to broaden the metaphor so as it acquires a more general sense, thus
referring to “putting within the scope of one’s interest, and thus attention”.
The motivation behind equating an act of ostension with an activity meant to attract
attention is not limited to philological concerns and the intention to incorporate the
term into a model of contemporary cognitive psychology. The main aim of the gener-
alization made is to explain relevant aspects of ostensive acts as elements of communi-
cation processes in the theatre. The consequences of adopting a definition going be-
yond the metaphor of “pointing” that have been discussed earlier can now be comple-
mented with an examination of the order of those human experiences that make up the
concept of ostension. Its prototypical understanding as an act of pointing implies
a sender, who makes clear his/her intention to highlight a certain object. What is more,
such a situation assumes the existence of a code or convention making it possible to
point to a chosen object by for example stretching out the arm or using an arrow sign.
Meanwhile, such conventions are secondary to the primal experience of the attracting
of human attention by phenomena in the surrounding reality, ones that are free from the
communicative intention of another person. At the cost of overgeneralization it can be
said that every change or movement causes a direct reaction in humans or it triggers the
process of interpretation. A basis for human activity, this mechanism is at the same
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time a foundation for the sender’s ostensive behavior. Introducing suitable changes to
the setting of the interaction, the sender can control the intensity and direction of the
recipient’s attention. As for pointing by stretching out the arm, it most probably con-
stitutes a trained convention, which we get to know in childhood. Eager to point the
child’s attention to a picture, the parents stretch out their arms in its direction, scraping
or tapping their fingers on its surface. It is the accompanying sounds that attract the
child’s attention; with time, it finds out that he/she should follow the stretched arm
with his/her eyes. Experience thus gets conventionalized, which leads to the emer-
gence of a code.
This last example can serve as an introduction to another issue of primary signifi-
cance to the cognitive process, that of the creation of new meanings. An outstretched
arm gets registered as an act of pointing as a result of its frequent concurrence with
other activities aimed at attracting the child’s attention. This process takes place also in
the theatre – where it is as a matter of course much more complex – which makes it
possible to create new meanings or, more broadly, also codes characteristic of new
trends in stage production. For his semiotic model, Eco has created the term
“undercoding” (Elam op.cit.: 55), which refers to the moment in the development of
new dramatic modes when the rules of generating meanings are known to the audience
only approximately. One way of the emergence of new, more precise rules of reception
is the repetitive process of focusing the audience’s attention on particular elements of
the performance, owing to which they get remembered as the elements making up the
new aesthetic trend. That is why we often feel fiercely attacked by avant-garde thea-
tres, which, paving the way for future codes and conventions, are forced to make use of
radical actions aimed at focusing the recipients’ attention on new elements of dramatic
art. Significantly, to the audience such actions seem often too intense in relation to the
meanings they carry. It is only after some time that particular elements of the new aes-
thetics gain a deeper meaning, allowing artists to use them in more sublime ways.
Summary
Summing up the considerations above, it is most of all necessary to note the distinction
put forward by some scholars between language or sign communication and “the most
»primitive« form of signification” (ibidem), i.e. ostension. Such a distinction is un-
founded because ostension does is not a type of communication but constitutes its inte-
gral part, present also in more complex forms of conveying meanings and information.
It plays the key role of signaling communicative intention, thus triggering the process
of conceptualization, i.e. an interpretation of the information being communicated or
only received. That is exactly why ostension cannot be contrasted with other kinds of
signification – it is constantly accompanied by the search for relevancy in the process
of inference or decoding. Other key functions of ostension include preliminary selec-
                                                       
 The primary way to attract attention, besides by sound, is through movement, the proof in which an
outstretched hand provokes the eyes of the receiver to fall in the direction of the giver.
30
tion of information, outlining of borders in the process of repetition, signaling the mo-
ment of the change of state, and differentiation between figure and background (con-
text). Each can be described in terms of both the perception of physical reality and
activities within mental space. This in turn enables us to search for an analogy between
the perception of on-stage reality and the process of conceptualization, i.e. interpreta-
tion of perceptual data leading to the emergence of meanings.
2. OSTENSION IN THEATRE
To assent to understanding ostension as an instance of focusing attention (a central
component of the cognitive process) means to question its conventional role as a dis-
tinctive feature that differentiates between the art of showing, typical for theatre, and
sign-based narrative communication. As it is, acts of ostension leading to focusing
attention are communication-universal; they indicate that communication is about to be
initiated and help determine the content of the message to enable its interpretation.
What is crucial, though, is how ostension manifests itself in various kinds of communi-
cation. In natural language, the intention to communicate and the selection of commu-
nicative content are strongly conventionalized, which often makes them escape our
attention. Relations and hierarchies that hold between individual words fall within the
domain of grammar, while communicative intention is an a priori component of the
verbal sign. Incidentally, communicative intention is central to all systems of signs.
Passing a tree we do not always notice it, but if our traveling companion says “Tree!”
we assume there is some intention on their part, or we react, for instance swerve to
avoid a log lying on the road. Communicative intention, an a priori part of the sign
system, also helps identify certain objects that we perceive as signs, without necessar-
ily having the right knowledge to interpret them correctly. To simplify a little (the de-
tails of this process are irrelevant here) let us look at an example. A driver seeing a red
circle with a white stroke positioned on a pole along a road may fail to remember what
its meaning is, but will certainly interpret it as a road sign and will attempt to investi-
gate what he is thereby obliged to do. Naturally, the driver can easily drive past the no-
entry sign, but its presence is in itself an act of ostension. Indifference towards acts of
communication, in turn, results from focusing of attention being scalar in character and
largely dependent on extra-systemic conditions, pragmatic situation and the recipient’s
mental state. A sign that is not conspicuous enough will not attract the tired driver’s
attention, nor will a friend of ours stop to pick us up unless we wave at them enthusi-
astically enough. The usual comment made afterwards is “I saw someone waving, but
I had no idea it was you”, or “…you were waving to me”. It is so because we tend not
to recognize acquaintances or realize that a gesture is addressed to us, even though we
notice the person and the gesture, unless the action is explicit enough to make our
friend stand out from the crowd. However, one reacts not only to other people’s inten-
tional actions, but also to any event that arouses curiosity.
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In political theatre, the intention to communicate intended messages directly to the
audience is made explicit; an example is Brecht’s plays, where songs meant as com-
mentaries on the plot clearly stood out from the other stage events. In theatre of illusion
addressing the audience directly is much less frequent. Thus, the audience look at the
events taking place as if they were watching extra-theatrical reality. The difference lies
in the way theatre arouses interest outside the mere pragmatics of life. By reacting to
everyday stimuli one avoids danger or satisfies one’s needs, be they mental or physio-
logical. However, theatre experiences do not entail the necessity to react to prevent
disaster or to satisfy needs. After all, the audience and the stage are separated, so
events of the fictitious world need not directly influence their recipient. Therefore
every play must face being ignored, the way we ignore scores of events taking place
outside theatre, if they are not directly relevant to us.
Both theorists and practitioners of theatre realize the need to arouse interest in
events. Zbigniew Raszewski defines a theatre event as a dynamic, focusing and polar-
ized arrangement. He exemplifies it as a road accident: an extraordinary happening
attracts bystanders (the audience, in a sense) who gather at the scene trying to find out
about the circumstances. The arrangement whereby rescuers’ actions are under obser-
vation holds good until the events are no longer interesting for the observers. A theatri-
cal performance should exhibit similar features, which is why various measures are
taken to attract attention. In Peter Brook’s version of Mahabharata a child acted as
a listener; this was Brook’s reaction to the consequences of the non-dramatic form of
his mise en scène which started as a narrative, a tale of “days long gone”. In line with
the director’s intention, the little listener would ask simplistic questions, thereby, in its
naivety, ingratiating with the audience, who entirely succumbed to the magic of the
story. Interest in a play can also be subject to extra-theatrical facets, such as the price
of tickets. Conventionally, a high price suggests high value of the commodity. Simi-
larly, a good review or comments made by an authority in the field can result in high
expectations about the play. All of the above have to be taken into account with respect
to performance reception. Our focal point here is the influence of a theatrical situation
in itself on captivating viewers’ attention.
Semioticians stress the role of convention which makes the audience add meaning
to stage events. However, a theatrical situation entails the existence of an inherent
mechanism of focusing attention. One of its elements is delineating the area where
action takes place. Even initiators of certain happenings put ropes around the space
where they are performing. During their experimental tour of Africa Brook’s troupe
would lay a rug on the ground before performing; in bourgeois theatre the ramp con-
stitutes the main boundary of the theatrical world. These actions are all based on the
principle of perception presented in earlier sections, which holds that the density of
a confined space is greater – in other words, it is perceived as heavier. In theatre, this
principle typically manifests itself by means of stage frame. Invented to enhance illu-
sion, it naturally leads to focusing of attention, as the audience perceive the stage as
a space where signs are dense abundant (in line with Łotman’s model). Arguably, this
is why stage frame still prevails although illusion is no longer a central concept in
theatre; recently, it has even grown in status, becoming – albeit in a modified form
– one of the main moderators of cognition in Krystian Lupa’s performances. In his
book, Grzegorz Niziołek points out that “the concept of box stage is renewed and rein-
forced in Lupa’s performances. It presents a compressed view of life, refreshing and
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enhancing our cognition at the same time. Lupa uses a »fourth wall«, a frame with
fishing line stretched on it, like a net. Thus actors keep the audience at bay, and the
audience perceive the play from a different angle, with new experiences as characters,
objects and events are seen as if through a transparent pane; Lupa speaks here of »3D
shock«” (Niziołek 1995: 108–113). Thus, stage frame plays an active (and significant)
part in performance reception.
It seems, therefore, that an event has to be not only unusual but also physically dis-
tant to arouse interest. As Raszewski aptly points out, a volcanic eruption can only be
admired at a distance; however, if the distance is too great, interest fades. Raszewski’s
belief that the correct distance to events must be maintained draws on Kozielecki’s
cognitive human psychology, which has it that any act of ostension must be strong
enough to be perceptible, but may not be too great a novelty for the recipient as it will
be neglected. The same holds good for theatre. Dyed-in-the-wool convention leads to
boredom, excessive avant-garde daunts as entirely incomprehensible. However, one
must not forget external factors which influence our attitude. As a theatrical perform-
ance is conventionally taken as a meaningful event (this is a view that semiotics holds),
a greater degree of tolerance toward any instances of unconventional adornment of
theatrical images is required. There are limits to this tolerance, though, and they are
context-dependent. For instance, acclaimed artists who can be trusted as to the signifi-
cance of what they have to say can take the liberty to be more innovative. In turn, when
a critic is working on a review of a play, their attitude has to be more open and inquisi-
tive, to justify their point of view.
There is more to ostension, though, than its communicative function, making the re-
cipient take the trouble to interpret stage events. Acts of ostension also shape meaning
by selecting only those elements of the mise en scène that would help set up a hierar-
chy of signs necessary to comprehend a performance. Assigning meaning to each stage
element runs counter to the idea of the cognitive process. It does not lead to a holistic
interpretation of the work of art; moreover, it is not feasible, as selecting elements and
assigning meanings is practically inexhaustible. Drama can to a certain extent be
guided by specific for it discourse codes, whereby the protagonist or the plot’s key
elements can be pinpointed. However, if a drama is staged with a view to merely pre-
senting its storyline on stage, then the cast should have a range of theatrical strategies
to manipulate information selection that is part of performance reception.
The most foolproof way to achieve this is to establish a code which would arbitrar-
ily draw the audience’s attention to relevant elements of the stage image. In antiquity it
was the actor’s attire that distinguished him from the surrounding. Such codes, though,
tend to be too static as compared with the dynamic development of the plot. Therefore
in certain historical periods theatre used highly conventional methods of acting
whereby fixed gestures and choreography steered the audience’s attention. Contempo-
rary theatre, even though it occasionally refers to traditions of the past, dismisses the
static code as fossilized, as it prevents any development in the form. The development
of stage space does not proceed so radically. Despite the theatrical revolution of the
XX century and significant changes to the idea of the stage, viewers still associate
theatre primarily with the stage standing apart from the audience and the curtain which
marks particular junctures of the play.
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The curtain as theatre’s main attribute was interestingly analyzed in Małgorzata Su-
giera’s paper on Jerzy Grzegorzewski’s staging of Dziesięć portretów z czajką w tle
(Chechov based). The curtain first rises at the beginning, showing
“fuzzy contours of objects, the characters of Nina, Konstanty, Miedwiedenko, but above all
Masza clad in a black dress under which she conceals her true feelings. The next scene shows
Konstanty, lonely and trapped in time, reflecting the emotional state of all the characters. A gray
curtain then unfolds, revealing another one – red and draped. When Masza talks to Dorn and dis-
closes her feelings toward Konstanty, the red curtain is slowly drawn back. The audience cannot
see the background, though, as behind the red curtain there is white framed canvas. Nina, naked
from the waist up, kneels in front of it. […] She then says to Trigorin: »I spent my entire life at
that lake and I know every single islet here«; this sounds as the beginning of the story we all make
up, scene by scene, until finally it becomes like life. The story of the girl-bird is eventually com-
pleted by Trigorin. […] When he tells the story, Nina slides the canvas off the stage. With the
canvas gone, another curtain appears, this time in the form of a white two-winged door in the rear
wall of the stage. It is at that door that Irina knocks in despair during Konstanty’s suicidal attempt.
It is also there that she acts out her main »scene«, trying to prove to Trigorin how helpless he has
been since she discovered his secret. The door never opens, not for anybody, although the niche
backstage clearly suggests that there must be something on the other side” (Sugiera 1993: 117).
For Sugiera, Grzegorzewski’s multiple curtains are metaphorical, in that they “go
deeper and deeper into the essence of everyday »theatre« of character, revealing how
their double identities work” (ibidem: 118). The above-mentioned analysis clearly
shows how the subsequent unfolding of curtains draw the audience’s attention to rele-
vant facets of actions and utterances linking them to form a meaningful whole (Sugiera
1993: 117).
The opening up of the curtain with a view to focusing attention in a temporal and
spatial frame can be found in a variety of theatrical traditions. However, there are few
other performance elements that are so closely connected to theatre code. It is therefore
hard to call theatre a catalogue of tricks. Thus watching a play is like observing the
surrounding reality, but the observer lacks pragmatic context, therefore there is no
purpose in his interpretative actions and, consequently, no reactions. A driver who
wants to avoid a road accident seeks information about traffic regulations. The audi-
ence are normally not at risk; even if actors have some provocation in store for them,
such as dousing them or pouring flour on them, they can hardly help it. Why then
would one want to involve oneself in the events that are being shown or attempt to
comprehend them sitting in a comfortable armchair (which political theatre advocates
so often condemn)? By saying merely that it is part of the agreement which we have
already discussed that gets the viewer to focus attention we make the recipient take the
entire responsibility for the meaning of the performance, which by extension leaves out
the issue of the art of acting. However, a good performance can gain even in the eyes
of the most hard-headed skeptics, whereas incompetent acting can put off even the
most faithful advocates. The art of “persuasion” is based, among others, on the ability
to captivate attention, sometimes merely to gather any the audience that come. Street
performers know it very well, so they start their work with a selection of rhetorical
tricks to attract attention; when a group of bystanders have already congregated they
“warm them up” by practicing “spontaneous reactions”. Professional non-theatrical
troupes act accordingly. Eugenio Barba describes how his group Odin prepare for their
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performances by strutting around on stilts with colorful pennants attached to them,
blowing whistles and playing drums.
It is not always so that one can resort to such aggressive solutions, though. In drama
whistling and getting the audience to applaud or shout is hardly used except in comedy,
and even there it is not common. Therefore to focus the audience’s attention on the plot
the cast have to deploy much subtler techniques. Roberta Carrieri, a member of Odin,
brings up this issue presenting a video recording of a workshop where her gestures
make the audience focus.
Peter Brook’s experiments also demonstrate how attracting attention to stage events
forms an intrinsic part of acting. In his accounts of the trip to Africa incomprehension,
a result of natives’ lack of interest in what the visiting troupe have to show, is a recur-
ring issue. It stemmed not from incompetence at acting, though, but from unfamiliarity
with the target culture. For the art  of  focusing the audience’s at tention is
mostly about  s tr iking a viable balance between the eff iciency of
a message and i ts  appropriacy in a given si tuat ional  context .
The need to restrain hard-line methods of influencing theatrical audience stems not
only from the general principle of drawing the line somewhere, but also from fitting
our actions to the framework of rules and regulations that hold in the world on stage.
Solutions that are unwarrantable or otherwise depart from the core of the play tend to
be regarded as erroneous. A play that is aesthetically based on visual effects should
avoid unwarrantable reliance on sharp sounds or means of verbal expression. What
then does “unwarrantable” mean in this context? It is normally for the critic to decide.
Theoretically speaking, one can only say that any act of ostension should have some
rationale within the framework of the rules that govern the world on stage or its pres-
entation.
As the issue is best exemplified by showing an imaginary world against dramatic
narration, let us look at acts of ostension and their mutual compatibility in Konrad
Swinarski’s staging of Forefathers’ Eve, a fairly traditional version in this respect. One
of the director’s main concerns is how to account for the presence of spirits that appear
during the rites that the local folk perform. As theatre is not endowed with such effi-
cient means of conveying illusion as film is, a viable solution is to do away with the
spirits, so only their voices can be heard from a distance, or to assume that theatre is
arbitrary per se. Contemporary theatre barely tolerates presenting immaterial characters
in an illusory way. As far as ostension is concerned, the issue narrows down to how
spirits are shown on stage (or, more precisely, how their presence is made known to the
audience). Conventional signals, such as the wind howling or a door squeaking, can be
dismissed as too naïve for a reputable mise en scène; furthermore, they make the per-
formance tediously repetitive. In Forefathers’ Eve the ghosts appear at short intervals,
so Swinarski deploys different techniques each time their presence is signaled. Prior to
the appearance of doves that symbolize the ghosts of children, the team look around
anxiously in wait for the first spirit. When the spotlight illuminates the doves perched
on a ledge, the team look in their direction and point at them. The ghost of the evil
master, on the other hand, announces his arrival by a loud knock at the door, thus
scaring the team. Finally, Zosia, blown in by the wind, occupies a focal place on the
stage – the altar.
Even second-grade directors know that the audience find repetitive images boring.
Swinarski achieved excellence in that all of the many ploys used to direct the audi-
35
ence’s attention have been amply justified in the sphere of the play’s ideology. The
doves are brought to light quite literally (the spotlight), but also by the team’s ostensive
behavior. They cannot take any actions, nor express their needs; they are like toddlers,
dependent on their parents’ thoughtfulness (Swinarski made the children’s souls
dumb). In turn, the ghost of the evil master knows perfectly well what he wants. The
problem is that the team fear and hate him at the same time, just as they did when he
was alive. A beggar cannot thud on the window or scare people away with fiery flames.
But it is in the nature of this spirit to be unsympathetic and vehement, and that is what
makes him condemned forever. Zosia also manages to find a place for herself. Mindful
of her unfulfilled love, the girl desecrates the altar, pretending to be making love as she
delivers her monologue. Paradoxical as it may seem, though, it is not impurity that
makes her suffer, but purity. The finest girl in town, Zosia was too proud to lower her-
self to try bodily pleasures and ‘touch the ground’ even once. Thus, what the rite mas-
ter says on her arrival (“Is it indeed Our Lady’s vision, or an angel come down”) is to
be understood as accusation, condemnation of a young woman guilty of making herself
superior to other mortals. The fact that Zosia is placed on the altar is a discrepancy
between her need to experience the “pleasures of life on Earth” and the sanctity of the
place; it serves to illustrate the secret of love, purity and its violation, which some peo-
ple find it hard to come to terms with.
The art of putting plays on stage is inextricably linked with the skill to combine
staging ploys with the logic of the world shown on stage. In daily life we are forced to
learn to achieve the goals we set ourselves without excessively stretching social rules;
likewise, in theatre the use of ploys enhancing the visual effect or the meaning of
a scene is restricted by the regulations of dramatic narration. Similarly the type of rep-
resentation should be justified if it falls outside current standards. Marta Fik recalls that
“before Swinarski’s staging, all other versions of Forefathers’ Eve (in particular Part
Two) were merely theatrical »illustrations« of the play with some suspense-creating
effects. […] Any other, more »detailed« or »specific« instructions as to how to present
the rite, were taken arbitrarily. […] By reconstructing the rite, Swinarski gave it its
own clarity and authenticity” (Fik 1999: 196–197) Why then did the audience not
frown at having to »go against their conventions«, so to speak? After all, Swinarski’s
mise en scène was hailed as a major achievement in the history of the Polish stage. The
reason is primarily the coherent and consistently realized principle of rooting charac-
ters’ actions and experiences in their sensual and bodily perceptions as well as signifi-
cant matters of the real world. In Great Improvisation Konrad falls down »defeated by
his body’s weakness, as if by epilepsy«. Lucifer, who acts as master of ceremony at the
ball (starring Jerzy Stuhr in both roles), gets involved in an actual political dispute
between Polish patriots and the senator’s court – thus his actions acquire an equally
realistic dimension. Thus all the actions gravitate toward real world issues. Fik is right
in stressing that “Forefathers’ Eve have never been interpretable in a mystic fashion”
(ibidem: 196).
This is actually what Swinarski used to the benefit of his play, not necessarily in the
sense that he speaks of things that the audience feel close to. Mysticism and transcen-
dence need not be dehumanized, but as spirits assumed human form, Swinarski man-
aged to create unforgettable characters, free from the stereotypical metaphysics of the
romantic hero or the stigma of the naive, local-festival-style presentation of the ghost.
It is none other than the ghosts arriving at the scene of the rite at the beginning of the
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play who attract the audience’s attention to real life issues. Doves are not too far from
the conventional way of showing spirits, but the use of live birds goes somewhat be-
yond the conventional theatre arbitrariness. The dummy that acts as the evil master is
in the course of the play replaced by an actor, who can show the ghoul’s suffering on
stage. Finally, there is Zosia, with her faltering voice, trembling, hysterical, eager to
experience real love. These are no longer one-dimensional characters like the ones
traditional Polish ‘spirit shows’ used to portray. Neither are they merely voices from
behind the stage. They are genuine ghosts, as shown by Mickiewicz in his work. Their
words are folk wisdom rather than religious preaching, in line with eastern, beliefs,
referring more often to natural laws than to the metaphysics and mysticism of the west-
ern world. Thus the presence of “living spirits” in Swinarski’s staging is entirely justi-
fiable; thanks to it, the characters have access to more means of artistic expression. As
a consequence, the mise en scène is free from the monotony of typical markers of the
supernatural, and the director can take the liberty to utilize staging ploys based on the
major issues of human existence that the spirits portray.
The requirement to fit ostensive behavior within the framework of the rule-
governed world of the play and its conventionalized stage representation becomes part
of the most popular form of western world drama, where the central issue is the plot
made up of fictional events which the actors show on stage. The events give rise to
interpretative conclusions that the audience can draw, form a point of reference to ar-
tistic activity, and help attach greater or lesser importance to a given play. Zbigniew
Raszewski very aptly points out that “the only reason why a portraying world should
exist is to produce the portrayed one” (Raszewski op.cit.: 124). However, in our culture
there are also other forms of theatrical expression that give other objectives priority
over representation; these objectives include exploring the phenomenon of performing
or “pondering over the essence of performance and the process of creating additional
meaning” (Pavis 1998: 180). In turn, in political theatre actions are prompted not so
much by the telling of a story, but the ability to change social awareness in a specific
way. Thus the pragmatic rationale behind political theatre delineates staging techniques
that accord with the rules of rhetoric and the reality behind the scenes to a much greater
degree than theatre of fiction. In Meyerhold’s ground-breaking Jutrznie upon entering
the theatre the audience were greeted by agitating slogans painted on the walls; moreo-
ver, the show included reports on actual events of the Russian revolution. It has been
standard practice in theatre through centuries to draw on elements of reality when cre-
ating a world of fiction, but Meyerhold in fact strove for the opposite, for fact to annex
fiction. His audience were so accustomed to it that when “Red Army militants came on
stage on one occasion and the performance turned into a genuine rally” (Braun 1984:
224), it came to them as no surprise whatsoever. Meyerhold’s plays were part of the
reality of the revolution, not a separate world of fiction insulated against audience in-
tervention, which would merely show reality on stage.
The rhetoric of political theatre makes directors specify a suitable pragmatic con-
text. In theatre of illusion context becomes a marginal issue or varies depending on
critical interpretation (which can make a performance even more valuable). In political
theatre, if performances were open to multiple interpretations, it would run counter to
the very rationale behind this form of art. Let us go back to the example of the drunk-
ard poised on a platform in the middle of town. As we have already learned, the mes-
sage this act attempts to convey will be subject to many interpretations, depending on
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who passers-by think may have instigated the happening. The Salvation Army’s inten-
tion to debase the detrimental effect of abusive drinking will go to waste if most of the
passers-by decide that the drunk has been put on the platform by a revolutionary
movement; in this case, rather than a symbol of dissipation the drunk will become
a picture showing the consequences of the government’s ineffective social policy.
Given that, the instigators have to suggest to the audience who is behind the happening.
It does not seem to be a difficult task. The drunkard might even be wearing a t-shirt
with the appropriate logo, but audiences do not always accept going against the rules
shown in theatre of illusion, or making the intended objective overtly explicit, or mak-
ing the author of a didactic-political utterance known to the general public. We do not
like being preached. That is why the Salvation Army ought to opt for more subtle tech-
niques, thus showing that they are acquainted with the art of influencing personal
opinions. Arguably, a passer-by should not identify the instigators offhand, as he can
grasp the message before he has seen the drunk “perform”, since the Salvation Army
promotes universally recognizable values. Then the actor who plays the drunk should
also exhibit some talent, as he will have to try to highlight the desired facets of drunk-
enness. The character should ideally arouse sympathy or disgust, but not at the mishap
that he was unfortunate to experience, but the one he himself asked for. It is certainly
a tall order, but at the same time part of the art of acting – not so much to be the spit-
ting image of the person one appears as, but to underline certain aspects of their char-
acter. If the actor imitates a drunk he is more likely to provoke laughter than reflection.
A theatrical performer ought to be able to influence the selection of incoming in-
formation among viewers, as it constitutes a powerful tool for manipulating imagina-
tion. Otherwise actors are guided by pure luck, which makes them amateur. Most ac-
tors and directors follow their intuition and experience plus a flair for theatre. How-
ever, there are after all rules subject to rational explanation.
Ostran iene
On the basis of what has been said so far, it is fairly easy to infer that ostension is most
often equated with a dramatic procedure known as ostraniene. This Russian term often
appears in works by both theatre scholars and practitioners. Its source is the Russian
formalist school, which had a major influence on the development of literary criticism,
and also on the discussions on the art of the twentieth century. One can assume that the
success of the term was also partly due to the high profile of early XX century Russian
theatre, which coincided with the beginnings of the formalist school. Stanislawski and
Meyerhold are arguably the most quoted authors in literature treating of dramatic art.
Also some contemporary playwrights and directors employ directly the formalists’
ideas. To take an example, Eugenio Barba – a key originator of the second theatrical
revolution and the creator of “the third theater” – refers in his book to Viktor Shklov-
sky, a representative of the Russian formalist school. Shklovski spoke of ostraniene “as
                                                       
 The most felicitous English translation of the term seems to be that suggested by Benjamin Sher, who
in the translator’s introduction to Shklovsky’s “theory of Prose” uses the term “enstrangement”.
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a process or act that endows an object or image with “strangeness” by “removing” it
from the network of conventional, formulaic, stereotypical perceptions and linguistic
expressions based on such perceptions” (Shklovsky 1991: XIX).
However inspirational they may be, the formalists’ ideas cannot be applied directly
in the theatrical reality. Describing the development of the historical-literary process
subjected to predominantly the inherent laws of automatization and disautomatization,
they focus on style and composition. Disautomatization consists in most of all trans-
gressing the norms of style and the conventionalized arrangement of elements of the
reality shown. In contemporary theatre it is difficult to speak of a system of stylistic
norms that would be recognizable enough to the audience to result in serious interpre-
tative consequences in case they were broken. In turn, the conventionalization of the
rules of the reality shown is connected with the composition of the plot rather than the
rules for presenting dramatic heroes and objects.
There are of course some common theatrical conventions, which were discussed
earlier in this work. When actors overstep the boundaries of the stage, invading the
area reserved for the viewers, the audience normally treat such actions as relevant and
try to interpret them. The same is true when a play is performed in the foyer – as was
the case with the Forefathers’ Eve rites in Swinarski’s performance – or when the audi-
ence has been made to sit in the wings (as in Andrzej Wajda’s Hamlet IV), and is thus
able to watch the play “from the inside”. It is however decidedly more often that the
understanding of a dramatic event is based on the knowledge acquired through experi-
ence that is not linked with the knowledge of theatrical codes. It is in such a context
that Burns (1972: 315) has made a distinction between two types of conventions:
 rhetorical: “The means by which the audience is persuaded to accept characters
and situations whose validity is ephemeral and bound to the theatre” (ibidem:
31),
 authenticating: the conventions providing with relevance the rhetorical effort of
dramatic art, owing to their origin in everyday, extratheatrical experience of the
recipient.
The latter group of conventions are those which “prevail for the interaction of the
actors as characters in the play. [They are t]he »model« social conventions in use at
a specific time and in a specific place or milieu. The modes of speech, demeanor and
action that are explicit in the play have to carry conviction and imply a connection with
the world of human action of which the theatre is only a part. These conventions sug-
gest a total and external code of values and norms of conduct from which the speech
and action of the play are drawn” (ibidem: 32). It should be added that a model of ex-
tratheatrical behavior has to allow for deviations from the norm as equally important
instances of behavior. Walaszek (1991: 207) in her description of the entrance made by
another character of Swinarski’s Forefathers’ Eve, Senator, stresses his hauteur and
loftiness and directs the reader’s attention to the behavior of Senator’s henchmen, who
enter the stage walking backwards (because they have to face him) and then sit down
gingerly on the edge of the chairs instead of assuming a more comfortable position.
Such unusual behavior of the characters is therefore explained by the henchmen’s awe-
inspired attitude to Senator.
Although examples of such singular behavior are not uncommon in everyday life,
for other forms of dramatic activity a simple analogy with the gestures and behavior
characteristic of normal human activity sometimes does not suffice. In one of the first
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scenes of Grzegorzewski’s The Slow Darkening of Paintings, the main hero, Consul,
approaches the proscenium calling out the nonsense words, “Coriolanus, he is dead!
Nothing! Nothing!” and then makes a series of movements, which could not be ex-
plained even in the context of the most extravagant of behaviors. The bizarre ballet,
full of superhuman struggle against gravitation and the character’s own body cannot be
put down to intoxication. His gestures and poses are too artificial to pass for the ran-
dom and unsynchronized movements of a drunk person. In the real world Consul’s
actions could be at best interpreted as indicative of a mental illness or as a pointless
provocation. The nature of theatre, however, permits some exaggeration, which re-
quires an interpretative effort leading to an explanation going beyond the singularity
and abnormality of a given scene. For Ewa Bulhak, Marek Walczewski’s acting in
Grzegorzewski’s play is a hyperbole allowing the recipient to see how a body living its
own life assumes inhuman forms (Bułhak 1985: 74). The use of hyperbole can be justi-
fied by, inter alia, the fact that an actor staggering in the “usual” way would probably
not convince the recipient to ascribe supernatural features to Consul, whose story is not
a psychological drama but a tragic parable of human fate. Also Sugiera (1995: 161)
sees The Slow Darkening of Paintings as a play full of pathos, though in her interpreta-
tion Consul’s torment turns out to be a purposeless illusion and delusory tragedy that
nobody needs. Committed to imaginary tragedies and resolute in his uncommunica-
tiveness, the main hero becomes grotesque, thus revealing the falseness of his role.
Both these interpretations go beyond the set of conclusions that can be drawn through
analogy with people’s unusual behavior that we witness in everyday life. It is so be-
cause the amplification of the character’s stubborn uncommunicativeness or lack of
control over his own body goes beyond the boundaries of authenticating conventions,
preferring the rhetorical figure of hyperbole instead.
One should not limit authenticating conventions – also in the shape of their nega-
tion, which consists in a meaning-inducing modification – to models of social behavior
acquired through everyday experience. The recipients come to the theatre equipped
with much more ideas about the world, which are the result of the appreciation of art
and knowledge gained from books and other sources of information. The difference
between authenticating and rhetorical conventions does not lie in the nature of the
source where they comes from, but in their function. Authenticating conventions are
part of the reality, whose authenticity or rather probability is not questioned by the
audience. Since however we do not have access to many spheres of life, our convic-
tions are shaped on the basis of messages of often fictitious or artistic nature. Also art
itself is largely a territory described by people in terms of truth and probability. An
unwavering Hamlet will always seem as unreal as the departure to Moscow of the three
sisters from Chekov’s drama. Thanks to such a way of thinking it becomes possible to
apply dramatic devices which, by modifying the motives and artistic images of com-
mon consciousness, lead to the effect of ostraniene. In Tadeusz Kantor’s May Artists
Perish there was a barricade on the stage resembling that from Delacroix’s painting. It
was not Liberty, however, that was leading the group of revolutionaries, but Cabaret
Hooker. The audience’s expectations, derived from the knowledge of painting, were
undermined and called for an explanation of the unexpected situation.
The explanation of an unexpected situation on the stage does not always have to
consist in ascribing it a meaning within the rules of the reality shown. One must not
forget that Burns distinguishes between two coexisting types of conventions; the inter-
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pretation of a play is also affected by rhetorical conventions, which set the rules for
creating the reality shown in both the common dimension (some general theatrical and
dramatic codes) and individually (idiolectally). Entering the stage backwards does not
always define the character or his/her attitude towards others. During a rehearsal before
Grzegorzewski’s The Screens, the director asked one of the actresses to appear on the
stage walking backwards (ibidem: 69) and did so not to accentuate a meaning associ-
ated with the mode of walking, but in order to make it easier for her to act out a part of
her role: Grzegorzewski’s intention was to protect the actress from resorting to con-
ventional ways of manifesting despair. It remains obvious that the audience could treat
the manner of entering the stage as meaningful – that is however exactly where the role
of rhetorical codes as an idiolect defining the rules of the director’s artistic transfer
manifests itself. Multiple contact with Grzegorzewski’s stage productions makes it
clear that actors’ movement in his performances should be treated more functionally
than in mimetic theatre. The rhetorical code works because it suspends the conclusions
imposing themselves on the basis of some of the authenticating codes. What seemed to
be ostraniene, in connection with the idea of the world contained in our consciousness,
becomes a rule for creating a fictitious reality or performing persuasive acts. The thea-
tergoer should learn how to recognize those rules, or otherwise he/she will end up as-
cribing a special meaning to even simple rules of the presentation modes characteristic
of particular theatrical conventions. For example, the rules telling the actors to face the
audience when speaking cannot be treated as an important feature of the hero’s behav-
ior.
Repet i t iveness and memory
New styles or conventions grow primarily out of repeated practice; consequently, tech-
niques that used to be considered shocking lose their ability to create cognitive dis-
tance. As a result, the recipient’s interpretative actions are substituted for by automati-
cally associating certain events and actions with unequivocal meaning. In time, the
audience get used to characters in Grzegorzewski’s plays entering the stage backwards
and see nothing particularly significant in the way they move. On the other hand, repe-
tition can lead to reverse effects highlighting an element, thereby becoming an act of
ostension. To comprehend what seems to be a discrepancy between the two effects of
repetition one must bear in mind that no action or image per se constitute an act of
enstrangement, but manifest themselves contextually. A character’s action is regarded
as extraordinary when put in the context of our understanding of what is typical in
a given situation. By repeated exposure to an action the audience can get used to its
peculiarity. On the other hand, the frequency of repetition itself may strike one as pe-
culiar. Thus enstrangement can refer to various aspects of our mental representation,
which should be brought to light in the analysis of an act of cognition.
In order to thoroughly characterize the dimensions of mental representation we
would have to provide the readers with an exhaustive report on the findings of Lan-
gacker, Lakoff and other cognitivists that deal with cognitive structures. An overview
of some is made elsewhere in the thesis, others have been left out as less relevant to the
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theory of theatre (at least when we take into account the current state of cognitive
studies on the reception of a theatrical performance). Let us therefore limit ourselves to
treating enstrangement as a heuristic phenomenon and giving a few examples to help
understand repetition in the context of enstrangement.
To start with, enstrangement in theatre more often than not refers to what Goffman
terms wrongfully assumed personal façade (Goffman 1981). This means either an ac-
tion that is in contrast to our character, or a character placed in the wrong context, or
finally a character that lacks a significant attribute. The first case is best exemplified by
how European directors react to Japanese performances, where female characters are
played by male actors. It is particularly interesting to analyze the barely noticeable
difference which is due to the motor differences between the two sexes and which
makes the men appear slightly odd despite the actors being perfectly competent at what
they do. Sometimes a character representing the world of fiction is put in the wrong
context. King Richard the Third in Witkiewicz’s Nowe Wyzwolenie is in sharp contrast
to the surrounding, where he is placed, to quote from Konstanty Puzyna, “instead of the
helpless Konrad from Forefathers’ Eve, whereas right beside him, on a sofa, there is
a group of characters chatting over a cuppa. There are no masks, but plain murderers
brandishing daggers, and in lieu of Erinys six thugs barge in” (Puzyna 1985: 10). The
grotesque nightmare is therefore a result of the striking incongruity of characters, ob-
jects and events.
Finally, a most spectacular example of a character lacking attributes. Richard II
wears no regalia when he is about to abdicate. Noblemen follow him and carry his
symbols of power, but as he has no royal coat he is now actually powerless. After the
ceremony his crown, too, is snatched away from him. Richard looks into the mirror and
throws it to the ground. This gesture runs counter to the previous one. A king wearing
no royal attire and no crown should change his identity, as he is no king any longer.
But the mirror reflects Richard’s old face (Kott 1991: 16, 55). His image of kingship
(and ours, in a sense) is ruined.
When the concept of enstrangement is placed within the framework of Goffman’s
theory, it turns out that the concept is well exemplified by the incongruity between the
particular elements of personal façade. A character looking like a woman but moving
a little like a man, a king among a company at tea, or rid of the insignia of his power.
In real life situations such inconsistencies are merely instances of violating a norm, but
in theatre their significance should not be questioned.
Although the examples discussed show a typical way of understanding the nature of
ostraniene, this rule functions also in the case of frequently repeating the same element
of the performance. The technique of repetition works only when it seems unusually
recurrent, thus questioning the statistically justified frequency of the repetitions.
Walking the stage, the actor makes thousands of the same steps and yet nobody consid-
ers that to be a meaningful repetition. On the other hand, the appearance of a dead lap-
wing three times in Chekov’s drama forms the basis for its numerous interpretations.
Still another issue is that of repetition as a contribution to the preparation of the audi-
ence for a shocking scene or action. We get accustomed to Macbeth’s murders as the
plot unfolds and it is the murder of the king that seems to be the one to disturb the
audience the most. In Scene 6 of the first act there is an example of tragic irony, the
only one in the play. “This castle hath a pleasant seat; the air Nimbly and sweetly rec-
42
ommends itself Unto our gentle senses” (Shakespeare 1999: 39), says Duncan after
Macbeth’s arrival at the castle, while the hosts have already decided on a murder.
The interrelations between repetition and ostraniene are an important mechanism of
a theatrical performance. One of the most telling examples is provided in Pleśniaro-
wicz’s (1994: 45) analysis of Kantor’s The Dead Class. The first scene of the perform-
ance shows pupils sitting at four old-fashioned desks. They are not, however,
“schoolboys preserved in eternal memory but real or made-up old people, who some-
times exchange the bookbags they wear on their backs for mannequins of their own
childhood. Their faces are pale as corpses, their hair threaded with white, and some of
them are wearing old-fashioned bowler hats. The school uniforms of the child-
mannequins that accompany the dead pupils contrast with the cheap “funeral suits” of
the pupils themselves, which are less appropriate for the classroom than for a mass
burial” (1994: 75, transl. by W. Brand). The whole picture is in stark contrast with the
common perception of a classroom, calling for explanations. According to Pleśniaro-
wicz, Kantor’s stage design proves the impossibility of reviving childhood memories.
“A photographic plate developed in the memory can only be brought to life in the
Theater of Death” – hence the old men’s funeral clothes and mannequins, which
“rather than »playing« the dead, […] »replace« them in a special way and participate in
the metonymic relation of shifts from dead to doll  to actor  as intermediaries”
(1994: 76, transl. by W. Brand). In Kantor’s performance there are much more ele-
ments going against the conventional idea of the world. With time they become famil-
iar and ordinary, owing to frequent repetition of the same images and actions. Pleśnia-
rowicz provides an apt and precise ordering classification of the play, dividing it into
six recurrent “photographs” and six sequences.
Photographs:
K1 – The photograph of the dead class.
K2 – The parade of the pupils around the benches.
K3 – The successive lessons centered around thematic slogans.
K4 – The school transformed into a heder.
K5 – The Grand Toasts.
K6 – The auditory photograph.
Sequences:
S1 – The games played by the Cleaning Woman.
S2 – The family machine along with the mechanical cradle.
S3 – The Secret Official Executioner in the WC.
S4 – Collusions with the void.
S5 – The simultaneous orgy and the colonial robinsonial.
S6 – The woman with a mechanical cradle beside the cradle-coffin and a pile of
rubbish sings a Jewish lullaby.
Pleśniarowicz then goes on to distinguish significant arrangements of photographs
and sequences which show the impossibility of reviving past events. For considerations
about the function of repetition particularly important is the very fact of the establish-
ment of clear-cut performance units. Thanks to the successive repetitions, what seemed
difficult to explain turns into recognizable units, which make up the language of The
Dead Class. However, if the language is to impact upon the recipient, it cannot remain
static. One of the basic factors starting and stimulating the recipient’s cognitive activity
is the interference with the recipient’s idea of the world existing in his/her mind. That
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is why Kantor introduces some variability to the successive repetitions of particular
photographs: “[e]arlier images like that of the Grand Toast can be filed in, but in the
form of posing for a Historical Daguerreotype. There can be a return to the benches for
the next “lesson”, but with white handkerchiefs tied across the pupils’ eyes (The Cere-
monial Funeral). Or again, in reverse, certain elements may be subtracted from a re-
evoked situation: the run around the benches but without the mannequins of childhood,
the voices alone from the Historical Hallucinations, without the actors. Also transfor-
mations appear frequently: dolls in the benches instead of the actors, the heder replaced
by the Jewish lullaby” (ibidem: 69, transl. by W. Brand). The creative capabilities of
the language of theatre are thus defined by the process of setting, and at the same time
questioning, a code, which I why a particular artist’s idiolect or a given artistic trend
appeal to the audience.
The variability of the repetitions finishes the cycle of the performative procedures
connected with the process of disturbing the recipients’ idea of the world, as well as
closes the stage of their assimilation. With time, the intriguingly odd scenes of The
Dead Class get assimilated and begin to make up the image of the world shown on the
stage. At the same time, particular meaningful units create the possibility of their fur-
ther modification, and thus of more instances of ostraniene, which appear as elements
of the afore-mentioned variability. Pleśniarowicz’s analysis documents one of Lot-
man’s basic postulates: every performance should work out its own code. A key pre-
requisite for this process are acts of ostension embedded in repetition. In The Dead
Class they bring about a certain aesthetic aura, which makes it possible to order the
performance according to Pleśniarowicz’s semantic rhythms: reviving – dying, focus-
ing – dispersing, validating – canceling etc.
Not every theatrical performance provides examples of such explicit semantic
rhythms, emerging thanks to easily discernible similarities between particular scenes.
In every performance nevertheless the categories of rhythm and similarity constitute
a basic aspect of ostension acts. The semantic meaning of rhythm is most often ana-
lyzed in connection with the text of the play. So understood, the rhythm decides about
the arrangement of dialogues, configuration of conflicts and the semantic hierarchy of
scenes, as well as controls the tempo of replies – it thus manages the dramatic appeal of
the performance (see Pavis 1998: 442). By highlighting the turning points, the rhythm
is also important for the composition of the play. As for the semantic function of the
scene hierarchy defined by rhythm, so far no definitive conclusions have been drawn
by theatre scholars, who limit themselves to most of all working out hierarchies of the
rhythms in a particular play and describing their role in the creation of the relationships
between different systems of stage signs (ibidem: 440–444).
Still, in the context of the semantic function of ostension discussed here, the rhythm
of a theatrical performance constitutes a key meaning-inducing factor. Particular se-
mantic elements get the audience’s attention, whereas their appropriate arrangement
(hierarchy) can decide about the suspense and tension of the turning points.
The connection of rhythmic arrangements with the interpretation intended by the di-
rector can be observed in Niziolek’s (op.cit.: 72) analysis of Gombrowicz’s Wedding as
staged by Krystian Lupa. Niziolek points out that, introducing a new arrangement of
semantic elements, the composition of the performance makes it possible to highlight
some motifs and disregard others. According to Niziolek, “Lupa in some way destroys
the composition of The Wedding. He is not interested in the dramatic functioning of
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sleep or the mechanism of associations in dreams, but in the intense experience of
one’s own self that borders on hallucination” (ibidem). One of the culminations of such
an experience was the moment when the “great sorcerer” appeared through Henryk, the
main hero’s actions. “He is circling Wladzio, who is imprisoned in the center of a cir-
cle drawn on the floor. The dialogue has been written into the rhythm of the repeated
»laps« and Henryk’s intensifying trance” (ibidem). The great sorcerer himself is not
among the dramatis personae of the play, but the intensification of the rhythm, which
is at the core of the third act, invalidates the other meanings of the drama, focusing the
recipient’s attention on the issue of experiencing one’s own self, an issue of interest to
the director. Rhythm as the creator of emotional tension thus does not have to consti-
tute negation of the intellect in theater. Similarly, it does not have to be based on the
rhythms of “extradramatic systems”. The scene described is about a ritual activity of
characters that involves movement and speech, i.e. elements characteristic predomi-
nantly of the theater rather than other art forms.
The second of the categories allowing one to notice the repetitiveness of scenes,
that of similarity, in principle requires an analysis only at the conceptual level. A pre-
cise definition of the nature of similarity, i.e. the explanation of how it is different from
the category of analogy, needs to be based on a characterization of relevant features of
the process of conceptualization. In the context of ostension, memory remains the only
element of the cognitive process that gets evoked by comparing particular moments of
a performance. Any comparison of remote fragments of the plot or references to earlier
scenes are only possible on the condition that an earlier situation or image that are
being referred to have stuck in the recipient’s memory powerfully enough to be
evoked. Let us examine the similarity between two scenes from Swiarski’s Forefa-
thers’ Eve, which are pointed out by Walaszek, who justifies the comparison of the
Senator’s dream with Konrad’s prophetic vision by noting an analogy between the two
characters’ movements. Pursuing imaginary fame and authority, both the Senator and
Konrad negotiate the same inclined plane of the platform to raeach its central point,
where, disillusioned, they fall to the ground. However, was Konrad’s and Senator’s
route conspicuous for other recipients? Conversations with students who watched the
performance on tape show that, although they did not notice the analogy, they accepted
it as well-founded after reading Walaszek’s interpretation. The students’ reaction sug-
gests a basic difference between accepting the meanings potentially present in a per-
formance and actually noticing them during the performance, which decides about the
authentic experience of an encounter with the play, i.e. an aesthetic experience. In the
same vein, it has to be emphasised that although as a result of persuasion the audience
may begin to notice an analogy between two scenes, it need not be convincing. This is
so because the performance itself may not provide strong enough signals that would
make it possible to link both fragments. That is one of the reasons why an intriguing
interpretation presented by theater critics does not always contribute to the success of
a performance. The value of watching the events presented on stage is based on emo-
tional and intellectual impressions, which stem from the perception of those events.
That is why the director of a play has to make sure that the meaningful juxtapositions
of chosen fragments are the result of predominantly performative actions. The similar-
ity itself of remote scenes is most often not enough. The director thus can choose some
additional solutions. Firstly, he/she can reinforce the effect of the first of the scenes so
that it gets remembered by the audience. Conversely, an obvious reference to the ear-
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lier scene is an option. The theater, which normally does not have a narrator bringing
back the previous events in the commentary, uses a distinctive sign selected from
among all the elements of the scene presented, or, alternatively, a recurring musical
theme. The use of a conventionalized symbol, which only constitutes part of an event
shown earlier, is often more effective in evoking an earlier, similar moment of the play
than the aggregate similarity of both moments. Another advantage of only using
a fragment of the whole for building up similarity is the possibility of introducing vari-
ability to the recurring images, as noted in Plesniarowicz’s analysis of The Dead Class.
Despite the fact the successive “pupil parades”, each time shown differently, are easily
classifiable under the same manner of activity, Kantor complements them with the
recurring theme of the waltz François. In doing so, he assures the audience that the
parades and sudden chases of the old men are still the same ritual of “the funeral of
dead childhood” (Plesniarowicz op.cit.). A theater director thus has to allow for the
recipient’s cognitive capabilities, his/her memory capacity in this case. As for the solu-
tion the director chooses to achieve the intended effect has to go wel with the logic of
the performance, since it would be difficult to determine all similarities and analogies
by means of only a sentimental waltz.
The special status of ostraniene as a type of ostension is linked to directors’ con-
viction that it constitutes a key meaning-inducing activity. According to Ida Kurcz
(1995: 135), the development of cognitive abilities results from the unbalancing of the
cognitive system. Still more interesting in the context of some practitioners’ considera-
tions about activating the audience seem to be Kozielecki’s (1980: 237–238) remarks,
who claims that
“the driving forces behind an activity lie in internal and external information that is properly
structured. Discrepancies and oppositions between pieces of information become the main source
of motivation. […] An interesting issue are the relationships between the magnitude of discrepan-
cies and the extent of motivation. According to a common understanding of the world, the bigger
the difference between aspirations and the actual situation, the greater the determination to
achieve new gains. […] And yet that is not so. In psychology one rarely finds such simple corre-
lations. […] Humans are equipped with a certain tolerance towards the discrepancy between aspi-
rations and achievements. When this discrepancy is small, no action is taken. […] Interestingly,
a very big discrepancy between the standard and the actual situation does not bring about stron
motivation” (ibidem).
A director using ostraniene should thus do so in line with the rule of the golden
mean, adjusting the degree of “strangeness” to the situation. Worth mentioning here is
Brecht’s concept of the verfremdungseffekt, or “alienation effect”, which should make
it possible to recognize an object on stage, at the same time giving it an appearance of
strangeness. In such a way political theater forces the recipient to assume a critical
approach, i.e. some intellectual activity aimed at explaining the strangeness of the
events shown. And that in turn should lead to recognizing the rules governing social
life. The object, as Brecht stresses, should nevertheless be recognizable because other-
wise the recipient will give up any attempts at trying to interpret the events, dismissing
the director and actors’ effort.
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Theatr ica l  space and ru les o f  percept ion
Every kind of ostension consists in highlighting, more or less intensely, an object,
fragment of space or simply a direction. There is thus always a kind of ostraniene in-
volved, consisting in giving a particular element or direction a different status to that of
the other elements being perceived. However, it seems that the concept of ostraniene
should be reserved only for describing those cognitive processes, which are based on
the difference between the image of reality held in the recipient’s mind and the new
information coming from the stage. For there is a set of ostensive activities that are
connected with predominantly acts of perception determined by human nature and with
trained conventions of reception, and only at a later stage with the alienation effect.
According to assumptions adopted by psychologists, motivation for human activity
comes from the lack of balance experienced by the body, which state leads to activities
aimed at redressing the balance. In referring this position to the process of perception,
one needs to assume that every instance of imbalance appearing in the perceived im-
age, brings about the recipient’s mental activity. The basic mechanisms underlying that
process are described in Arnheim’s work on Art and Visual Perception (1974). At this
point it does not seem unreasonable to make some references to Arnheim’s remarks,
which tell us about the ways in which we perceive most of spatial compositions. Arn-
heims begins his considerations with an example of a black disk placed on a white
square. He points out that we do not have to make any measurements but can see at
a glance that the disk lies off-center. He then introduces an example in which a disk
placed very close to one of the boundaries of the same square appears to be drawn
toward the contour. This illusion has its explanation in psychological forces of percep-
tion, which are based on an interplay of directed tensions. To quote Arnheim, “these
tensions are not something the observer adds, for reasons of his own, to static images.
Rather, they are as inherent in any percept as size, shape, location, or color” (ibidem).
In consequence, they constitute a universal rule of perception. To cut a long story short,
let us just point out that some spatial compositions are perceived as unbalanced, thus
creating certain directed tensions. These tensions in turn control the spectator’s atten-
tion, directing it to a particular aspect of the performance. Apart from the action of
directed tensions in a percept, one can also speak of the perception of weight there, not
only in the form of an obvious impression that ascribes greater weight to bigger ob-
jects, but also as a consequence of colour and perspective. As it turns out, spatial depth
is a factor influencing the emergence of the impression of heaviness ascribed to par-
ticular objects. As Arnheim puts it, “the greater the depth an area of the visual field
reaches, the greater the weight it carries” (ibidem: 24). A similar rule applies to the
choice of colours: the lighter the colour, the heavier it appears. Finally, Ether Puffer
speaks of intrinsic interest: “An area of a painting may hold the observer’s attention
either because of the subject matter-for example, the spot around the Christ child in an
Adoration – or because of its formal complexity, intricacy, or other pecularity” (ibi-
dem: 24) Puffer’s comment makes evident the relationship between meaning and the
nature of perception. What appears to be heavier, will be more likely interpreted as the
semantic centre of a picture than its other elements. In this context the common meta-
phor of an ideas or opinions “carrying weight”, i.e. importance, influence etc. is not
accidental. Nevertheless, it needs to be made clear that the choice of important ele-
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ments is the result of mutual influence, and sometimes of clash between the rules of
perception and the recipient’s expectations. Sometimes “the very tininess of an objects
may exert a fascination that compensates the slight weight it would otherwise have”
(ibidem: 24).
In his analysis, Arnheim makes some references to theater as well. Arguing that the
impression of weight is achieved by highlighting, he quotes actors with leading roles,
who often insist that their colleagues should stay within considerable distance from
them during important scenes. A similar function is played by highlighting some region
of the stage by circumscribing it, i.e. providing with a contour. It is the case that
a shape given a contour is normally perceived as more substantial and dense than its
surroundings, which seem to act as an empty, diffuse background. Every time then that
a character gets somehow separated from the rest, the weight of his/her actions in-
creases in the audience’s eyes.
Another significant issue connected with the perception of theatrical space is the
distinction between left and right. This distinction constitutes a proclivity stemming
from our everyday life, based on the asymmetry of using our arms and the habit of
reading from left to right (at least in some cultures). Despite that, some perceptual
automatism is created, whereby objects situated on the right-hand side seem to be
heavier. In the theater, on the other hand, the recipients tend to identify with the char-
acter entering the stage from the left (ibidem), a claim difficult to confirm without ex-
perimental research. What remains certain is the audience’s tendency to ascribe a natu-
ral directional hierarchy, from left to right. That is why politicians’ faces are put on
advertising posters in the right profile, which is to ensure the impression of looking
into the future. Similarly, when describing an inclining stage, we tend to say that it
ascends from left to right rather than descending from right to left.
The concepts of weight, density or direction are in nonspecialist discussions about
performances most often replaced by the term center  of  the act ion, which consti-
tutes a conceptual generalization of the perception attributes mentioned. The specifica-
tion of such a center is the not limited to perception processes, but also depends on
conceptual activity as well as some habits stemming from the knowledge of social and
theatrical conventions. The central point of the world shown on stage can thus be posi-
tioned at the intersection of two ways, as for instance in Swinarski’s Forefathers’ Eve,
where the centre of the space was defined by intersecting podiums. Nevertheless,
theater uses more often the social conventions which highlight some characters because
of their social status or focus the recipients’ attention on such objects and places as e.g.
a throne, pulpit or altar. Arguably the most frequent instrument used by directors is the
arrangement of the characters. A hero surrounded by other dramatis personae focuses
the audience’s attention, as does an object circumscribed by a line. In many such cases
an additional factor highlighting the person enclosed by the circle is the surrounding
characters’ gaze, directed towards him/her. The tendency to follow somebody else’s
gaze is not a rule of perception; it is learned. Still it functions very effectively indeed,
which is noticeable in plays for children, where the audience often look around the
theater, yielding to the illusion created by the actors, who notice exceptionally inter-
esting characters and events all around. For an adult audience, which is more often
focused on the actors’ performance itself, the characters’ gazes are an effective marker
of important elements of the play. Pavis (1995), in his analysis of Brook’s Marat/Sade
draws our attention to the scene, in which Sade hands over a dagger to Charlotte that
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will be used to kill Marat. The dagger has been described by Pavis as a punctum, i.e.
“in Barthes’ sense of the term […] the main detail in a photograph, a detail which
“touches” us and imposes its meaning […]. The punctum is foregrounded via a system
of focused gazes, and also, by the convergence of Sade and Corday’s gaze” (Pavis
1995: 220, transl. by Ch. Shantz).
It seems that despite the great influence of stage arrangement on the reception proc-
ess, the actors’ dramatic performance remains a fundamental factor controlling the
audience’s reaction. The arrangement of characters and contrasts between different
groups can all be analysed by means of the methods described by Arnheim in connec-
tion with image composition. In the case of theater some additional factors appear,
namely sound and movement. Within a static arrangement of elements the recipient’s
attention gets focused on the elements in motion. That is why some acting techniques
consist in making a movement before saying the lines. As for sound, it is a key and
extremely effective factor activating the recipient’s attention, but rather within a tem-
poral arrangement of events. While visual perception to a great extent depends on the
recipient, sounds are mostly perceived involuntarily. It is so because we are unable to
recognize the exact place on stage from which the sounds reach us – hence the special
role of actors, who, by joining in speech the effects of movement and sound, attract the
audience’s attention with their every line.
Summing up these considerations, it needs to be emphasised that an analysis of how
the audience’s attention can be controlled is not easy because of the competing rules of
perception. A basic way of distinguishing important elements of a performance re-
mains the comparison of the force of particular signals. Then again, how can we com-
pare the force of sound with the consequences of stage arrangement for reception? Will
a region circumscribed with a line seem heavier than its surrounding space? Answers to
such questions can only be found through psychological experiments on perception; to
a theater scholar they are only an element of an analysis that will not be complete if we
do not allow for processes of conteptualization and relevanvce. The human system of
distinguishing elements of spatial reality is subordinate to the human mind’s tendency
to search for significant information and to a mechanism of interpretation that is to lead
to a better understanding of the events perceived.
When analysing the assumptions behind a performance we are watching, it is neces-
sary to also distinguish between the ostensive and semantic functions of a dramatic
technique or instrument. To explain the implications of such a distinction for the inter-
pretation of a performance, let us examine the function of light. It can introduce a cer-
tain atmosphere to the audience or define the character of the person in the spotlight,
thus having a primarily semantic function. This happens in the most platitudinous of
systems, where blue stands for heveanly provenance of the hero, and red brings asso-
ciations with infernal powers. And although, in line with the assumption adopted in this
dissertation, every act of ostension carries a potential meaning, it does not necessarily
lie with the activity itself conducted to attract the recipient’s attention. A spotlight
highlights the character, concurrently signalling the director’s communicative inten-
tion, though the colour of the light, its intensity and movement often do not play an
important part in the interpretation of the scene.
It is from past experience of everyday situations that we learn to associate the
source of ostension with the object that carries basic meaning. For example, hearing
a car horn we try to steer clear of the vehicle whose horn is heard. In theatre, on the
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other hand, the element underlying ostension does not constitute the central component
of the plot in itself. Oftentimes it even stands alone against the meaning-shaping ele-
ment (unlike in the example of the light earlier). In Swinarski’s staging of Forefathers’
Eve the actress appearing as Sowa mimes her hatred for the Ghost of the Evil Master.
As Walaszek puts it, “she gobbles barley, stuffs her mouth with it, almost choking on it
– all that before the eyes of the Ghost, who has come to beg for food” (Walaszek 1991:
192). Although the acting is conspicuous, the intention might escape the audience’s
attention, what with the actress being part of a large crowd on stage. Therefore, as she
manifests her hatred, Sowa stands not only close to Guślarz, the rite’s master, but also
to the character who is speaking at that moment. Thus the audience, focusing on the
speaker, can appreciate Sowa’s action, which plays a significant role in Swinarski’s
staging. The intentionality of such staging ploys is seen even more clearly in the next
scene when a shepherdess who takes part in the rite sees the ghost of her late lover. As
they exchange glances, she makes only one move; the expression on her face also
changes but once. The audience could easily overlook this insignificant symptom of the
girl’s pain, but for Guślarz’s command to fetch the aspergillum from the altar, given at
that very moment. As the audience cast their eyes on a young lad who approaches the
shepherdess and takes the aspergillum lying next to her, they can see the young woman
look down. Thus, even though it was the man’s movement that drew the audience’s
attention, what mattered was the girl’s facial expression.
That is why the definition of an ostensive act has to contain the concept of di-
rect ing one’s at tent ion, and not merely pointing directly to an object or activity.
Very important in the theater is also the understanding of ostension as intensifying
attent ion, and it I not possible to speak of binary oppositions here. In other words, the
recipient’s attention may prove unsatisfactory for a proper reception of the perform-
ance. Irina Rudakova (1995: 59), describing Stein’s failure in restaging Stanislawski’s
Three Sisters, demonstrates how differences in ideas about the world make realism of
the turn of the centuries seem like a completely exotic world to contemporary Russian
audience watching Stein’s actors. As a result the recipients were interested in scenes
that the audience of a hundred years back treated as ordinary and of no import, e.g.
“ceremonies of unfamiliar life which in some instances […] completely overshadowed the action.
For example the love scene between Masha and Vershinin in the second act was totally lost. It
took place mid-stage in the living room with the lights off. In Stein’s production, while the actors
played the scene, upstage in the dining room the maid adjusted the candles in the wall candelabra.
The foregrounding of the decorative details focused our attention on her actions as aesthetically
significant, and the fact that she was well lit while the central characters conducted their conver-
sation in the semi-darkness, drew our attention to her even closer. As a result, we remember a cu-
rious cup with a very long handle that she used to extinguish the candles or the strange matches
she used to light them” (ibidem: 58–59).
It would seem that the Russians are too familiar with Chekov and so the maid’s in-
triguing actions only should vitalize the restaged production without any significant
harm for the performance. Yet Rudakova reminds us of the special role that the emo-
tional aspect of events on stage played in Stanislawski’s productions. The rendition of
subtle emotional states responsible for the characters’ behaviour after all requires
a particularly focused attention on the audience’s part. And so if Stein’s ambition was
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to attain the dramatic result of Stanislawski’s production, he should have avoided the
unnecessary effects distracting the audience’s attention.
These findings, though, do not apply to some types of comedy, where exaggerated
gesticulation and garish make-up play a role. If the audience were to follow stage im-
ages closely, they might figure out what lies behind the illusion or notice some unnatu-
ralness. To prevent that, action is often fast-paced, so the audience can only see its
‘rough outline’ that builds up the humour of the events. Thus, manipulating audience’s
attention entails taking into account intended goals as well as conventions and tech-
niques used in acting. Unless it is realized, tragic actors appearing on a small stage can
suddenly become grotesque, as reported on several occasions by theatre historians;
their artificial gestures and unnatural make-up get noticed by the audience following
the acting at close quarters.
Object  and re la t ion – what  ostens ion shows
Another inconsistency in the description of ostension in the cognitive process stems
from curtailing its area of activity to a set of individual objects, entirely ignoring the
relations that underlie any cognitive act. Highlighting of any sort derives from a stage
relation: estrangement (as regards current beliefs about the world), misbalance between
stage elements or pointing (at something) that is convention-governed. However,
merely acknowledging the existence of a relation does not unequivocally determine
which of its elements should be highlighted.
Theatre best exemplifies that by actors’ ostensive behaviour on stage. In principle,
any action on stage is related, in one way or another, to the surrounding reality; thus
the relation between the actor and the reality around him is of a permanent nature. If
we think of a person looking at an object, highlighting applies not to one, but to two
elements from among all the stage components – the object that the actor is looking at,
and the look itself. In Pavis’s analysis of the hierarchical structure determined by Sade
and Cordey’s behaviour, the scene’s punctum was a dagger – the object that both char-
acters were looking at. However, one can also think of an interpretation whereby the
blade is merely a pretext to express feelings such as fear or determination, just like the
dagger that Gustaw holds in Swinarski’s Forefathers’ Eve. Thus, even though everyone
in the audience can clearly see Gustaw raise the weapon as he reaches the climax of his
monologue, what matters is the vigour of this gesture that expresses the onerous moral
choices Gustaw has to make. Another, albeit less apparent, example is that of women
arriving at the rite and kneeling in front of a picture of the Virgin Mary. Is it about the
symbolic connotations of the picture or about the mixing up of a pagan tradition and
Catholicism (cf. the custom of kneeling)?
It becomes even more complex to determine which element is of greatest relevance
to a given scene when we take into account the fact that a relation itself is also subject
to highlighting. To bring back the example of meaningful looks, let us return to the
scene of the Lover’s Ghost and the Shepherdess form Swinarski’s Forefathers’ Eve. As
he looks at her, she returns the look; so the image is complemented by the mutual rela-
tion between the two characters.
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The concept of relation also underlies such significant elements of the play’s struc-
ture as contrast and surprise. A critic discussing Brook’s play Marat/Sade was as-
tounded to see a room tiled white where gaudily dressed characters were executing
aristocrats. The white tiles must have been as curious to the English audience as loud
costumes and grotesque acting. What was key to the mise en scène, though, was the
very contrast between the cold, sterile interior of the lunatic asylum and the insane
string of events shown by the patients.
Surprise, in turn, is accounted for by the temporal arrangement of events, when
a customary image is blurred by a discord. For example, when Giorgio Strehler adjusts
the first scene of King Lear to a rite deeply rooted in tradition, the mise en scène shows
a solemn, church-like choir, a somewhat archaic variation on the feudal rite, with clear
references to the notorious Shakespearean declarations of parental love; this ritual
equilibrium later on develops into verbal cacophony (after Strehler 1982: 305). Here
the caesura is marked out by Cordelia’s meaningful “nothing”. Strehler argues that the
essence of the scene is only explicable when one takes into account the destruction of
the old order. According to him, Cordelia commits sacrilege and Lear, quite under-
standably, loses his temper. In order to appreciate that, though, the audience have to
grasp the discord in the music that delineates the order of the rite, and make it the main
reference point of the staging. The unexpected dissonance should be strong enough to
surpass the discussion on the rationale of cultivating or discarding the old order. Thus
the mise en scène is interpreted quite differently due to shifting the meaning focus from
the very relation determined by the surprising change of tack to the elements that it
highlights. The audience can therefore see either the court’s fossilization against Cor-
delia’s honesty, or the onset of a youthful rebellion against the old order.
Thus, the very existence of ostension on stage does not mean that the suggestion is
no longer open to interpretation. Whenever the light is seen again after a prolonged
spell of darkness, the audience have to decide on their own whether it signifies revela-
tion, highlights the darkness prior to the light, or draws attention to the change. How-
ever, to take the decision conceptualization is required; thus, situational context influ-
ences the process of drawing relevant conclusions. This issue will be discussed in de-
tail elsewhere in the work.
Key (c le f t )  s igns
According to Martin Esslin (op.cit.: 109–111), key (or cleft) signs play a special role in
the reception of a theatrical performance. Like other acts of ostension, they indicate the
significant components of the mise en scène. However, key signs do not help to high-
light a single element of the performance, but establish a modality of reception that
operates over a period of time or applies to a selection of signs. We can therefore speak
of “prolonged ostension”. Occasionally key signs have to be repeated for the prolonged
effect to obtain, but most of the time, quite obviously, a given modality of reception
lasts until there are grounds for it to be changed. If a theatrical performance sets out to
introduce a realistic world, its realism gets reaffirmed as we interpret new events as
realistic.
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Esslin exemplifies the realism-enhancing function of key signs by discussing the
change from unrhymed poetry to prose. He compares key signs to musical keys. How-
ever, when singling out a particular system of signs as fundamental in the reception of
other signs, we tend to reconfirm the focal position of a system among other systems.
A typical strategy to do that is augmenting contrast between elements of a system at the
expense of other systems. Umberto Eco brings up music as an example. He argues that
the notes of a scale are like figures that combine to make meaningful signs, such as
chords or intervals. The meaning, though, is of a syntactic rather than semantic kind.
Chords and intervals, in turn, combine to make musical syntagms. This musical se-
quence is universally recognizable regardless of the instrument that plays it or the tone;
if a musician chooses to alter the tone with every note he plays, though, what comes
out is a sequence of tones rather than a tune. Consequently, the note ceases to be rele-
vant and becomes facultative. What is relevant is the tone (Eco 1971: 198). As we can
see, the set of meaningful elements in this case is determined not by a single choice,
but as a result of divergence that highlights a given system.
More explicit examples of this phenomenon can be found in Sugiera’s monograph
on Grzegorzewski and his plays. Key signs, as presented by Esslin, operate in plays
described in the chapter titled The First Scene: The Key to the Performance. Sugiera
describes the first scene of Grzegorzewski’s America:
“Grzegorzewski decided to place the seats for the audience on the stage, thereby moving
stage events to the nearby foyer and cloakroom. […] The audience became even more discon-
certed when the lights went out and, in place of actors, they were shown other viewers leaving the
theatre, as another spectacle had just finished. […] The busy crowd in the cloakroom could be
transposed as the stage world; they were like travelers disembarking a ship that had just arrived in
America. […] However, were one to regard the scene merely as a typical real-life situation, going
home after a spot of evening entertainment, one would involuntarily be peeping rather than
watching. This would be awkward, especially that our notional »peeping Tom« had just left his
own coat there and primped in front of the cloakroom mirror. […] Thus the actions of the invol-
untary subjects of this theatrical experiment took on different meanings; they became theatre or
‘theatre’, depending on the audience’s interpretation, with no involvement on the part of the sub-
jects, the quasi-actors. […] This was Grzegorzewski’s way to point up the creative character of
perception, the potential discord between the conclusions of the perceiver and the intention of the
perceived. This is also how he would present his audience with the key  [emphasis] to compre-
hending or, better still, to identifying with Rossman, the protagonist. Rossman attempted to dis-
cover the intentions of strangers he met in America in very much the same way. Devoid of clear
premises, he would put the new definitions within the interpretative framework of the Old World”
(Sugiera 1993: 75).
The ploy that Grzegorzewski implemented in the first scene of his staging threw the
audience off balance, thus helping them appreciate the protagonist’s actions. This cre-
ated the right modality of reception.
Grzegorzewski’s staging of The Threepenny Opera, where “the first scene is a sheer
medley of theatrical conventions and styles” (ibidem: 185) is another example of this
practice. Sugiera claims that this staging technique aims at “distorting Brecht’s appar-
ent division into stage events and commentaries and ridding the audience of whatever
conveniently simple preconceptions about stage fiction they may have, even before the
story of Mac the Knife starts. Thus the audience’s uncertainty as to the status of the
world they perceive lasts virtually until the end of the performance” (ibidem: 180).
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However, uncertainty is not the only reason behind the mixing up of various theatrical
traditions at the beginning of the play. To quote Sugiera again, “in his staging of The
Threepenny Opera Grzegorzewski teases the audience toying with twisted and broken
reflections of stage styles and conventions” (ibidem: 185). Thus a system appears,
whereby theatrical styles and conventions function as main systems of signs and bind
the unfolding events together. This particular role is being brought to mind throughout
the entire performance, according to the aforementioned principle. An example is the
scene when Peachum’s enterprise turns out to be a genuine theatre, set up not through
greed but through the joy of pretending and fibbing. In this way audience expectations,
a result of theatrical competence, are ‘questioned’, producing the effect of estrange-
ment. Another technique that Grzegorzewski employs are contrastive alterations of
acting styles, referred to by Eco. The short scene at a brothel opens up with Mrs
Peachum’s sexual song sung like an aria. Then comes a melancholic and impression-
istic description of the brothel, complemented by Jenny’s truthful song of love gone by.
Suddenly, though, the song is intercepted, and we hear a vibrating voice sing farcical
operetta as prostitutes run away from police officers – all that to the sound of cancan.
By piling up instances of scenic fiction Grzegorzewski succeeded in disclosing their
untruthful nature, thus making his own contribution to Brecht’s principle of revealing
theatrical tricks of the trade (ibidem: 184).
As we can see from the analyses quoted above, Esslin’s concept of key signs gives
an adequate description of cognitive mechanisms that are reflected in staging interpre-
tations. Esslin’s theory seems to be imprecise in but one aspect, that is to say it lacks
a clear-cut division into key signs that determine the correct modality of reception, and
techniques which serve to highlight a system of signs amongst other systems. A com-
mon feature of both processes is the effect of the techniques that spans several scenes
of a play. A sign system or modality of reception categorized for once at the beginning
of a play influences interpretation throughout the play, even if the technique that was
used to categorize it is no longer present on stage.
Summary
The analysis of ostensive activities in the theater presented in this chapter has used
examples in relation to only the first stage of the cognitive process. This first stage
comprises reception acts governed by rules of perception and impressions resulting
from the clash between ideas and the image of the world received by the senses.
“Attention” plays an important role also at the next stages of processing the informa-
tion connected with processes of conceptualization, the effects of which can influence
indirectly our perception of the world. Most importantly however, I have meant to
place ostension within the framework of those cognitive processes that are of a preno-
tional nature. This can help to describe acts of direct impact that on-stage reality has
upon the recipient. Such acts shape the process of watching those elements of a play
that are directly observable. That in turn makes it possible to explain not only the
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differences between particular interpretations, but also between perceptions of the same
phenomenon by different recipients.
So understood, ostension acts do not refer unequivocally to certain meanings, but
constitute their basis. Moreover, they allow us to describe the character of a given dra-
matic school or the works of a director. Let us have a look at a few telling examples.
Rebelling against fossilized tradition, early XX century theater shocked its audience
with farcical images of the world. On the one hand, it distorted the shapes of objects
and the spatial perspective of stage. On the other hand, it was geared towards at times
surprising simplifications. The audience would find it difficult to find rationalizations
for expressionist solutions. The English critic James Agate, impressed by one of Kai-
ser’s plays, was unable to explain why “the image of four men, waving their silk-hats
rhythmically in a lunatic ballet should be closer to the truth about races than a faithful,
photographic representation of their behaviour” (Styan 1995: 340). Audiences were
also surprised by new rules of stage production, introduced by directors who were first
of all breaking the dramatic conventions of presenting on-stage reality. “In the case of
Appia, the need to go against what the audience was used to, meant that Wagner’s
heroes would most often be portrayed as two-dimensional silhouettes against a light
background. Also, Appia substituted traditional acting on the proscenium with activi-
ties taking place further back on the stage, with the foot-lights off and the foreground
immersed in darkness” (Sugiera 1995: 22). A contrast differentiating particular ele-
ments of the production was also achieved by a simplification consisting in removing
insignificant elements of stage design or limiting characters’ movements to a necessary
minimum. Such an approach was manifest in Brook’s “gesture of rejection”. The same
principle was referred to by Brecht, who made static his stage images in order to high-
light the moment of movement, signaling a change relationships between characters.
Those examples are evidence of the fact that the character of particular dramatic
schools and directors’ approaches can be described by the character of ostensive ac-
tivities used.
The special nature of describing ostensive activities can also be noticed in dramatic
doctrines and theories. In his anthropological approach to acting, Barba opines that
oppositions in the body’s position are central to meaning. His model is thus in agree-
ment with the assumptions of anthropological theatre where man becomes the focal
meaning-shaping factor. With a certain degree of approximation one can also say that
the same holds good for phenomenology, where man is a psycho-physiological foun-
dation on which a theatrical character is structured. To refer to Raszewski’s view of the
actor who “sows” fiction, it might be said that the actual actor in theatre sows acts of
ostension.
A clear link can be seen between classifying individual directors’ works and types
of mise en scène on the basis of the acts of ostension that they use and the division that
has been applied to research thus far. Analysing ostensive behaviour, though, one can
leave out the issue of recipient competence, understood as comprehensive familiarity
with various trends and styles in theatre. The ability to identify features of individual
theatrical techniques and doctrines does not entail being familiar with them. Thus gen-
eralisations in reviews are compatible with the audience’s direct impressions of what
goes on on stage. That a performance should fall under a particular staging category,
therefore, is determined by the character of acts of ostension experienced during the
performance.
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As a fundamental element of communication, ostension is at the same time a sig-
nificant facet in characterising individual staging activities and trends. An investigation
of ostensive activities as decisive in selecting elements of a mise en scène can lead to
a desired hierarchy of meanings. Therefore a link can be established between conclu-
sions drawn on the basis of observable elements of a performance and the structure of
the mental representation of the world shown on stage. To simplify, elements high-
lighted by acts of ostension (also in mental structures) are superior to the others.
Another aspect of ostension under analysis in this dissertation is that ostensive be-
haviour reveals the addressee’s communicative intention. From the recipient’s per-
spective, the assumption extends to the effect that each act of focusing attention im-
plies relevance. The significance of the above in theatre has been declared by many
practitioners. Peter Brook recalls being in awe of a Hindu performer who could get
passers-by’s attention merely with the help of his little finger. A number of other Euro-
pean artists are similarly impressed by the extraordinary ability of eastern theatres to
produce plays of special significance to the given culture, thus immensely attractive to
locals.
Having said all that, one could conclude that manipulating audience’s attention is
one of the skills that make authors of performances genuine artists. Obviously, a per-
formance that is void of attention-getting elements is dismissed as downright boring.
On the other hand, abundance of acts of ostension is likely to be seen as exhausting and
result in overlooking significant staging activities. Similarly, a performance where
excessive attention is drawn to irrelevant facts is bound to cause annoyance. Therefore
ostensive behaviour should ideally strike a viable balance between explicitness (so they
can be noticed by the audience) and significance of the resulting interpretations.
Whether or not certain ostensive activities are suitable is ultimately for critics to de-
cide. Theorising can only produce a model of significant relations holding in the case
of acts of ostension.
The cast and the directors on the other side of the stage have no universal paradigms
of behaviour in store for the audience, so they could determine the realisation of acts of
ostension. The theory behind can be of considerable assistance, but artists can only take
final decisions as long as they implement their intuition and talent. But, after all, this is
what makes them artists, not mere craftsmen who act according to pre-learned sche-
mata. For it is thanks to their intuition that they can attract audiences, make them come
to the theatre, experience a product of art, and thus verify the rationale for the existence
of an aesthetic object.
3. A METHODOLOGY FOR OSTENSION RESEARCH IN THEATRE
Both this chapter, concerning practical implications of the model proposed in this the-
sis, and some methodological propositions for studying cognitive structures (see the
next chapter) will limit themselves to being merely outlines of basic methodological
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assumptions. All the studies presented here focus on reception, striving to find some
regularities in the process.
Attention, which is here understood as perception of events and objects, essentially
manifests itself in simple actions. However, as we have seen, selection among the
many mechanisms of focusing attention is not determined a priori, thus the rationale
behind it can only be explained if one studies the decisions made on the basis of sub-
jective feelings. There are scientific methods of analysing stress or eyeball movement.
However, they do not encompass all the activities the recipient can engage in to
“activate his attention”. It becomes necessary, therefore, to refer to a method where
conclusions are borne out in several sources.
Let us start with language. Cognitivism has it that images and their expression in
natural language are linked, which can be seen in text structure. It appears acceptable,
therefore, to assume that elements that are highlighted in a scene’s description by the
way it is linguistically formulated are also central to perception. In the terminology of
Russian formalism each act of language de-automatisation entails an act of ostension in
sensual perception.
Let us go back to Sugiera’s paper on Grzegorzewski’s Dziesięć portretów z czajką
w tle (based on Chechov) and see how she describes the set: „The proscenium and the
stage are separated by a grey curtain, not fully drawn back. To the right there is an
empty, gutted grand piano. A structure of several wooden frames runs toward the niche
in the rear wall. To the left a large white wardrobe comes into view. Behind it there is
another curtain made of red velvet, much smaller than the other one. In the back-
ground, centre-stage, there is a cupboard; behind it, an object not clearly visible, but
looking vaguely like a railway timetable booklet” (Sugiera 1993: 105). One might say
it is just a typical description of stage paraphernalia. However, the text is fraught with
practically all types of ostension discussed in the previous chapter. A typical method of
highlighting objects in descriptions is using marked expressions. Incidentally, these are
also the least conscious of the forms that authors use. The first object that Sugiera pin-
points is a gutted piano. The metaphor clearly distinguishes the instrument which is
present on stage in Grzegorzewski’s play from an object one might find in a rustic
room. Similarly, the “grey curtain, not fully drawn back” is a departure from conven-
tion which prescribes that as the play starts the curtain should disappear from sight
(enstrangement). The thing that looks remotely like a railway brochure is the only
movable object here; it is interesting because of its mysterious, blurred outline. Finally
there is the conspicuous white wardrobe (“comes into view”). The author underlines
the impression one gets looking at the object. The expression ‘a structure of several
wooden frames runs toward the niche in the rear wall’ is a direct description of the way
the audience perceive this set element. In line with the rules of optical perception, the
gaps between frames appear smaller and smaller, thus signalling the direction one
looks in.
The example above shows that Sugiera describes object by means of marked ex-
pressions such as metaphors or hyperboles, acts of enstrangement, highlighting per-
ception (“comes into view”) and pointing to objects (not all of them have actually been
mentioned). So as not to fall into the trap of subjective assessment and to verify the
thesis that the particular place of objects in the description has to do with actual sensual
impressions, we must look elsewhere for confirmation.
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As far as subjectivity is concerned, the matter appears simple enough. Since other
critics point to the same objects, we can readily assume that there is some regularity in
perception and try to compare our results with the assumptions that performance di-
rectors have made. The possibility to highlight an object in different ways helps to
make experimental data more objective. Walaszek in her description of Swinarski’s
staging of The Forefathers’ Eve is clear about the way perception takes place when she
says “In sight there is Golgotha in mourning robes” (Walaszek op.cit.: 189). This im-
age is also brought up by Marta Fik: “Going slowly to the chapel for the rite, passing
by the church mourners and the image of the crucified one we are really entering the
play…” (Fik op.cit.: 194). By putting the image in different contexts we become con-
vinced that it has arisen as a result of perception rather than interpretation of the play.
To further confirm whether an action or an object perform an ostensive function one
can inquire a greater number of viewers. However, there arises a problem that is actu-
ally common for all questionnaires; direct questions suggest answers, which often ob-
scures actual reception. There are certain ways to tackle this problem, but they will
only be mentioned in the chapter on cognitive domains. At this stage we can only ana-
lyse the marked expressions in performance descriptions that can act as verbal expres-
sions of ostension.
The first way to do so, quite naturally, is to study a substantial range of opinions
about the same fragment of a play. The fragment ought to include an event we want to
analyse and be fairly short, otherwise individual viewers’ interpretations will rely
heavily on their memory, and events will be singled out at random, due to subjective
interpretations of the whole play. What we want to analyse is how particular scenes of
a mise en scène are perceived and whether they are viewed as acts of ostension or not.
If most testees use marked expressions to describe an event, one might assume that the
given scene attracted their attention.
The next step to take is to verify the marked expressions, trying to arrive at their
origin. This is done to determine whether a figure of speech used in the text serves
mostly to highlight an action or object, or merely to specify its characteristics. To ex-
emplify, Walaszek describes the character of Sowa in the scene with the Ghost of the
Evil Master saying: “Now she clambers up the table” (Walaszek op.cit.: 192). To de-
cide whether clamber describes the movement or merely highlights the character,
a greater number of testees who have seen the play can be asked to decide which ex-
pression: the marked “clamber” or the neutral “climb” is a more accurate description of
the action Sowa takes. If most testees decide on “climb”, then the marked “clamber”
appears to have been used merely for the sake of underlying the ostensive function of
the character’s action.
Discussing the analyses in question here one should mention the use of video re-
cording, often criticised. The critical remarks are frequently unfounded. To stick to the
example of Sowa in Swinarski’s staging: it suffices to watch a videotape to determine
whether the word clamber is used appropriately. However, the staging assumptions
may change when the play is adapted for film rather than recorded as a play.
The problem can be solved if the researcher is familiar with the theatre version and
knows when and to what extent a video recording arouses feelings similar to those that
a genuine theatre audience have. Another advantage of using recordings for analysis is
that in cases where the impressions of those watching the recording and those watching
the actual play are different, one might conclude that it is the theatre environment that
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makes a scene be perceived in a special way. Assuming that there is some kind of ten-
sion which arises when a viewer meets an actor in the flesh, it seems appropriate to say
that a scene generating such tension in theatre will not make any particular impression
on the television audience. However, trying to estimate the extent to which the audi-
ence react to stage events one should always refer directly to their theatre experience.
Assuming that we want to concentrate solely on the audience’s spontaneous reac-
tions, the only reliable tool is dynamic research, especially when it uses modern tech-
nology; it makes it possible to record audience’s reactions, determine where they are
looking thanks to specialized spectacles, or even to examine their breathing, which,
apparently, may coincide with the rhythm of the dialogue being delivered on stage.
These methods have been debased as their results cannot be correlated with semantic
processes that shape the meaning of events. They can be made more meaningful if
juxtaposed with the results of the above-mentioned analysis of staging descriptions, as
there is more evidence for fragments pre-selected as acts of ostension. If a testee’s
reactions measured by means of scientific equipment accord with the scenes that the
testee highlights in their description, then firstly an intensified reaction on the part of
the recipient is borne out as playing a role in shaping meaning, and secondly it be-
comes more likely that a figure of speech reflects reception rather than intellectual
speculation or linguistic habits.
In conclusion, our experimental model seen as a collection of analyses has its ra-
tionale in confirming conclusions that can be drawn by looking at various forms of
theatrical expression, from spontaneous physiological reactions to expressing opinions
in a natural language. They can be further verified by our knowledge of universal rules
of perception. One must bear in mind, though, that the results refer to observation.
Therefore, although the theory of relevance acknowledges that identified acts of osten-
sion play an active role in cognition, their influence on interpreting meanings can only
be fully appreciated if the entire cognitive process is analysed, together with two no-
tions that will be of our interest in the next two chapters, that is conceptualisation and
relevance.
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(a) This is an orchid.
(b) Orchids are rare flowers.
Conclusion:
(c) This is a rare flower.
This conclusion is in line with principles of logic, but calculating such statements
provides no explanation why we tend to opt for a particular solution, the number of
solutions resulting from the information provided being virtually unlimited. Given that
(a) and (b) are true statements, the following set: “This is an orchid”, “Orchids are rare
flowers”, “This is not a tree”, also holds good. However, most of us will undoubtedly
agree that (c) appears to be the most feasible conclusion. Sperber and Wilson argue for
the existence of a principle guiding human reasoning that they call the principle of not
drawing trivial conclusions. Thus, if one says “The Prime Minister quit his job”, one
has to dismiss the following, logically true, statements: “It is not true that the Prime
Minister did not quit his job” and “If it’s the Queen’s birthday today, the Prime Minis-
ter quit his job” – the former, on grounds of triviality, the latter, even pure nonsense.
Merely acknowledging that one can limit a potentially unlimited number of possible
solutions does not explain the rationale behind models of logical reasoning. Cognitive
sciences, on the other hand, claim that logic is not acquired at birth, but rather learned
through experience and conceptualisation based on spatial thinking.
Let us return to deductive processes that make it possible to infer that, if a purse is
in a bag and the bag is in the kitchen, the purse, by extension, is in the kitchen too. Do
we apply logical formulas to find a purse, though? Or do we rather rely on experience
that has us go to the kitchen first to open our bag and get the purse? A more clear-cut
example (albeit a more complex one) can be that of someone lost in a forest, who de-
cides to walk in one direction without turning, hoping that they can reach a town by
doing so. In this case our understanding is based on experience (I always do that and it
has always worked) or a heuristic analysis that consists in conjuring up the image of
a map and several straight lines that sooner or later will reach a human settlement. This
method does not have to be foolproof, but reasoning is not only about drawing logi-
cally correct conclusions, but also less plausible ones. These conclusions are based on
heuristic methods in which human imagination works; they can, though, stimulate
understanding, which is often the key factor in achieving an objective. As one can
imagine, an attempt to guide one’s way out of an unfamiliar forest solely by calculating
logical statements would doubtless result in the poor thinker dying of starvation. Un-
doubtedly, then, when we decide on the nature of the reality that surrounds us, we use
images of reality stored in our mind, stemming from our experience, that is interaction
with the outside world; at least, these images are available for us to use.
Mark Turner provides a charming example that illustrates how imagination can be
deployed to tackle a problem:
“A Buddhist monk begins at dawn to walk up a mountain. He stops and starts and varies his
pace as he pleases, and reaches the mountaintop at sunset. There he meditates overnight. At dawn,
he begins to walk back down, again moving as he pleases. He reaches the foot of the mountain at
sunset. Prove that there is a place on the path that he occupies at the same hour of the day on the
two separate journeys” (Turner 1996: 72).
There must be a way to solve this problem in a formalised manner. However, it is
much easier to imagine two monks, one going up, and the other – on the same day
– going down. Their meeting point is the place in question. This, once again, goes to
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show that conjuring up images is an equally successful way of reasoning about the
outside world. As it is, though, the nature of our mental perception of the world is not
identical with genuine reality. As we were answering the question that Turner posed,
we schematised our mental image of the monk’s route. It was reduced to a line linking
the mountaintop and its foot. Similarly, the spot where the monk and his double meet is
an abstract point along the line that represents the route. Schematising certain aspects
of our perception of the situation that Turner presents helps enhance one’s train of
thought, simultaneously ignoring irrelevant details – where, for example, the down-
bound monk chooses to walk down another path and never runs into the up-bound one.
That could happen if we were to picture a mountain road with all its details, for in-
stance forking or parted with trees.
Mental processes that cognitivists tackle in their work are based on such more or
less schematised structures. Some of them are universal and have been singled out to
form a set of basic cognitive parameters:
 Basic ontological categories: being, state, event, action, situation.
 Aspects: attributes, behaviour.
 Shape of events: preserving – creative, destructive, one-time – repetitive, com-
plete – incomplete, cyclical – noncyclical.
 Causal relations: forcing, enabling.
 Image schema: part – whole, centre – periphery, up – down, link, source – path
– destination, container.
 Modality: ability, possibility, necessity.
Those cognitive domains, in tandem with logical formulae, form the basis of human
reasoning; universal as they are, they specify common reasoning rules.
It is wrong, therefore, to treat cognitive semantics as a revolution that discards pre-
vious models for description of mental processes; what it does is rather supplement
these with reasoning forms based on image structures that go beyond formal logic.
However, simply acknowledging mental structures does not suffice to explain the pro-
cess of conceptualisation. For that reason this section will go on to select, out of the
wide range of categories which determine conceptualisation, only those issues which
can help both characterise basic assumptions of cognitive grammar and analyse the
process of comprehending a theatrical performance.
Percept ion of  rea l i ty
Any human mental activity is rooted in all kinds of interaction that man has with real-
ity. However, events shown on stage do not normally bring about any direct conse-
quences for the audience, as its members are conventionally at a safe distance from the
actors and the world that they present. In middle-class theatre what the recipient nor-
mally does is watch and listen, and their reaction is normally applause or other signs of
approval or disapproval. Therefore it appears reasonable to start our description of
cognition by characterising the concept of human perception of material things. An
exceptionally synthetic and clear presentation of this issue can be found in Elzbieta
Tabakowska’s Gramatyka i obrazowanie (Grammar and Images). Tabakowska stresses
the dual nature of the world in our perception.
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“Its picture is composed of a multitude of things and connections between them. This duality,
which stems from sensual experience of elementary physical phenomena, is also reflected in the
duality of conceptual structures. One of the fundamental principles of generating such structures
in the human mind is the dichotomy of th ing  and  re la t ion  (emphasis – E.T.)” (Tabakowska
1995a: 23–27).
The “thing” is understood as something that occupies an area in space, that can retain
the state it is in (until it becomes the object of a relation which changes that state), and
whose existence in a given time and space is not significantly dependent on its relation
to other things. Tabakowska cites a simple example of table, an object which has
“particular dimensions, shape and texture, […] and can exist without necessarily en-
tering into relations with other things” (ibidem). She goes on to point out that, obvi-
ously, the most generic things are material ones; at the same time she stresses that the
human mind perceives abstract notions and real, existing objects in the same way. It is
possible due to our ability to handle concepts in mental space, whose properties are
analogous to those of three-dimensional space. Let us, for example, consider the con-
cept of quarrel. “It has its own internal structure (e.g. a beginning and an end)”, one
can have it, runaway from it, one can also take it elsewhere. Thus the properties we
attribute to the concept of quarrel are equivalent to those that characterise physical
objects in 3-d space.
As she goes on to describe relations, Tabakowska underlines that:
“unlike things, generic relations tend to take place in time, so they are dynamic in character. They
result in objects changing their state; in this sense the notion of relation is a nonautonomous one,
as the existence of a relation entails the existence of objects it obtains between. The most typical
relations are obviously physical processes based in the phenomenon of movement. However, as it
is the case with things, movement can be understood as a change in configuration of abstract ob-
jects that enter into particular relations with each other in mental space” (ibidem: 25).
In cognitive semantics, things and relations form the basis for analysing cognitive
domains. Ronald Langacker introduced a notation to help present sets of elements and
relalions that make up particular semantic categories. Out of the complex system for
classifying semantic categories proposed by Langacker, let us mention three basic
symbols:
to denote things
to denote any unit
to denote relations
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Other, more complex symbols will be introduced at a later stage, when particular
analyses are presented.
The aforementioned image schemata also belong to the category of cognitive do-
mains, as described by Langacker. These form the foundations of cognitive operations
of the human mind, as they are schematic and at the same time rooted in man’s motor
experience. It may seem that all these operations can be explained by traditional for-
mulae of logical reasoning. The mental picture of the world, though, cannot be reduced
to formulas that clearly determine the nature of particular concepts. A typical situation
that defies a univocal definition is a relation that obtains between a moving object and
a fragment of space, which is described by the preposition “across”. To simplify, let us
assume that the fragment of space we are interested in is an area in the shape of
a square. The least doubtful situation is the one where a given person crosses one of the
rectangle’s sides exactly in the middle and then, walking on in that direction, leaves the
area, crossing the opposite side – again, in the middle.
Without a shadow of a doubt, we will agree that the sentence “The person went
across the square” adequately describes the situation. However, does any other route
that runs within the area of the square actually go across it? A number of works in
cognitive semantics have attempted to answer this question. Without going into details,
let me present several figures along with a few comments on the issue in question.
Figures A and B are gradual departures from the canonical model where the route
goes through the middle of the area. In fact, both appear to fall under the category de-
noted by the preposition “across”, but as the line symbolising the route gets nearer the
side of the rectangle, our doubts as to whether it is still going “across” the area grow. Is
walking along the side of the area actually going across it? Example C is even more
controversial. In extreme cases we could even say that the person barely entered the
area. Example D, on the other hand, appears to contradict the way we see going
“across” an area. As for E, it is perhaps more suitable to say that the person had a walk
A B C D E
64
around the area. To answer the question whether a given situation represents going
“across an area”, one has to establish a suitable model that would present the represen-
tational image of the preposition “across”. For our discussion it is more important to
attract attention to some relevant aspects of a model like that than to actually arrive at
a definite solution.
To start with, the model is an image-oriented one. Thus our decision whether an
event qualifies as going across an area depends on the mental image we activate in
our consciousness. The image is most likely to appear as a prototype, a paradigm of
a category that we compare individual situations to. In our example, it is the perfect
model, a straight line that cuts across the two longer sides of the rectangle, right in the
middle. It is not uncommon for prototypes, though, to be of a different character. There
may be prototypes depicting typical  situations. To see the difference between both
concepts, Lakoff suggests considering the differences between a typical husband and
an ideal one. In order to define the concept of “husband”, one can draw from the ideal-
ised model of the function that a man performs in the family unit, or refer to typical
examples from family life that make up the image of a husband. In the model under
analysis here, whether or not an action qualifies as “going across an area” is dependent
on the ideal model. Thus, the farther the route departs from the square’s axis (A and B),
the more difficult it is to accept a given situation as “going across” an area. If the be-
ginning and the end of the route are not on opposite sides of the square (C and D),
a given case is less likely to be regarded as “going across” that square. Finally, the less
the actual route resembles the model straight line (E), the more difficult it is to classify
a given case as “going across” the area in question.
Another significant aspect of schematised image models is how deeply they are
rooted in human experience. Earlier we discussed an experiment based on deductive
processes; now we may want to consider some experiments that lie at the bottom of
a prototypical model of the preposition “across”. It is in line with the principles of cog-
nitivism, which have it that image schemata are based on experiments connected with
human activity.
An illustrative example is that of walking across the road or crossing a river. That
must be where the idea of moving to the opposite side of an area comes from. Why,
though, are we also inclined to accept the use of “across” to describe the situation
shown in figure C? Or, what is the actual difference between figure C and figure D, if
we assume that the area is not a model rectangle, but rather a figure with no angles at
all? To answer such queries one often refers to models that use rules of topology which
depict the transition process from a prototype to its numerous variations. While not
undermining the role of theoretical models portraying the transformation of a proto-
typical image, one has to note that they ignore the influence of situational context,
which is superimposed on the abstract representation of an image schema, thus com-
pleting the set of criteria for classifying a given action as “going across” an area. How
far from the edge (figure A and B) the agent is supposed to have been so one can say
without doubt that the action qualifies as “going across” the area, largely depends on
the situational context of the given action.
Let us imagine a group of young boys who want to prove their manhood and dare
each other to cross somebody else’s field. The owner will not have any trespassers
cross his territory and is determined to punish them if they do. Needless to say, not
every route that the boys choose will qualify as going across the inhospitable owner’s
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field. Let us assume that to do the task successfully one must come as close as possible
to the owner’s house, so a possible escape would not be easy. If we mark the
“hazardous approximation” area as G,
we can assume that the actions shown as figures H and J will qualify, whereas the boy
who took the route shown in figure I will be accused of going around, rather than
across the owner’s field.
This example illustrates how situational context (here the conditions of the chal-
lenge that the boys agree on) specifies the characteristics of the abstract image model.
It is the subjective feeling of danger rather than the topological characteristics of the
concept “across” that determines the route’s length. The above also holds good for
“going across” a mountain ridge. In order for an action to qualify as going across the
ridge, the route must not go too close to the ridge’s end or where the peaks run too low.
However, the word “too” is to some extent determined by a subjective assessment of
the task’s level of difficulty, which accompanies the idea of going across a mountain
ridge. The reason why the abstract spatial model and subjective psychical aspects are
compounded is the motor-experience basis of image schemata, which anchors the ab-
stract image of the movement “across” in a particular experience. The actual action, in
turn, is normally linked to such psychical aspects as the feeling of being threatened, the
task’s level of difficulty or the pleasure it carries. One way or the other, the movement
which qualifies as ‘going across an area’ has to correspond to its abstract image. The
route shown below would probably not qualify as “going across” an area.
It is so because the requirement of moving to the other side of the rectangle, speci-
fied by the schematised image of the relations marked by the preposition “across”, has
not been fulfilled. Merely entering the area marked G is just a criterion completing the
image schema, which helps determine the minimum distance required for the route to
qualify as a convincing example of “going across” the field in question.
How to qualify the movement shown in figure E will also depend on placing the
model in the right context, this time situational.
H I J
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Assuming that the rectangle symbolises a meadow, one cannot possibly say that the
figure shows movement across the meadow. On the other hand, there is no doubt that
the figure can symbolise going across a “forest”. The necessity to find one’s way
among trees (which is a consequence of the situational context determining the char-
acteristics of a given area, here – a forest) helps treat the requirement of the route being
as straight as possible as somewhat less significant.
The fact that schematised images are rooted in everyday experience is consistent
with one of the fundamental principles of cognitivism, which says that categories are
a reflection of our perception of the world, our motor activity in it, as well as the goals
we set. The schematic character of images helps combine particular experiences, which
form into complex cognitive domains only if they are, to an extent, schematised. As it
is, imagination is based on co-operation between schematic models and an array of
images: experience and perception. The researcher’s task is to pinpoint and interpret
the relations that hold between both types of images.
Fi l lmore ’s  soc ia l  and soc io log ica l  f rames
Taking into consideration the relations that hold between schematised images and our
experience of the world helps put subjective experience into universal frames arranging
our world knowledge. Generalised forms of thinking, shared by a large group of peo-
ple, are not limited to abstract conceptual forms. Individual cultures and social groups
have a lot of more detailed models of actions, attitudes and expectations shared by the
members of a given community. They take the form of scripts characterising relevant
action points, one by one. They also provide matrices that are collections of conceptual
structures used to structure a given image. A classic example is the analysis of the noun
“bachelor”, presented by Charles Fillmore to explain how social and sociological
frames (sets of matrices and scripts) work to shape concepts. As Fillmore explains,
“The noun »bachelor« can be defined as an unmarried adult man, but the noun clearly exists
as a motivated device for categorizing people only in the context of a human society in which
certain expectations about marriage and marriageable age obtain. Male participants in modern
long-term unmarried couplings would not ordinarily be described as bachelors; a boy abandoned
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in the jungle and grown to maturity away from contact with human society would not be called
a bachelor; John Paul II is not properly thought of as a bachelor” (Fillmore 1982: 31–59).
Thus, the notion “bachelor” functions properly solely in a culture that has the right
social framework, such as the concept of monogamous marriage and the right age to
get married. Therefore an eight-year-old boy will not normally be thought of as
a bachelor. Naturally, the issue is much more complex. The idea, though, is to stress
the cultural background of the concept “bachelor”. Fillmore’s model does not take into
account homosexuals or Muslims who can have more than one wife. The typical age
when one gets married and exceptions to the social obligation to marry (cf. Catholic
priests) also vary from culture to culture.
Thus, every culture creates a framework which helps form a category of actions and
attitudes relevant to a given community. The very model describing a notion, in the
form of a script or a social frame, does not exhaust its significance in communication
and cognition process. It cannot be treated as a definite meaningful unit, for its struc-
ture is subject to transformations which help to underline those aspects of a category
that are relevant at the moment. This is why cognitivists speak of mental scenes which
correspond to certain model mind images. Such a scene can be further “arranged” dur-
ing conceptualisation.
One of the basic mechanisms that shape the structure of mental scene, according to
Leonard Talmy, is the act of framing. In a nutshell, framing is attracting the recipient’s
attention to selected fragments of a scene, at the same time moving some less important
fragments to the background. To show how it works, Talmy presents various ways to
ask someone to bring milk from the fridge. The following description spans the full
range of actions needed to fetch milk from the fridge. Figures (1), (2) and (3) mark the
stages of the action forming a complete picture of the mental scene constituting the
script for “fetching milk from the fridge”:
[I need milk]
(1) Go, (2) take the milk out of the fridge (3) and bring it here.
However, the wording of the request need not contain all the three elements.
Fetch the milk from the fridge. (middle part framing)
Bring the milk here. (end framing)
Go and get the milk from the fridge. (end ellipsis)
Take the milk out of the fridge and bring it here. (beginning ellipsis)
Go and get the milk here. (middle part ellipsis)
Go, take the milk out of the fridge and bring it here. (full framing)
All of the commands above imply the same, complete script of actions connected
with fetching the milk from the fridge. However, each of them highlights a different
stage, a different fragment of the mental picture, thus partly modifying the meaning of
the request. Thus, we can speak of various possibilities of shaping the mental scene by
focusing the recipient’s attention (framing) on certain elements or omitting them. To
explain how framing and ellipsis influence the meaning of an utterance, let us imagine
significant elements of the mental scene describing the action of shopping. They in-
clude: the buyer, the seller/shop assistant (for instance, a Mr Black), the commodity,
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money, paying, receiving the commodity, bringing the commodity home. We can tell
a spouse about our shopping in a variety of ways, using framing:
A. Look what I bought.
B. Look what I brought home.
C. Look what I got at Mr Black’s.
D. Look what I spent my money on.
All of the above convey the message that shopping has been done; at the same time,
each of them expresses some additional information. Sentence A makes the interlocu-
tor interested in the shopping; B stresses the acquisition of a useful object; by under-
lining the location, C implies that the commodity is hard to come by in the neighbour-
hood; D emphasises the relation between the product’s value and its price.
The suggested interpretations of the sentences above are not the only possibilities.
They can help understand the role of framing in expressing various senses connected
with the act of shopping, though.
Wit tgenste in  –  dawning of  an aspect
Talmy’s framing deploys a fundamental mechanism of conceptualisation – focusing on
selected elements of the mental picture at the cost of others. Thus the same mental
scene can give rise to many different senses. Similarly, in eye perception the same
picture can be seen in different ways. This is stressed by Wittgenstein, who analyses an
illustration that appears several times in a certain textbook:
“You could imagine the illustration [3-d box-like structure] appearing in several places in
a book, a text-book for instance. In the relevant text something different is in question every time:
here a glass, there an inverted open box, there a wire frame of that shape, there three boards
forming a solid angle. Each time the text supplies the interpretation of the illustration. But we can
also see the illustration now as another” (Wittgenstein 1968: 270).
Seeing something in a specific way is what Wittgenstein calls “dawning of an as-
pect”. He is not interested in its psychological reasons, though. Cognitivists, on the
other hand, focus on analysing mind and perception processes in order to explain this
phenomenon. In the case of the illustration Wittgenstein describes, it is human ability
to complete schemata with detailed picture characteristics as well as the tendency to
supplement an incomplete picture with its complete image that cause the illustration to
be seen in a number of ways. That is why looking at the same object we see a cube or
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a solid angle. In the case of the former, what we see stands for the entire object; for the
latter, what we see is what it really is.
Wittgenstein has another example of differences in perception of the same object.
This time the explanation appears more complex, as there are more factors which can
influence the way the recipient perceives the object. The figure is called duck-hare:
The picture shows the head of a duck or of a hare, depending on how one sees it.
What factors, then, determine “how one sees it”? It seems that three significant ele-
ments that influence our interpretation of the drawing need to be pointed out. Firstly,
our glance goes from left to right. When it reaches halfway through the picture, we can
recognise a duck, not so much a hare. Another relevant issue is the so-called canonical
arrangement, which, in this example, makes the recipient see a duck, as its head is
pictured in its most common, horizontal position; if it was a hare, the head would be
positioned differently, as this arrangement is rather unnatural for a hare. This makes the
recipient less likely to see a hare in the picture. Finally (and usually most importantly),
the context plays a role. If the head of the duck-hare animal is seen floating over the
waves of a river, we are much more likely to see a duck than a hare. A body accompa-
nying the head would of course make everything absolutely clear. Such a solution may
appear trivial; however, it points to a fundamental mechanism of describing notions,
namely to establishing a relation of a part to a bigger whole. A finger is seen as part of
a hand, a branch forms part of a tree. If we see a broken branch that has fallen off a tree
we can recognise it, but in order to define a branch one needs to refer to the idea of the
tree. The case of the duck and the hare is similar. An animal’s head is definable only as
part of a bigger whole, in this case a living organism.
Prof i le ,  base
Cognitive semantics has it that the meaning of an object can be determined through its
relation to a particular context. As time goes by, context becomes so conventionalised
it is absorbed to such an extent that objects are recognisable through their attributes.
Thus, a realistic painting of a hare’s head does not require a body to be recognised.
However, the meaning of each concept is always determined on the basis of the context
of other concepts that encompass our understanding of the world. A typical definition
is, in a way, also a case of contextual completion, as it gives us some features that dis-
tinguish a given notion from other notions belonging to the same category. The kind of
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conceptualisation that consists in perceiving an object in a more general context arose
per analogiam to eye perception, where an element is seen against others.
The analogy between perception and conceptualisation was presented by Langacker
with the help of the so-called “perception metaphore”. The starting point here is eye
perception, described as follows: subject  of  observation (the person who sees
something), full  eye span that determines the boundaries of the perceptible area,
picture frames, that is to say the area which the subject of observation concentrates
on, and finally the highlighted object  of  observation. This model of sensual expe-
rience forms the basis of mental experience, which can also be described as above. The
relation between both kinds of experience is, after Langacker, synthetically described
by Elżbieta Tabakowska in her introduction to cognitive linguistics. She explains that,
according to Langacker:
“the subject is the speaker or the listener. Full eye span corresponds to the complete range of pos-
sible senses an utterance contains; in other words, all its potential interpretations based on full en-
cyclopaedic knowledge. Langacker calls this area maximum scope  of  semant ic  s t ruc-
ture ; within it there is a smaller range area that encompasses only those elements of semantic
structure that are directly relevant to the characteristics of a given concept. The rest is fuzzy and
barely noticeable, just like in visual perception. This reduced area, according to Langacker, is
called immedia te  scope . Within it there is what Langacker labels p rof i le , what our concep-
tualisation focuses on at a given moment” (Tabakowska 1995a: 59–61).
The model for conceptualising language expressions, as described by Langacker, is
general in scope and concerns all acts of thinking, also those that have to do with real-
ity perception.
Another advantage of Langacker’s model is the possibility to distinguish between
the kind of context that is associated with a concept by virtue of occasional connota-
tions, and another kind of context, activated due to its key role in defining a concept.
The latter is particularly well exemplified by the notion of hypotenuse, which, being
a segment, requires a context in the form of a right-angled triangle. The triangle forms
the conceptual base for the profile (the hypotenuse). Similarly, an island, a piece of
land in itself, is inconceivable in isolation from the surrounding water. Thus profile can
be part of base (cf. the case of hypotenuse), or only exist in relation to it (in actual fact,
an island is not part of an ocean). The distinction between profile and base constitutes
a fundamental relation in the description of conceptual structures. Any concept is under-
stood by grasping the relation that links it to the context of thorough world knowledge,
stored in the human mind in the form of cognitive domains: frames, scripts and images.
Context
As in the case of meaning, cognitivists describe context within the framework of
mental processes. In relation to utterance, they call it
“the set of premises used in interpreting an utterance (apart from the premise that the utterance in
question has been produced). A context is a psychological construct, a subset of the hearer’s as-
sumptions about the world. It is these assumptions, of course, rather than the actual state of the
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world, that affect the interpretation of an utterance. A context in this sense is not limited to infor-
mation about the immediate physical environment or the immediately preceding utterances: ex-
pectations about the future, scientific hypotheses or religious beliefs, anecdotal memories, general
cultural assumptions, beliefs about the mental state of the speaker, may all play a role in interpre-
tation” (Sperber, Wilson op.cit.: 15–16).
The above-mentioned areas of human knowledge used in interpreting events are
nothing new compared to previous methodologies. However, the task that cognitivists
set out to do is slightly different. Their interest is not so much in reconstructing the
right interpretative context as in understanding the mechanism of its selection.
So far nobody has been able to come up with a theory that would fully explain the
problem posed above, but the very awareness of the necessity to consider the mecha-
nism that controls the application of context is a feature of cognitive methodology.
Although other methodologies also display some interest in context as a meaning-
creative device, in cognitive semantics context is not limited to information coming
from the immediate environment and communicative actions immediately preceding
a given moment. Context is here to be understood as a set of images functioning in the
recipient’s mind and premises necessary to interpret a particular situation. Thus, apart
from incoming information, context can encompass: recipient expectations, scientific
hypotheses, religion, anecdotal memory, cultural beliefs, and assumptions about the
mental state of the speaker. Sperber and Wilson subdivide context into: direct, implied
and encyclopaedic. They all point to different cognitive abilities of the recipient, and
the differences between them can lead to multiple interpretations of the same phenom-
ena. After all, the scope of knowledge stored in human minds varies considerably from
person to person; drawing conclusions does not always proceed along the same lines,
and the amount of sensual data depends on a given person’s perceptiveness. There is no
doubt that standards of implication, required scope of knowledge or system of values
can be set; still, if recipients are supposed to react spontaneously to the input that they
receive, their interpretations should be based on premises that they draw from their
own experience. In order to be successful communicators, therefore, we either have to
tailor our message to someone’s understanding of the world, or to change that under-
standing itself.
Peter Stein, who worked on his version of Shakespeare’s As You Like It and made
an extensive study of the Elizabethan period (Patterson 1981: 123–150), opted for the
latter solution. He decided to present the results of his research in the form of
a “museum of Shakespeare”. It showed living pictures, processions and customs that
Stein and his team collected about Shakespeare. The experience that the audience ac-
quired through that did not make the drama’s meanings explicit, but certainly served as
a good background to the play. As the audience watched the exhibition their knowl-
edge and understanding of Shakespeare’s times changed, which led to a change in the
context in which they appreciated the action on stage.
What Stein did is actually relatively common in theatre. The programme the audi-
ence can read through before the play begins serves a similar purpose, although to
a lesser extent. In materials like that the director often enumerates the sources that in-
spired him in his work. Thus he provides his audience with the kind of knowledge that
enables them – at least partially – to see the events in the play from the same angle (or
in the same context) as the artist did.
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Metonymy – genera l  pr inc ip les
Metonymy is the last significant cognitive category discussed in this chapter. In princi-
ple, cognitivism understands metonymy more or less like it is understood in the tradi-
tional approach. Słownik terminów literackich (Dictionary of Literary Terms) (1988)
defines metonymy as “replacement of an object’s or phenomenon’s name with an-
other”. Similarly, Lakoff in Metaphors We Live by says that “Metonymy […] allows us
to use one entity to stand for another” (Lakoff, Johnson 1988: 36). Both the quoted
sources subdivide metonymy into classes that subsume individual metonymous expres-
sions under more general categories:
PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT:
“He bought a Ford”.
“I hate to read Heidegger”.
CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED:
“Nixon bombed Hanoi”.
“Napoleon lost at Waterloo”.
(ibidem: 38)
CAUSE FOR RESULT:
“A bullet killed him”.
SIGN FOR OBJECT:
“Defeated half-moon”.
(Słownik terminów literackich, op.cit.: 308)
However, unlike in the traditional approach, cognitive semantics treats metonymy
as much more than just a figure of speech. The role it plays in the process of designa-
tion was commented on by Lakoff, who speaks of “a general metonymy whereby
words s tand for  the concepts  they express” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 108).
To recapitulate – meaning is not rooted in words, but in concepts produced by the hu-
man mind. The scope of these concepts is broader than the objects designated by
words. Thinking of the word “lawnmower” one conjures up not only a conceptual im-
age of the person involved in the given activity, but also imagines an overgrown field
where the lawnmower is working. The fact that words designate a broader conceptual
scope is paramount also in symbolic metonymy, for example in the case of the dove
symbolising the Holy Spirit.
“this symbolism is not arbitrary. It is grounded in the conception of the dove in Western culture
and the conception of the Holy spirit in Christian theology. There is a reason why the dove is the
symbol of the Holy Spirit and not, say, the chicken, the vulture, or the ostrich. The dove is con-
ceived of as beautiful, friendly, gentle, and, above all, peaceful. As a bird, its natural habitat is the
sky, which metonymically stands for heaven, the natural habitat of the Holy Spirit. The dove is
a bird that flies gracefully, glides silently, and is typically seen coming out of the sky and landing
among people” (Lakoff, Johnson, op.cit.: 41).
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Due to this extensive connotation of the word “dove”, the characteristic white bird can
help people get a better grasp of the Holy Spirit, an abstract being. Thus the principle
of language metonymy based on the part (designate) for whole (full conceptualisation)
structure helps to root our abstract conceptual system in everyday experience.
The “part for whole” principle works in language not only in the case of a broader
meaning-creative context that departs from the designate. It is also used in coining names
where a single feature or attribute stand for an entire object or phenomenon. When asked
what a cuckoo is one tends to describe what the bird looks like, but the name itself is
indicative only of the sound it makes. Cognitivists are of the opinion that it is one of the
more significant rules that shape our reasoning. They claim that the choice of the part to
stand for the whole does not happen at random, but is guided by important cognitive
reasons. The Polish ścierka (lit. dishcloth) means “a piece of usually linen or cotton cloth
used for drying dishes in the kitchen” (Słownik Języka Polskiego 1978: 441). The name
stresses the function of the object, which is quite pragmatic, but to dry the dishes one can
also use a rag (Pol. szmatka), “a shred of cloth” (ibidem); there is every likelihood that
whether one asks for a rag or a dishcloth, the actual object one gets will be exactly the
same. This does not run counter to the fact that the concept of a dishcloth is somewhat
different from that of a rag, both concepts being shaped by important cognitive reasons.
What matters most in the concept “dishcloth” is what we use it for, the connotation we
have when we think of a rag is little value and, consequently, no need to be very careful
about it. In general one could say that a dishcloth and a rag are essentially the same ob-
jects, but when precision matters one is apt to say “please pack a few dishcloths”, as not
every rag can be used to dry dishes.
It is very often for pragmatic reasons that we decide to use exact terminology, but
the rationale may also be different. A highly aesthetic person might not want to think
of a rag to dry dishes. The sentence “John wrapped a dishcloth round the leaking pipe”
may also strike one as infelicitous (unless John actually did use a dishcloth). For politi-
cal reasons we will use metonymy and say “Nixon bombed Hanoi” to stress who is
responsible, even though President Nixon himself never dropped any bombs. Thus,
metonymy is quite significant in language and in our conceptual system, as it helps
shape the message and understanding of the world in accordance with certain prag-
matic, aesthetic, syntactic or rhetorical restrictions. In this way language structures or
cognitive domains are not a passive reflection of the perceived world, but a result of
active mental interpretation of sensual stimuli, in the context of internal needs and the
knowledge gained.
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2. MENTAL STRUCTURES; FIGURE – BACKGROUND
The role of cognitive domains in understanding the events on stage
The key role that cognitive domains play in gathering extralingusitic knowledge and
arranging it in the human mind is confirmed by a number of linguistic, anthropological
or psychological works recently written by cognitivists. A lot of language phenomena,
inexplicable in classicl linguistics, can be analysed within the framework of the meth-
odology that relates to structures describing human mental processes. Anthropology
also explains various forms of cultural activity by means of shared images that appear
in the minds of the individuals that form a given culture. Cognitive psychology is based
on similar assumptions: “Human behaviour depends not only on incoming information
from the outside world, but also on cognitive domains, that is knowledge acquired
through learning and thinking, encoded in long-term memory” (Kozielecki op.cit.).
The three above-mentioned areas of science hold interest for theatre researchers;
that is why cognitive sciences can be used in theatre research. However, whereas psy-
chological or anthropological aspects can form an integral part of the reception of
a theatrical performance, conceptualisation of meaning cannot be restricted to psychi-
cal reactions or cultural codes. That is why cognitive linguistics is such an interesting
domain, providing comprehensive treatment of cognitive domains as a basis for inter-
personal communication, with respect to psychology of reception and cultural aspects
of language. However, the highly critical remarks about theoretical models based on
quasi-linguistic models of performance reception as well as the well-known limitations
to the semiotic method which strives to describe theatre language, cause misgivings
about another attempt to ally linguistics with theatrology. Therefore using cognitive
domains in the analysis of the process of performance reception in the theatre merits
a few words of explanation.
Firstly, even if cognitive domains are independent meaning units, they are neither
clearly determined nor unchangeable, unlike in the classical theory of sign. In cogni-
tivism, these domains are structured by the recipient, in accordance with a number of
contextual factors. As a consequence, cognitivism dismisses the existence of elemen-
tary units, which formed a basic concept in traditional semiotics. This rule was in line
with linguistic assumptions, which held that “any semiotic study sensu stricto consists
in identifying units, describing their distinctive features and working towards more and
more exact markers of distinctiveness” (Benveniste 1977: 33).
Secondly, the interest in meaning interpretation does not limit a theatrical perform-
ance to a mere act of communication, decoding which means nothing more than identi-
fying meaning units. Identifying individual cognitive domains that the audience de-
velop whilst watching the play, merely establishes a background for further study of
the comprehension process which comprises the remaining aspects of mental activity.
The final structure of cognitive domains depends also on individual factors of percep-
tion, such as perceptiveness, mental state, ideological and aesthetic assumptions.
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Finally, let us explain to what extent and in what way cognitive methods of struc-
ture analysis can be used to describe the reception of a theatrical performance. The
simple relations that hold between the body which profiles the head of, receptively,
a duck or a hare, (cf. Wittgenstein’s example) appear too trivial to be applied to the
complex images of a theatrical performance. On the other hand, the impressive range
of cognitive domains representing language forms seems to be too detailed for a theatre
play.
Therefore, this chapter focuses on one of the paramount relations which shape our
cognition process, viz. the background – figure relation. The reason why that particular
structure has been selected is threefold:
A. The background – figure relation actually lies at the bottom of most cognitive
domains, manifesting itself as the distinction into marked and other elements of a con-
cept.
B. It fits within the framework of perception metaphor – a construct clearly appli-
cable in the theatre context – linking individual aspects of visual perception with rele-
vant aspects of conceptualisation. In this case, “figure” stands for a highlighted visible
object. Mentally, it corresponds to the subject of conceptualisation, or what conceptu-
alisation focuses on at a given moment. “Background”, in turn, covers a wider attention
span and the corresponding semantic structure scope comprising elements directly
relevant in characterising a given concept.
C. The relation helps seek analogy between the mental picture and acts of ostension,
which, according to prior assumptions, constitute one of the main aspects of theatre as
art.
Metonymy as a fundamenta l  ru le  o f  menta l  representat ion
In cognitivism metonymy describes the relation between perception data and resulting
mental images. Perceived images, often fragmented, lead to the audience developing
more complex images in their minds; these are necessary to adequately interpret what
we perceive through our senses. The principle is well-known among theatrical direc-
tors; in line with it, in some mise en scènes the set and the acting only suggest possible
interpretations. A very typical example of metonymy in theatre can be found in Jerzy
Grzegorzewski’s version of The Threepenny Opera, where London as the setting was
represented by a small model of Tower Bridge. The protagonist, Mac the Knife, can be
found squeezed between the spans of the small bridge, whereas according to the plot he
should be in prison. To stress that fact, Grzegorzewski uses metonymy again, by put-
ting bars into the prompt box facing the audience. Kate and Polly who come to see
Macheath in prison talk to him through these very bars. Thus the audience can conjure
up two superimposed images (London and the prison), thanks to the use of metonymy.
Paradoxically, the convict’s prison cell was in fact the whole of London, whereas the
women who were not imprisoned were crammed into the tiny prompter’s box.
Things become more complex with abstract images, which form an inherent part of
any performance. We tend to refer to the basic sense of the events shown on stage us-
ing such notions as hate, conflict, recognition, expulsion, etc. Though some of them
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manifest themselves in real actions, it is difficult to show the meaning of these notions
leaving no room for multiple interpretations. How to show the ultimate union of two
lovers? If it happens to be a happy end of an adventurous love story, the protagonists
are quite likely to be pictured kissing each other. In a tragedy, the audience may see
a grave shared by the two lovers. In a Catholic wedding ceremony the unity is symbol-
ised by tying the newlyweds’ hands with a stole. In any case, the given action shows
the ultimate unity of two people only partially. Each solution also highlights a different
aspect of the union. A kiss signifies passion, the tying of the hands stresses the indis-
solubility of the marriage, whereas the shared grave implies eternal unification.
Images that the audience generate in their minds are thus more than a simple reflec-
tion of what they can see on stage. Metonymy prompts imagination, which completes
and gives meaning to what is being seen. Naturally, there are performances so mimetic
in their character that the audience can hardly activate their imagination in this way.
Contemporary theatre, though, is more inclined toward suggesting meaning, and me-
tonymy, being the basis of cognition, makes it possible. It is through active completion
of images that the audience take part in creating meanings suggested by the mise en
scène. Their images become more personal, unlike those imposed by the staging, where
even the tiniest details of pictures and actions have been designed. Metonymy also
enables pictures to be superimposed, whereas in an actual theatrical performance this is
implausible. Mise en scène does not only passively suggest images, because images are
dependent on how they are suggested. Metonymy is about selecting a fragment of the
complete image to be pictured on stage. The action of tying hands during a wedding
ceremony brings to mind a different image of a relationship than the picture of two
lovers kissing.
Prof i le  –  base re la t ion
The audience’s active role in creating meanings is not restricted solely to completing
fragments of images shown on stage, but also lies in establishing relations between
selected elements of the staging. One of the main meaning-creative operations that the
audience are involved in is determining which elements of mise en scène constitute
profile (subject of cognition) and which constitute its base (the immediate context
needed to define the subject of cognition). The audience establish that relation on the
basis of incoming information from the stage, but the very division into profile and
base is a conceptual one, and as such cannot be found in acting and stage events. It is
also essential that occasional context (which adds secondary shades of meaning, usu-
ally emotive meaning) be distinguished from the kind of context which forms the base
of a concept. When a devil’s figure is illuminated in red, the intention is to create the
atmosphere of terror (or its ironical opposite). The red light, though, is not contextually
sufficient to understand the concept of devil; what is needed is the metaphysical struc-
ture of the world of gods, angels and creatures from hell.
Whether the profile – base structure that shapes the meaning of a selected fragment
of mise en scène is generated by the audience’s collective mind, depends on staging
arrangements and on the audience themselves – their knowledge, way of thinking, and
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attitude. A good example which shows how the relation in question is formed is the
scene from Shakespeare’s King Lear where the kingdom is divided. The text itself does
not suggest a clear enough interpretation; this is pointed out by Jan Kott, who stresses
the weak points of the exposition,
“astonishing in its bareness, sketching of conflict, gradation. King Lear’s exposition is ridiculous,
if one is to seek at least some psychological likelihood in it: a grand and formidable ruler holds
a speech contest among his three daughters who are to voice their love to their father; the results
of the contest are decisive in the country’s division. Lear sees no evil and hears no evil; Regan
and Goneril’s hypocrisy are apparent. As a character, Lear is ludicrous, naive and silly. When he
goes mad, he evokes sympathy, but hardly compassion and fear” (Kott op.cit.: 66).
A director who subscribes to this opinion is facing a daunting task: his mise en scène
should not display the weaknesses in exposition that Kott exposes.
Giorgio Strehler’s staging attempts to add a tragic dimension to Lear’s fate. As he
was looking for a more convincing rationale of the king’s behaviour during the cere-
mony of dividing the land among his daughters, Strehler moved the daughters’ hypoc-
risy to the background, opting for highlighting the conflict between the king’s dying
generation and the youth who yearn for power. Strehler describes the nature of this
particular generation gap:
“The old generation consists of Lear, Gloucester and Kent. Old Man, tenant to Gloucester,
makes a brief appearance, too. There are very few representatives of the older generation and a lot
of the young and greedy ones. It seems to me that this balance is paramount, regardless of
whether we achieve it through »naturalness« or through »convention«. What matters is that
amongst the agile, cruel and greedy animals who »happen to live at a later date«, both the old men
look like two mammoths. Their moves are slow, as if numbed. It’s a daunting vision, this de-
fenceless old generation shuffling along in mud. The youth around them are clawing their way
and burning out in hot and cool passions” (Strehler op.cit.: 284).
Strehler’s comments stem from his knowledge of the complete text, but in order for
the audience to appreciate the play, the generation gap should manifest itself at the very
beginning, in the exposition. This is how Strehler imagines the opening scene of the
tragedy on stage:
“Lear puts on his cloak. Light goes on – and here we see »King Lear’s court«. An almost pa-
thetic impression. The King sits in the middle, his crown on his head, wearing a long, dark-red
cloak with folds going behind his back. There are others on his side, also wearing crowns, head-
bands or gilded noblemen’s rings. They are all young, long-haired, with magnificent beards,
striking casual poses, their hair extravagantly coiffured. The men are clad in dark, almost shiny
clothes, tight-fitting sleeveless doublets and boots; the women are wearing coats and scarves with
patterns painted on them. Next to the old, white-faced and wrinkled king there is another old man
with fair eyes and an almost ridiculous air. A third old man stands opposite them. There is nobody
else. A feeling of isolation and loneliness of the old. A feeling of temporariness and falsity of the
court” (ibidem: 296–297).
Strehler’s intended division of the characters into old and young renders multiple
interpretations. The very division into two opposing groups does not completely de-
termine which element of the resulting arrangement the recipients’ conceptualisation
should focus on. In our example there are three possible choices of the highlighted
element constituting – along with the other elements – the profile of the cognitive do-
main:
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– Focusing on Lear’s behaviour we see the old, anachronistic king’s isolation.
– Shifting attention to the young we see their greed.
– We can also highlight the very relation that pinpoints the conflict and the genera-
tion change in particular.
Strehler’s remarks suggest that he opted for the third possibility, which focuses on
the change itself and its consequences. It is worth noting, though, that unless the audi-
ence see the king’s out-of-date behaviour and the young’s greed, they won’t be able to
conceptualise the generation gap. Thus in the example under analysis here, the change
constitutes the profile, whereas the base, the necessary counterpart, is Lear’s anachro-
nistic behaviour and the greed of the young. In the first and the second options the two
elements of the structure also condition each other. Lear’s failure to comprehend con-
temporary reality is shown in his idea to underline his power through an impotent rite.
In the new world what matters is strength and determination, symbolised by the tight-
fitting doublets showing the characters’ muscles and their nonchalant poses, indicative
of lack of respect toward tradition. Lear’s obsolete attitude can only be seen through
the young’s negligent and greedy behaviour, determining the then-current reality.
A comparison of Strehler’s interpretation of Shakespeare’s play and his pre-staging
assumptions reveals predictable correspondence. However, this alone does not guaran-
tee that the audience will arrive at identical interpretations just watching the particular
performance. My students, who saw it in class, were rarely able to appreciate Strehler’s
intended division, even if they had read his comments beforehand. To a certain extent,
this may have been attributable to the fact that, for technical reasons, the video version
they saw slightly blurred the visual differences between both groups of characters. It is
not so much the question of the extent to which the mise en scène achieved its intended
purpose, but rather which factors influence its interpretation. Watching the play on
a TV screen should therefore be treated as watching it under special conditions. In their
comments, my students paid particular attention to the relations holding between the
threesome: Lear, Cordelia and their sisters. The other members of the court were
thought of as merely context accompanying the events taking place between the three
characters in question. Thus, the court only served as a background for the events of
the play; although physically observable, it played no significant role in understanding
the conflicts and behaviour of the four protagonists. In their interpretations students
tended to juxtapose Cordelia’s honesty and Regan and Goneril’s mendacity.
The rationale for this interpretation of events is multifaceted, to say the least. It
seems that the dichotomy of one good daughter vs. several bad ones, a model that fa-
bles often deploy, is firmly rooted in our literary imagination; if so, then it is more
likely to be referred to in the context of a theoretical performance than any other
structure – here the generation gap. What is more, the princes’ costumes were patterned
after Italian young fashion from the 1960’s, which an average Pole finds almost as
exotic as Lear’s costume. Thus the intended contrast between the youth wearing fash-
ionable clothes and Lear’s retinue in their démodé attires became fuzzy. Another rea-
son has to do with the mise en scène itself. A female student comments: “The girl
(Cordelia) says she is truthful to her father. Unlike her sisters’ coiffured, fair hair (one
white-haired, the other red-haired), hers is long, straight, natural”. Stressing the con-
trast between Lear’s daughters does not leave out the king himself. Their honesty or
dishonesty are feelings they harbour for their father, who automatically becomes
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a necessary component of meaning as a whole or, in Langacker’s terminology, the
concept’s base.
As they were analysing the play’s opening scene, my students also paid attention to
the scene where Cordelia leaves the court’s area, marked with a transparent curtain,
and demonstratively sheds her royal cloak. They interpreted that gesture as a clear
symbol of mutiny against the court’s falsity. Strehler understands Cordelia’s behaviour
similarly, but he does not see the rebellion in such a positive light as the students do. In
her dissociation from the court’s untruthfulness, Cordelia goes against a certain fixed
order, which, naturally, evokes the king’s rage. He sees the rite not as a test of love, but
a ceremony confirming his power as the Lord’s Annointed through his daughters’
adulatory addresses. However, the students did not see this hidden meaning, not infre-
quently failing to even accept the interpretation.
The reasons why students’ interpretations differ from Strehler’s are explicable only
by analysing the profile-base structure, which profiles the meaning of Cordelia’s action
in relation to the complete exposition. The gesture itself (profile) has to be interpreted
in the context of the events preceding it (in other words, its base). Mutiny, by defini-
tion, is directed against something. Thus my students’ interpretation stemmed not from
their difficulties to recognise the characteristics of Cornelia’s behaviour, but rather
from their subjective attitude to the ceremony itself. An experiment among the students
showed that the subjects who disapproved of the rite itself were more reserved toward
Strehler’s claim that Lear sees his youngest daughter’s action as sacrilegious. It is not
sacrilege to go against principles established through tradition we do not approve of.
Speaking of that, it is worth noting that this instance proves that the meaning of a ges-
ture determines the attitude the recipient has toward the context that profiles the
meaning of the main gesture. Thus validation becomes a meaning-creative part of cog-
nitive domain.
In his staging, Strehler attempted to make the audience feel at loath about Cordelia
by his choice of music accompanying the events. He wanted the beginning to appear
solemn.
“A choir that is almost church-like, a fairly »archaic« modulation of the feudal rite, in line
with Shakespeare’s text, the verbal formula of declaring children’s love for parents. This ritual
»atmosphere« eventually leads to verbal and sonic disorder. Upsetting the order leads to cool,
mathematical disorder” (ibidem: 305).
Thus the music was intended to stress the significance of Cornelia’s action that upset
the “sacred” order. In the video version the choir’s singing stopped as Cornelia started
protesting; the above-mentioned disorder was not there. However, Cornelia’s behav-
iour cannot be assessed in universal terms; it depends on the recipient’s attitude to the
singing which precedes the disobedient daughter’s address. The music, which Strehler
thought would create a solemn mood, was often interpreted as merely another element
of the anachronistic rite. Some students even used the expression “church singing”, in
a negative sense of the word.
This comparison of multiple interpretations of the same scene shows how a differ-
ent arrangement of the same set of elements leads to a change in meaning of the events.
This applies both to the paradigmatic aspect of the picture, for example the dichotomy
of the young and the old, and to the relations which link the subsequent parts of the
play, that is to say its syntagmatic dimension. Normally, a gesture of protest refers to
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the events or situation preceding it. The meaning of a given fragment of the perform-
ance depends on which elements are considered to be profile and which its base. How-
ever, it is not an independent and unrestrained decision of the audience who rely on
their subjective beliefs and attitudes. It is also perception itself, as well as acts of osten-
sion attracting the audience’s attention to certain objects and actions, that influence
which element or relation will be singled out.
Prof i le  and prof i l ing
The profile – base relation, which determines the meaning of concepts, is generated
by the human mind in the process of highlighting certain elements of the mental picture
against others. To analyse the mental representation of observed events, two-element
structures are not sufficient, though. In its construction of the mental picture of the
world, the human mind deploys also abstract categories. Once they are determined,
a schematic cognitive pattern is developed that classifies a given phenomenon as proc-
ess, object, quality or state. In natural language these structures have the form of
grammatical categories. Thus, via an analysis of linguistic expressions, one can reach
an understanding of how the audience interpret selected fragments of a performance.
For example, members of the audience use short expressions to describe what they see
on stage: escape (noun derived from verb – process), terrifying storm (noun + adjective
– state, character of the scene), middle-class living room (nominal expression – object,
place).
In Langacker’s terminology, the process of forming particular cognitive categories
is called profiling. Thus, an expression, an external stimulus, profiles a given cognitive
category that represents a relevant grammatical category. In theatre the process is quite
similar, but it is the context of the events shown on stage that determines the form of
a cognitive category. Here conventions determining whether the actions of a character
take the plot forward or merely present certain qualities are hard to find. The very ar-
rangement of elements on stage – theatrical and “mental” – does not ultimately deter-
mine conceptualisation. In his example, Langacker analyses two expressions with dif-
ferent meanings, which are based on the same integration of elements of a mental scene
– a football lying under a table (Langacker 1987: 289–290):
That football under the table. (profile football)
That football is under the table. (profile relation – under the table)
Both sentences bring to mind the same general picture (a football under a table),
whereas the difference in meaning arises as a consequence of language profiling, that is
marking certain structures of the picture.
In theatre, things work in a similar way. When we see an actor standing on a table it
is our decision whether we interpret it as pinpointing a character, highlighting them
(“look at the one on the table”) or stressing the relation (somebody on a table), leading
to interpretative conclusions: ill-mannered, the head of the family, etc. Theatre does not
have such a strongly conventional system as language and, as we have already indi-
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cated, is more dependent on elements outside mise en scène. Let us name but two that
are of prime importance to theatre:
1. cultural context,
2. an interpretative hypothesis formulated in relation to a larger fragment of the plot
that determines the reception of particular scenes.
The role of the story presented on stage remains central to the arrangement of
events. Whether the audience have read the text of the play or not, they themselves
arrange the sequence of events in certain conventionalised plot patterns. Thus they
enrich mise en scène with additional meanings related to the pattern or interpretation of
the pre-read play.
Cultural differences are also very important in appreciating contemporary theatre,
which often purports to be universal art. Unlike in the case of literary works, which
need to be translated, theatrical performances are frequently shown in the original,
regardless of the target culture. There are, however, limits to universalism in theatre, as
interpretation of acting tends to vary from culture to culture.
The findings of Peter Brook’s research into the language of theatre as a universal
code appear to be very interesting. John Heilpern, who accompanied Brook in his ex-
perimental trip to Africa, comments that “an European actor leaning forward to show
an old man can be interpreted in Africa as doing some kind of physical exercise”
(Heilpern 1978: 109). In line with the old joke about a doctor asking a hunchback why
he is creeping like that, one can imagine that an African audience, seeing Molière’s
Miser, hunched and moving sideways, can see him as a clever thief attempting to
snatch another character’s moneybag. In that particular case the interpretation is not
altogether wrong, in fact, but it does change the meaning of the acting considerably: in
lieu of character (adjective) we get action (verb).
Actually Peter Brook experienced something very much like that himself. In his
search of a language of theatre that would be shared by different cultures, he prepared
a simple scene to act out with his troupe. The scene’s central element was a pair of
boots. It started with an actor putting a pair of boots somewhere, walking away from it,
then going back to them, putting them on and beginning a stroll… Brook and his crew
could not understand why that particular scene aroused genuine interest and apprecia-
tion in one village and in another the reception was at best perfunctory, clearly with
precious little understanding on the part of the audience.
Brook himself was of the opinion that his troupe based his improvisation on sym-
bols and elements very typical of European culture, but hardly known to African vil-
lagers (ibidem: 109). What his multinational team have to say about it sheds some more
light on the nature of the difference in interpreting the same action by different audi-
ences. Heilpern describes how Katsulas places his big army boots in the middle of the
stage, capturing the audience’s attention, then approaches it, expressing great joy at
having found a pair of boots in the middle of a desert; he then puts them on, feeling just
great, strutting around the carpet like a newly born man (ibidem: 98). Yoshi Oida, in
turn, comments that:
“in Africa, just as in Japan, boots represent wealth, culture and status. From then on, a point of
contact – an understanding – existed between our audience and us, and we were able to begin im-
provising. Someone put the boots on, then walked to and fro, displaying their immense power and
wealth. People immediately understood, and loved what was going on’ (Peter Brook and the Ma-
habharata 1991: 110).
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It is clear that the same actions were interpreted quite differently. Heilpern de-
scribes how the boots were found (action), whereas his Japanese colleague, who treats
boots as a certain symbol, focuses on personal features (character). The difference in
the function of boots in both cultures in question resulted in profiling different cogni-
tive categories; thus, Katsulas’ improvisation is understood, in the first case, as action
or, in the other, as “presentation of quality”. After all, it does make a difference
whether we perceive a performance as an adventure story or as a presentation of
a character.
* * *
When one looks into mise en scène that are more complex than a simple improvisa-
tion, one notices a much greater complexity of cognitive domains forming concepts.
Multiplying cognitive categories determining the character of actions, though, would
result in an endless array of mental structures. Critical approaches, reduced to describ-
ing a limited set of elements typical for a given mise en scène, require a detailed analy-
sis of cognitive domains necessary to comprehend a performance. In the theory of
theatre, though, it is more important to establish general relations between a variety of
contexts and the process of bringing out elements in a cognitive domain (a mental rep-
resentation of stage events and actions), which would hold regardless of the level of
generalisation.
Let us refer back to Langacker’s example (Langacker 1987: 214–216) to introduce
the cognitive method of symbolic description of semantic phenomena, which is neces-
sary to further our discussion on profiling cognitive domains in the reception of a theat-
rical performance. Langacker stresses the difference in profiling the conceptual struc-
ture by two different expressions, exemplifying it by the words [GROUP] and
[NEAR]:
[NEAR] profiles a relation:
In the diagram above, e stands for a single cognitive event, for example profiling
a region in mental space, or establishing a relation. The thick line (e3) symbolises the
relation of closeness (near). The squares (e1 and e2), as elements of the relation (e3)
brought out in the conceptual structure of the expression [NEAR], have been marked in
thick line too. A relation is therefore an independent cognitive event, as it is always
accompanied by its counterparts.
[GROUP] is the basis for a nominal structure:
Here the relation (e3) is just an additional cognitive event, linking e1 and e2 that






that hold between individual elements in this case are not as significant as the basic
cognitive event, that is singling the group out of the other elements.
Thus, when the audience see a group of actors on stage, they are involved in a cog-
nitive activity, as they have to decide whether to treat the characters on stage as
[GROUP] or to highlight their spatial relations in that they are “next to each other”
[NEAR]. The system of theatrical conventions does not allow for such distinctions.
Therefore what frequently matters most is the interpretative hypothesis that stems from
prior assumptions as to the general character of the mise en scène or from prior knowl-
edge of the plot.
To decide how to label the group of characters on stage, let us analyse four expres-




– PROPER NAME (e.g. PEASANTS).
Each of these refer to a particular gathering of characters on stage. Thus all the four
expressions carry the same basic conceptual value. It has the form of a set of elements
that create a fuzzy whole:
Figure 1
(In Langacker’s notation which we have adopted in this dissertation, circles represent
objects, whereas squares may represent objects or relations)
At this stage of our analysis the human gathering on stage is a homogeneous mass
(Langacker 1991: 71) in the form of a number of characters that form a whole only
because of their topographic proximity. This kind of conceptualisation is called un-
bounded region of conceptual structure. The audience can provide the contour them-
selves, though. By widening the scope of conceptual structure one can determine the
contour of an area within our interest against the background. Langacker describes
looking at a red circle on a white wall in close-up; as a result, one can only see
a shapeless red mass. To see the shape one has to walk away from the wall far enough
for our eye span to cover also the white background against which the red circle is
painted (ibidem: 65). Contour in cognitivism is not limited to the lines delineating the
space an object occupies. It can also be imposed on an area by highlighting the relation
that links individual elements. This is what happens in the case of the expression
“team”, whose members are seen as an entity, as they cooperate to achieve a goal to-
gether. This is called “internal contouring”, as opposed to external contouring (cf. the
red circle).
                                                       
 Homogeneity constitutes a distinctive feature of mass nouns, according to Langacker.




One expression, viz. CROWD, appears to be of particular interest; it is also quite
problematic to interpret in the given context. In Leon Schiller’s staging of Nie-Boska
komedia (Non-Divine comedy) (Zawistowski 1927: 50), there is a scene with mutinous
masses in the third act. Władysław Zawistowski, in his comments, uses such expres-
sions as “the crowd acts as a single mass”, “individuals form part of a mass”, which
seems to imply that the region of conceptual structure that corresponds to the picture
on stage is unbounded. Thus the shape of the crowd becomes irrelevant; so do the rela-
tions which hold among its members. Other fragments of the text, though, reveal some
characteristics of the crowd, such as “vitality”, “harmony”, “anonymity”, “threat it
poses for noblemen and merchants” (ibidem: 51); these are specifically underlined by
the critic. One can thus venture to say that in Schiller’s staging CROWD functioned (at
least in Zawistowski’s perspective) as an area profiled in the so-called quality space
(Langacker 1991: 73–74). Thus, the area’s contour would be determined by the inten-









T1 – vitality of the crowd
T2 – harmony, homogeneity
T3 – threat
T – profiled area at the crossing of quality spaces, marked in thick line.
This perception of CROWD seems to be in line with the expressive character of
Schiller’s staging. CROWD is not an “object”, nor is it a group of people linked by
particular relations.
Contouring of a different kind is observable in Joanna Walaszek’s description of
Swinarski’s version of Forefathers’ Eve. The expression that she uses to call the par-
ticipants in the forefathers’ rite, namely GROMADA, gives rise to a conceptual struc-
ture bounded by the relation of co-operation that marks the GROMADA’s unity. It is
manifested by the GROMADA’s reaction to events: “GROMADA disapproves of the
girl’s gesture”. The community is weakened when the rite’s observers are not unani-
mous in their actions: “The ghost of the girl causes repulsion with some of the women,
sympathy with others. As to the boys, they are excited”. Certain events, though, enable
the participants to reunite: “The gromada is most firmly united in hatred toward the
Ghost of the Evil Master” (Walaszek op.cit.: 192).
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The area of the semantic structure that corresponds to Walaszek’s expression
GROMADA, is bounded just like in the case of the word “team”. The only difference is
that the GROMADA’s shared objective should be interpreted along emotional rather
than pragmatic lines (compassion, hatred, fear, not – for example – winning a match).
An individual joins a community if their attitude to relevant events is in line with that




























The figure shows how relation e5 that represents the attitude of character e9 to
events e10 contours and delineates the area of GROMADA [G1]. In other words, char-
acters e1, e2 and e3 belong in the area [G1] only because if they are placed under e9,
their reaction to event e10 can be described using relation e5. If e10 stands for the ap-
pearance of the Evil Master’s ghost, relation e5 refers to hatred that the members of the
crew display.
The rural GROMADA seen as a community united through common reactions is in
contrast to a later scene, namely Great Improvisation, where “there are PEASANTS on
stage, the same individuals who took part in the rite”. They are the same individuals,
but no longer a GROMADA, just PEASANTS, who ‘are sleeping, eating, drinking,
quite indifferent to Konrad’s ordeal” (ibidem: 201). The fact that the PEASANTS are
indifferent to what is going on around them is again in contrast to the GROMADA’s
vivid reactions. The internal links which used to unite the members of the rite are bro-
ken. The plural (PEASANTS) makes it possible to conceptualise individual characters
as performing certain actions separately from the others. Some are sleeping, others
eating, still others drinking. The plural is less likely in the case of GROMADA which,
as a mass noun, can take singular verbs. This stresses the unity of all the GROMADA’s
members.
















(Elements in the GROMADA diagram are not labelled for purely technical reasons,
to reduce the number of indices ascribed to the letter e).
The thin lines e4, e5, e6 that link the individual units e1, e2, e3 signify that the rela-
tions that obtain between them are irrelevant. The absence of relation linking region
CH with any other cognitive unit is due to internal contouring of the area correspond-
ing to the expression [PEASANTS]. Thus, the factor that determines whether an indi-
vidual falls under the category PEASANTS is, in Swinarski’s version, mostly their
costume.
Thus, PEASANTS are shown as similar, but unrelated individuals. Konrad fails in
his “quest to liberate the nation from slavery and suffering” (ibidem: 201). The GRO-
MADA, as a co-operating community, was able to protect its independence. The
PEASANTS, in turn, as a random collection of individuals, are not interested in unity;
they just “sleep, eat and drink”. In this way the GROMADA’s fight for unity, its active
attitude, was juxtaposed with the divisible community of PEASANTS whose sole in-
terest lies in satisfying their individual needs.
In The Senator’s Ball, the scene that falls immediately after Great Improvisation,
social unity is shown in the context of Polish struggle for independence. The guests
that come for the ball can be divided into two GROUPS: patriots and aristocracy, who
sympathise with the occupant. In terms of ideology, which group an individual belongs
to is dependent on their attitude to “the national issue”. Just like in the case of GRO-
MADA, belonging to the patriots’ GROUP entails sharing the common goal, that is
regaining independence. However, the mise en scène reveals some differences. The
GROMADA’s unity manifested itself in action and reactions to events, whereas in the
scene under analysis here it is the costume and the code of behaviour that is decisive in
classifying an individual as a member of a given GROUP. Female patriots wear black,
Grottger-like dresses, whereas the Ladies’ height of fashion is a “dandy” (ibidem: 206)
dress. The GROUP, though, does not constitute a random collection (like the PEAS-
ANTS, whose only distinctive feature was their characteristic costume). It is clearly
shaped not only by the physical likeness of its members, but also by the relation of
contrast between “patriots” and “collaborators”. This is related to Langacker’s example
of the red circle against a white background (see earlier). Let us picture a few women
dressed in black standing next to one another in a huge crowd. Looking at them at close
quarters we see a group of people clad in black; from afar, they form a clearly con-
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toured group of women wearing black clothes against the whole crowd. The same hap-
pens in The Senator’s Ball, although the GROUP is not bounded by means of their
relation to the surrounding crowd, but rather to another GROUP:
When comparing the above with the diagram for the concept GROMADA (fig. 3)
one can spot two significant differences:
1. Region G2 is bounded in relation to region G3, and relation e1 determines the
contrasts between GROUPS. In the case of the GROMADA (fig. 3) region G1 is
bounded in relation to a unit symbolising an event e10 (e.g. the appearance of the Ghost
of the Evil Master). Relation e5 is shown on stage through the actions of the GRO-
MADA.
2. In the diagram the GROMADA is marked as a figure (labelled as tr) in relation to
event e2 that forms the background (labelled lm). In GROUP, the concept under analy-
sis here, both elements of relation e1 mark the shared region G2G3, which in total forms
figure [tr].
The differences between both diagrams are clearly exemplified by Langacker
(Langacker 1991: 76):
“A is parallel to B” (A – figure [tr], B – [lm]),
“A and B are parallel” (in this case [AB] mark a shared region constituting figure
[tr]).
What Joanna Walaszek says serves as a rationale for combining areas [G2] and [G3]:
“Each of  the groups demonstrate their superiority”, “Both groups are clearly
divided” (Walaszek 1991: 206). It is apparent that the subjects “each of the groups”
and “both groups” mark a shared region [W1W2] that comprises both areas of the op-
posed camps. (The expression “are clearly divided” refers to the relation that holds
within region [G2G3], previously delineated by the collective subject (“both groups”).
The perception of this scene that shows in these utterances is not accidental. The frag-
ment of Forefathers’ Eve under analysis here does not glorify patriotism, nor does it
condemn lack of patriotism. The Senator’s Ball fully portraits the enslaved and languid
Polish society and attempts to diagnose this state of affairs. Suddenly “the Master of
Ceremony […] groups (emphasis mine) everyone in the middle of the stage” (ibidem)
Walaszek points out that this very situation is where the division into collaborators and
                                                       
 Langacker’s notations tr for figure and lm for background serve a detailed description of the figure
– background relation, which is outside our interest here.
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patriots ceases, and “the confusion induced by the master of ceremony, […] gives rise
to a metamorphosis of people and social relations” (ibidem: 207).
Conclusions
It may seem that analysing cognitive domains as mental representations of stage events
means dissecting a performance into definable meaning units. It is not the case, though.
For cognitivists cognitive domains do not form semantic units but rather matrices
which enable the audience to arrange incoming information and stimuli into meaning-
ful entities. The basic meaning-creative operation that this chapter has discussed is
profiling, or “selecting particular semantic structures by singling them out of the so-
called semantic base. In the case of natural languages, the base is the whole conceptual
value of a given expression” (Tabakowska 1996: 169). In a theatrical performance the
base is the mental image that is generated while watching stage events. It is either
a mirror image of what is being seen, or – in line with the principle of metonymy – an
expansion of it. However, to determine the essence of events shown on stage this basic
level of cognitive activity does not suffice. In the opening scene of Strehler’s version of
King Lear the protagonist is recognisable by, for instance, his regalia, his daughters can
be spotted out in the crowd too, and in general the whole is definable as a royal cere-
mony. The division into the young and the old can be seen, too. These pictures make
up the mental image of the scene, but do not explain the essence of the events that take
place. It is only highlighting an element that profiles the complete mental image that
constitutes a cognitive operation which determines the interpretation of events. As we
saw earlier, the individual interpretations of Strehler’s version of King Lear’s opening
scene depended on which interpersonal relation profiled the scene: that between the
King and his daughters (his blindness to their lies), between Cordelia and her sisters
(the contrast between the good and the bad), etc. In case of multiple interpretations of
a scene, selecting one of them must entail specifying the premises that influenced the
choice.
It is therefore essential that the mechanism that guides the audience’s choices be
specified. Cognitivists claim that context, understood as a collection of beliefs and
images that the audience activate to interpret a phenomenon, plays a great role here. If
the audience are particularly sensitive to visual stimuli, they are apt to concentrate on
the difference in appearance between Cordelia and her sisters. If one is familiar with
the plot one will focus on the protagonist, that is the king (a person who does not know
the play or the title will be hard put to pinpoint the protagonist solely on the basis of
what they see in the opening scene). Contemporary world experience is a significant
context as well. The costumes supposed to symbolise the vivacity and youth of some
characters in Strehler’s version will be interpreted quite differently if the play is seen
years from now. A future audience should be able to recognise Italian fashion from the
1960’s, but their feelings will be a far cry from that of the contemporary audience, who
may know the style from first hand experience. Thus the relation between the young
and the old becomes less relevant for the recipient, who does not identify him- or her-
89
self with the young who rebel against obsolete forms. Therefore, by developing an
attitude to fictitious reality one can assess the events that one sees on stage as well as
generate a cognitive domain. By failing to accept the church-related rite Cordelia be-
comes less spectacular in her mutiny, as in this context her negative reaction appears
quite natural. Thus, the strength with which individual contexts influence the recipient
determines the shape of the mental structure and, consequently, plays a significant role
in comprehending events shown on stage. The abstract character of the relations that
determine cognitive domains, in turn, provides a common background for the co-
operation of various contexts which shape our understanding of events: perception
data, knowledge stored in our memory or psychical reactions.
Cognitive domains also delineate the area where different semiotics systems co-
operate. The fact that patriots and collaborators are grouped in the centre of the stage is
aligned with Wysocki’s monologue about the character of Polish people delivered at
that very moment. Thus, characters’  movement adds to the text’s image of the
nation as a collection of people with good and bad traits of character, at the same time
undermining the division into real Poles and Traitors. However, mental images directed
by various semiotic systems do not have to be consistent with each other. The meaning
of Great Improvisation in Swinarski’s version is based on the discrepancy between
what Konrad says about uniting the nation through action and the picture of the indif-
ferent peasants sitting on the edge of the dais. Also, analysing cognitive domains
makes it possible to compare images of society shown in further scenes of the play.
The crew, who become unified in act ion, manifest a different sense of belonging to
a community than the patriots, marked by their costumes. A third significant advan-
tage of appreciating cognitive domains that lie at the bottom of comprehending actions
on stage is the possibility to describe interactions that hold between individual systems.
In Strehler’s pre-staging assumptions the word “nothing” that Cordelia says was sup-
posed to lead to disharmony in the music that accompanied the rite. The possibility to
link two different semiotic systems stems here from the fact that cognitive domains are
schematised and thus can combine two actions belonging to two different semiotic
systems (language and music) into one “action leading to confusion”. To clarify – the
common ground for both these actions is not the language expression (“confusion”),
but the mental process in which the feeling of order becomes the feeling of confusion.
Cognitive semantics, though, does not dismiss the necessity to distinguish between
semiotic systems. The analysed area of mental structures helps describe meaningful
units as elements that transgress semiotic systems and cognitive contexts. To show
a speaker one has to combine the specific way in which a language utterance is formed,
the characteristic gestures, and finally the image of a human being itself. As it is, men-
tal representation of the world around us is not a selection of divisible elements, but
a network of many semiotic systems. Theatre, by creating fictitious reality, refers to
processes and cognitive domains that “represent” the “real world”, being its reflection
only in that sense of the word. However, this reflection is structured with respect to the
additional context of theatrical conventions, and the very process of comprehension is
geared toward somewhat different aims than those set by the pragmatism of everyday
life. Watching a performance we attempt to comprehend the events not so much be-
cause of life’s necessities, but rather as a reflection of certain aesthetic values.
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3. A METHODOLOGY FOR STUDYING CONCEPTUALISATION IN THE RECEPTION
OF A THEATRICAL PERFORMANCE – AN APPROXIMATION
If cognitive domains are regarded as a research subject relevant to the description of
the reception of a theatrical performance, the hypotheses about the structures that shape
the process that have been put forward require verification, as there is no direct access
to mental processes. These processes can only be studied on the basis of how they
manifest themselves (e.g. language, behaviour) and certain regularities of conceptuali-
sation. What underlies this procedure is the assumption put forward by cognitivists that
a relation of likeness holds between the individual elements of cognition: perception
– conceptualisation – expression. This relation should not be extended to absolute
analogy, though, the more so that commenting on a performance just seen we are refer-
ring to the cognitive domains that structured our reception of the play only indirectly.
Individual acts of expression that manifest themselves in language expressions always
constitute reconstruction of the mental experience that stems from our perception of
reality; they are never an absolute reflection of it.
Thus the conclusions we draw from a text analysis of a description or interpretation
of a performance have to be examined so any inconsistencies stemming from ambigu-
ity, lack of attention or inadequate knowledge on the part of the recipient, or the condi-
tions in which the utterance was recorded are excluded. Contrary to what it may seem,
the recipient-oriented factors above do not mean that the concept of ideal recipient who
can correctly interpret the performance’s meanings is in fashion again. In cognitive
studies of performance reception the idea is only to establish a foundation of knowl-
edge that the audience build their interpretation on. We must realise that the author of
the descriptive material we are working on may simply have missed out on some stage
events or does not have the required knowledge to notice them.
Conditions of verbal expressions constitute one of the main obstacles in reception
analysis, according to sociologists. Expectations as to the style of an utterance, its co-
herence and recipient expectations assumed by the sender blur the actual image of
a theatrical experience in the recipient’s mind. It does not seem feasible, though, to get
rid of these expression-shaping factors entirely. Therefore the only viable solution
seems to be a method that would at least partially help determine which elements of
expression reflect the actual reception of the play, and which are due to other factors.
The first verification procedure is to look for relations between arranging the ele-
ments of the perceived area and a relevant cognitive domain that represents the expres-
sions used by the audience. In her example, Walaszek refers to the peasants who come
to the rite in Forefathers’ Eve as gromada. The mental representation of this expres-
sion has been schematised as part of abstract relation delineated by the characters’
collective behaviour in presence of danger. This stems from Walaszek’s interpretation;
she juxtaposes the gromada who fights for unity and the peasants who sit idly on the
edge of the dais, indifferent to the sense of Konrad’s monologue. Highlighting action
as the key factor in the image of the gromada is reinforced by other elements of the
performance’s description. Even if they result from Walaszek’s a priori assumptions
which make up her interpretation, they still can help understand how the concept is
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structured. The description contains mostly expressions that describe the gromada’s
actions; this goes to show that their role in shaping the cognitive domain is undeniable.
What it means is that the concept gromada is bounded by the principle of co-operation
of all its members. Once one gets acquainted with the premises that lead to the conclu-
sion above, one can do research into their relevance and feasibility. Such an experiment
can be designed in a variety of ways; the purpose it serves is to ascertain that the gro-
mada plays a significant role in the rite depicted in the play. The simplest solution is to
request description of a fragment of the play that is of interest to us. Discussions that
I had with my students confirmed the hypothesis that the gromada is quite an important
character. Thus, Walaszek’s interpretation was justified not only by the factual content
of Swinarski’s mise en scène. Apparently, the audience (that is to say the students) do
acknowledge the importance of those elements of Swinarski’s version that Walaszek
thought were significant. The students also said that the gromada was the central ele-
ment in the fragment, in that it captured the audience’s attention to a greater extent than
the ghosts did. When asked about the subject matter of the fragment, most of them
were also of the opinion that it was the gromada and some related issues. Those stu-
dents who stressed the role of the ghosts’ part also saw the extraterrestrial visitors as
juxtaposed with the gromada. Therefore, even though the stimuli and their interpreta-
tions may have varied, the research does show that cognitive domains seen as a basis
for interpreting a theatrical performance and the process of perception establishing the
order of space are related.
If cognitive domains that form the basis of an utterance are to be identified, ambi-
guity has to be eliminated. The simplest solution seems to be a dictionary. Definitions
of gromada (gromada) and grupa (“group”) in Słownik Języka Polskiego (Słownik
Języka Polskiego, op.cit.: 698, 704) confirm that the cognitive domains in question
have been described adequately. One of the definitions states that a group is a unit of
arrangement, whereas grupować (“to group”) is both to combine elements into sets of
particular characteristics and to gather around an element. The analysis above refers to
the first sense, i.e. classifying elements into sets. This sense is in accordance with the
plot (viz. the division into patriots and collaborators) and the visual features of the mise
en scène. The characteristics of an individual’s attire determine which group he (or she,
quite often) belongs to; female patriots wear black dresses, smart, dandy-like ones are
for “ladies who follow the Senator”. In Polish, the word gromada (gromada) is also
frequently used as a verb (gromadzić się, to gather, of people and things, also to col-
lect). Thus, the definitions make it clear that the Polish gromada refers solely to ac-
tions, whereas grupa can also be characterised by its attributes. Interestingly enough, in
Polish gromada is derived from gmina, an administrative unit whose objective by defi-
nition is to perform certain tasks. Not infrequently these became unfounded, as there
are no tasks for them to do or goals to pursue. Swinarski’s staging is similar in this
respect: what unites the gromada of peasants is their collective action against external
aggression.
However, analyses of dictionary data and resulting conclusions require confirma-
tion, in that actual language users have to verify them. The forms of mental representa-
tion put forward are but one possibility. A “group” is also a team of people who work
on a task together. In this sense it is not much different from a “gromada” united
through action. Therefore the proposed distinction between “group” and gromada
holds only in a particular context. In this case the question is whether gromada
92
(“gromada”) refers to individuals who team up to act together, and grupa (“group”) to
characters who are visibly different from other groups. An experiment was therefore
held, in which subjects were to say whether they thought the following sentences were
felicitous:
A. A group of people wearing black could be seen against the crowd.
B. A gromada of people wearing black could be seen against the crowd.
C. The group united against the aggressor.
D. The gromada united against the aggressor.
The experiment was conducted as unrelated to the analysis of the play presented
here. Subjects were asked to choose between A and B (and, subsequently, C and D),
indicating the more felicitous of the two sentences. The results confirmed the hypothe-
sis that speakers of Polish, when presented with the choice shown above, refer to
a selection of individuals who co-operate to do a task as gromada (“gromada”), and to
a collection of elements shown against other, contrasting elements as grupa (“group”).
All the 32 people who took part in the experiment thought A was more felicitous than
B. In the case of the other pair, 13 subjects chose C as more felicitous, while 9 people
thought they were equally acceptable.
The idea behind the method for analysing cognitive domains as a basis of under-
standing a fragment of a performance is to juxtapose a number of aspects of its expres-
sion, ideally independent of each other. Ideologically shaped structures are compared
to those determined by grammatical forms or typical mental representations of expres-
sions. An ideological interpretation should also be in line with the staging arrangement
that can be seen in fragments of the play’s description. The ultimate order is estab-
lished by universal rules of perception. Any interpretation expressed in a natural lan-
guage is rooted in the audience’s experience gained through reception of a perform-
ance, if the structure contained in that interpretation manifests itself in an analysis of
the remaining aspects of the recipient’s expression.
III. METAPHOR AND RELEVANCE
1. RELEVANCE – AN INTRODUCTION
The category of relevance is a requisite complement to a model of theatrical communi-
cation posited in the present study, a model understood as a process of constructing
meanings. Every theory purporting to create a model which describes such a process
ought to determine its ultimate goal. From the extreme perspective of deconstructivism,
the production of meaning occurs within the indefinite context of an utterance. How-
ever, an attempt at describing the world is tantamount to an infinite process of some
signs being replaced by others and of translating a sign into its interpretants. Remarka-
bly, metaphorical transformations, inherent in the process, allow a free flow of the
recipient’s thoughts leading to increasingly new streams of associations.
Cognitive semantics, while also making ample use of human imagination, empha-
sizes the systematicity of the process of metaphorisation and its focus on arriving at
relevant conclusions, thus placing a constraint on the process of semiosis. Relevance is
then defined as a property of the human mind to arrive at significant conclusions. Unlike
in semiotic models, meaning is not secured by the inextricable relation between
a denoting element and a meaning denoted by this element (singnified – signifier). In-
tended polysemy is the only situation when the recipient has to determine the meaning.
The issue of relevance appears for example in Kowzan (1998) who in his Znak
i Teatr (Sign and Theatre) provides an exhaustive treatment of the application of semi-
ological methodology in theatre studies. In the chapter devoted to the presentation of
a model of theatrical semiosis, the author discusses, among other things, the problem of
various referents referred to by a military cap worn by Macbeth during the play. Ac-
cording to Kowzan, this sign could designate a uniform of a South American dictator,
some totalitarian country in Eastern Europe or the notorious African “emperor” Bo-
cassa (ibidem: 79). In order to retain the model of a sign as an inseparable relation
between the denoted and the denoting, Kowzan proposes treating the numerous refer-
ents as aspects of the same sign. He stresses at the same time that the denoted element
remains the same in all the three cases referred to by the military cap. Macbeth’s
authority is perceived as totalitarian in each case.
From the position of the theory of relevance, the crucial point is not the multi-
faceted construction of the sign but the question why recipients refer to various refer-
ents and assign different meanings to the same object. A military cap does not need to
characterize Macbeth as a totalitarian ruler, but, for instance, as “merely a soldier”,
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a character not worthy of a kingly status. Let us leave the ostensible “point” factor,
already discussed, which by distinguishing the cap from among other elements induces
the audience to make the effort of interpreting. Let us commence from the moment
when, according to Kowzan, “a member of the audience, while attempting to grasp the
significance of the cap, starts conjuring up in his mind an image of a South American
dictator seen on the TV” (ibidem). It is Kowzan who points to one of the basic reasons
for this particular association. The picture of a dictator seen on the TV constitutes one
source of our experiences which shapes our perception of the world. Since th television
exerts an extremely powerful influence on human imagination, associations with char-
acters appearing in everyday programs become very probable. Another, apart from
experiences, interpretative context comes from the development of the plot. The events
shown in the tragedy provide a sufficient basis for Macbeth to be perceived as a totali-
tarian ruler. The use of a military cap, which evokes the images of contemporary re-
gimes, serves the purpose of substantiating such images in relation to the main pro-
tagonist. One should not forget though that not everybody associates a military cap
with some actual ruthless tyrant. More generally, it might evoke an image of totalitar-
ian, junta-style government without any reference to a region, country or person. The
concept of “totalitarian rule” would be evoked in that case without designating any of
its “aspects”. Many people do not associate the image of a general with ruthless mili-
tary rule. Let us leave aside a possible misunderstanding, when contrary to the direc-
tor’s intention, a military uniform brings up positive associations for a member of the
audience, and return to our example in which the military cap assigns Macbeth military
status. Identifying this particular meaning of the military cap helps to understand that
the play was staged in such a way as to illustrate the fact that Macbeth, in his attempt to
rule the country, transgresses his own destiny. The way in which Shakespeare’s trag-
edy is understood here corresponds with those interpretations that equate its message
with fundamental moral truths which are encapsulated in the commandment: “Thou
shall not kill”. Murder is against human nature and is punished through “a death of the
perpetrator’s soul, poisoned by the sheer horror over one’s heinous deed, shame, lone-
liness and despair” (Shakespeare 1992: 147). In the play, this truth is spoken by the
doctor called to Lady Macbeth: “Unnatural deeds do breed unnatural troubles” (Shake-
speare 1996). Macbeth’s deeds are, in addition, against his own nature, that of a faith-
ful and loyal soldier, who suddenly aspires to become a king. On stage, this is shown
by means of the cap worn by the hero instead of a crown.
Which of these interpretations will the audience opt for? Will they at all decide to
assign any meaning to this cap? After all, the proposed senses are embedded in the plot
of the play. Macbeth’s deeds might seem to them much more ruthless than those of an
obscure general or a colonel on the television. Alternatively, if they are particularly
keen on following the intricacies of the plot derived from contradictory prophesies,
they will probably fail to notice the hero’s headwear.
Theory of relevance does not provide unanimous answers to the above-mentioned
questions; instead, it attempts to determine the reasons for specific choices made by the
audience. Apart from the rules of an arbitrary code posited by semiotics, the theory
draws on their experience, knowledge, sensitivity and expectations. The choice be-
tween a South American dictator or the African “emperor” Bocassa as embodiments of
authoritarian rule will largely depend on the experience accumulated by the audience
while watching news programs. Assigning military status to Macbeth can be traced
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back to our knowledge of a particular interpretation of the play. Rejecting the image of
modern totalitarianism in favor of the more frightening events in the play is indicative
of the recipient’s sensitivity. The murders committed by Macbeth can have a stronger
impact on some members of the audience than the daily occurrence of violence shown
in news programs.
In the example discussed above, possible meanings were suggested by specific
codes functioning within a given culture. The recipient could make his/her choice by
drawing on the rules of relevance signaled earlier. It is important to realize that, ac-
cording to Sperber and Wilson’s theory of relevance, comprehending signals from the
outside is not necessarily based on a pre-arranged code. For the sake of clarification, let
us consider a classic example used by Eco to explain the concept of code:
“In a tank of water there is a device (a kind of float) which having reached level zero sensi-
tizes a transmitter capable of emitting a signal (e.g. an electric one). The signal travels along
a certain path until it is intercepted by a receiving device which transforms the signal into a form
containing a message for the addressee. In this case, the addressee is the second device, which,
properly instructed, on receiving the message starts correcting the initial situation (due to a feed-
back mechanism causing water to outflow from the tank)” (Eco 1996: 37).
This is the way in which the process of communication occurs in the world of cy-
bernetics. The posited model does not fully represent the situation when man is the
recipient of the message. Instructed about the signaling code (for instance: red lamp
flashing means the critical water level has been exceeded) he/she will know that the
water has gone past the safety level but limit himself/herself to merely identifying the
situation. As Eco stresses: “He/she might, for instance, get scared. This fear cannot be
categorized as an emotional reaction independent of communication phenomena be-
cause it is derived from a communication phenomenon” (ibidem: 51). Along the lines
of Eco’s reasoning, all reactions that arise without a pre-arranged code (one has to be
told beforehand about the danger signaled by a red lamp flashing) should be treated as
emotional and – in the popular belief – not based on logical reasoning. Let us, how-
ever, imagine that alarm is indicated not by a flashing light but a mass of overflowing
water seen by an observer. The fear accompanying this phenomenon has not been
probably aroused after receiving the code signals, it is not even due to an understanding
of the gravity of the situation that one might have already experienced. It is possible to
assume that we had never been instructed that in case a dam burst we should escape.
Fear and a subsequent adequate reaction will have been triggered by the results of our
observations, reasoning, and knowledge.
There are many possible ways in which this process could work. We shall restrict
our analysis to two key points. First, one should distinguish between actions based on
rational perception of a situation and on an emotional reaction. The fear caused merely
by the noise of water falling is hardly characterized by rational thinking and is usually
categorized as an emotional reaction. It is not until one realizes that the swirling water
moving towards them is a threat, that a conscious emotional reaction (terror) is formed
and one takes appropriate steps – most likely through an escape. Reasoning, in this
case, is based on generalization. Water is perceived as a mass of some potentially dan-
gerous material moving towards us. Another stage in the reasoning refers to subjective
aspects of reception. What might be a threatening swirl of water for a little kid, does
not pose that much of a danger for an adult. It is essential, however, about the percep-
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tion of alarm is the occurrence of a threat for one’s life or health. Hence, if in our sub-
jective view we do not associate the observed events with any danger, then we do not
classify a given situation as a cause for alarm. We will escape at the sight of an ava-
lanche crashing down in our direction but not when we see a mass of light snow even
though we might suffocate in there. Assessing the danger depends to a large extent on
our imagination. It is the lack of imagination that we blame people for if they failed to
predict the consequences of atypical occurrences. Imagination, therefore, enriches the
conventional pattern of reasoning with a largely subjective evaluation of their validity.
It would be naive to say that in our reasoning we did not refer to preconceived con-
cepts, such as a mass of material, its movement and the threat. Defining the observed
occurrence as a state of danger emerged as a result of reasoning or assessing the rele-
vance of our conclusions and not as a result of a previously internalised relationship in
which a burst dam automatically stands for danger.
Apart from a range of possible options provided by the polysemy of the code, the
rule of relevance is even more apparent in reasoning processes. A single sign cannot
comprise more than a few definite meanings, of which only one is relevant in a given
context. The number of possible conclusions and approaches adopted towards the ob-
servance of water bursting through the dam is virtually infinite: the dam was too weak,
somebody neglected their duties. When we have to face the elemental fury, the recog-
nition of danger is the essential, the sole relevant conclusion.
In their book Relevance. Communication and Cognition, Sperber and Wilson made
an attempt to describe rules behind drawing valid conclusions. As mentioned earlier,
the authors set out to define relevance as an intuitive skill of constituting new concep-
tual constructs in order to improve our knowledge of the world. This essentially means
reinforcing conceptual structures which provide a better understanding of the world
outside, are more easily available in processes of perception and conceptualization, as
well as more developed in the realm of individual interest (Sperber, Wilson op.cit.: 47).
Reasoning itself is about arriving at relevant conclusions based on one’s knowledge
and incoming information. Both these sources, being a collection of active assumptions
stored in the recipient’s mind, serve as a context against which the relevance of par-
ticular information is tested. Sperber and Wilson cite three examples of irrelevant sen-
tences when the context is assumed to be a collection of assumptions active in the
reader’s mind while he/she is reading their book on the theory of relevance (ibidem).
Let us imagine that the authors utter, at some point, the following sentence:
(1) May 5 was a sunny day in Kabul.
Information included in this statement is in no way connected with the content of
the book on the theory of relevance. Intuitively, then, we could say that sentence (1) is
irrelevant in the context of communication theory (ibidem: 120).
Another sentence whose utterance does not make it possible to draw any valid con-
clusions in the context of reading Sperber and Wilson’s book is the following state-
ment:
(2) You are reading a book now.
The message provides no novel information with regard to the reader’s idea about
the outside world. He/she is perfectly aware of his/her reading and, more importantly,
takes it for granted. It is not true then that statement (2) reinforces in any way his/her
conviction as to the facts arising.
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Sperber and Wilson’s third example of an irrelevant utterance directed at the reader
is the following:
(3) You are falling fast asleep.
In this case, the statement contradicts the reader’s awareness of his/her own state.
The actions of reading a book and falling asleep cannot be performed all at the same
time.
The sentences cited above represent three types of cases where relevant information
does not interact with the reader’s assumptions present in his/her minds – hence be-
coming irrelevant in a given context. In the case illustrated by sentence (1) about the
nice weather in Kabul, the statement provides new information but it is in no way con-
nected with the context specified by the content of the book. The information from
sentence (2) is already present in the reader’s mind and is functioning as a strong con-
viction so an additional statement does not change anything. The third sentence (3)
depicts a situation where a statement contradicts the other assumptions specified by the
context of its utterance (ibidem: 121).
At the same time, it should be emphasized that absence of relevance in the analyzed
examples was discussed in reference to a given context. Expressing irrelevant content
in a given context could in itself be relevant information. It might, for instance, indicate
an intention to change the subject of a conversation. One of the basic actions form the
perspective of message reception is deciding to discard the information as irrelevant or
searching for an adequate context in which it could make sense. According to the the-
ory of relevance, there are three types of context activated by the human mind in order
to find relevance:
1. Assumptions formed during communication preceding a given utterance. They
are expressed directly or implied by the recipient and easily available because they are
stored for a short period of time in short-term memory.
2. Factual knowledge stored in memory in the form of conceptual schemas, inter-
pretative frameworks, action scripts and prototypes.
3. Objects directly indicated by the sender or designated by the speech act itself.
The tendency to search for an adequate context where an utterance becomes rele-
vant can be traced back to the general rule that ostension implies relevance. The recipi-
ent’s involvement in the search for an adequate context is defined by a rule which de-
termines the relation between an interpretative effort and benefits accrued from
drawing conclusions. If, then, activating a given context requires too much effort and
conclusions seem trivial, the recipient will dismiss the information as irrelevant in
a given situation. From the perspective of an individual, this activity seems to a large
extent subjective and, in consequence, elusive. Within particular social groups and
cultures there exist various systems of values which enable one to assess whether the
effort was worth the final outcome. In the reception of a play, for instance, particular
traditions of aesthetics define the relation between an individual’s necessary involve-
ment in the process of interpreting the work of art and the values he/she receives in
return.
Such assumptions make it possible for the recipient to evaluate the amount of effort
necessary to achieve the desired results. Works of art which are too intricate and ab-
struse could be, after all, rejected, if they were to be analyzed beyond the system of
artistic values. The rule of using sophisticated artistic measures is in direct contradic-
tion to yet another rule of relevance, which says that the recipient assumes the sender
98
to have used the optimal signal to communicate the desired content. The signal, then,
should enable the recipient to interpret the message at the least intellectual cost. If we
want to inform somebody that our friend John keeps a tiger at home, we could phrase
our message in the following manner: “John keeps a big cat at home”. Even if our re-
cipient understands our message correctly – “John keeps a tiger at home” – it is quite
likely that he would attach an additional sense to the expression “big cat”, for instance
irony. His reasoning would work on the premise that if one’s aim is to merely convey
a message, it is enough to say: “John keeps a tiger at home”(ibidem: 168).
Thus, irrespective of whether the meaning is denotative, connotative or implicative
(inferred from current contexts), the rules of relevance as a range of possible meanings
essential for the recipient at a given moment could be subsumed under a few basic
rules:
– Ostension implies relevance.
– Relevant information must effect a vital change in our assumptions about the
world or about the situation which we are experiencing (or observing).
– The information provided remains relevant with regard to a definite context, con-
strued by the recipient based on the maximum effect/least effort principle.
– When interpreting a message, we assume that the sender has used an optimal sig-
nal to communicate the desired message.
2. NATURE OF RELEVANCE IN THE RECEPTION OF A THEATRE PERFORMANCE
The above-mentioned rules also apply in the reception of a theatre performance. The
difference in reference to language communication as described by Sperber and Wilson
lies with the way context is formed, which represents the basis for conclusions or audi-
ence reactions. In the theater, unlike in the real world, conventions prevail. The speci-
ficity of these differences will depend on the character of the theatre. For the sake of
clarity, we will concentrate on the typically European theatre of illusion with its focus
on fiction.
First, it is important to realize that in their analysis of natural language the authors
of “theory of relevance” separate the verbal message from the context created by the
audience perception of the surroundings. In the theatre, such a distinction would re-
strict available means of communication to dialogues entered into by actors, which
does not reflect the true character of the majority of modern stage productions. Alter-
natively, including the characters’ actions and objects on stage would dramatically
increase the information load in contrast to a situation when the message is based
mainly on sequences of utterances. In the previous chapter we discussed the process of
selecting stage elements made by the recipient on the basis of the acts of ostension.
This mechanism does not suffice to determine relevant meanings in unequivocal terms.
Sperber and Wilson propose, therefore, to adopt the weaker assumption whereby osten-
sion merely suggests relevance but it does not provide it. In that case, we have to allow
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for a situation when the audience might notice a particular element but will subse-
quently dismiss it as having little significance for the content being presented. Ac-
cording to the rules of relevance, an element, apart from highlighting the message,
must at the same time import new vital content for the on-going events.
An interesting example can be found in King Lear staged by Georgio Strehler. It
illustrates the process of assigning meanings to events on stage on the basis of infer-
encing the three previously mentioned contexts which affect the process of relevance.
In the first act of the tragedy Regan and Goneril discuss their father’s obstinacy. Dur-
ing the dialogue the two women beat and then fold two halves of tulle material. Inter-
pretation of their actions typically leads to the formation of a metaphorical image in
which the two pieces of material stand for the parts of kingdoms they had been given
(Lear tore the tulle material in two when he was dividing the kingdom). The actions
performed by the sisters reflect their passionless approach to the gift, which they treat
as washed linen. After making sure they got equal pieces, they beat, fold and take them
away each in her own basket. The question arising in the context of relevance concerns
the reasons for assigning particular metaphorical meanings to the described actions.
Folding the torn tulle material could be viewed as a simple sorting-out activity,
which helps the two characters to express their emotions. From time to time the sisters
pull at the edges aggressively. There are, however, a few reasons for regarding Regan
and Goneril’s behavior as significant, also in the broader context of stage production.
First, the presence of the two pieces of cloth is highlighted right at the beginning of the
scene through the use of light which brings them out of the darkness that fell after
Lear’s exit (context explicitly provided). It would be difficult to assume that the props
– to which our attention is drawn – left over after the previous scene were to be unnec-
essary. Our knowledge of the world helps to identify the sisters’ actions as typical ac-
tivities connected with washing linen (factual context). Finally, tearing the veil by the
king at the point when he was dividing his kingdom establishes a relationship between
the two pieces of cloth and two parts of the kingdom (implicit context). The metaphori-
cal image representing Regan and Goneril’s intention to “wash away the old traditions
and customs of their father’s rule” is based on activating and linking in the minds of
the audience the images of the kingdom and the washing. This metaphor is of great
significance for the comprehension of the events presented. The possibilities of its
interpretation go beyond the content of the sisters’ dialogue. It is also translated into
the logic of the whole stage production which establishes a reversed relation between
Lear, shown in a few scenes as a child, and the daughters playing the role of mothers
(housework, including washing, is stereotypically associated with mother). In the first
part of the play Lear seeks understanding with Regan and Goneril who icily refuse to
indulge his tantrum. One of the highlights of the play, when Cordelia meets her father,
is depicted as a pieta: the daughter-mother strokes his gray hair with tender loving care,
which is an idealized image of child – parent relationships.
The metaphor of “washing the old rule off the kingdom” is justified in all three
contexts imparting, at the same time important content to our understanding of the
presented events. Although, this situation does not guarantee that the metaphor is no-
ticed by the audience but it makes it very probable.
This last conclusion touches upon one of the fundamental differences between the
cognitive approach to the process of reception and the traditional ones, especially
semiotics, according to which relevance in the theater is ensured by conventions, a kind
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of agreement between audience and play producers. The agreement, however, does not
free the theatre from the obligation of presenting events in a way that is interesting and
relevant for the audience. Just as in other arts, the theater should convey messages and
provide experiences which will compensate the recipient’s effort made by interpreting
the events on stage.
Sperber and Wilson present the general principle of communication as a relation-
ship between suitability expressed in terms of the costs of getting involved in “a dia-
logue” and the resultant benefits. In the theater, description of this relationship does not
stop at comparing the interpretative effort with the importance of the conclusions. The
unique character of theatrical encounter affects the free flow of information. Let us
consider the middle-class theatre of illusion.
People pay for their tickets, which “literally raises the costs” of watching a per-
formance and, consequently, of audience expectations. Performances usually take place
at prime time. About two hours of our precious time must not be wasted. There are also
the usual preparations for going out. All this makes play producers feel particularly
compelled to “compensate” for the extraordinary costs of visiting the theater.
Audience expectations are also created by the theater itself. It draws on a number of
tricks to let the theatergoer feel the unique atmosphere and thus concentrate on the
events being presented. Some such methods are based on actions described in the
chapter on ostension. Others are linked to sociological aspects of visiting the theatre;
they are based on creating a unique atmosphere through the rituals performed at the
temple of dramatic art, whether it be a beautiful palace or a secret meeting place for an
intellectual elite. Elegant clothes and the required proper behavior intensify this atmos-
phere. Silence accompanying the performance could be interpreted not only as indica-
tive of the absence of an audience but also as a sign of religious concentration. All
efforts are aimed at drawing audience attention to the importance of stage-setting and
proving that their effort was worth it. On the other hand, such methods boost expecta-
tions of the audience, who are entitled to think that benefits in the form of emotional
and intellectual experiences will “reimburse their expenses”. The feeling of having
wasted one’s time and energy to see a play that failed to fulfil one’s expectations is
directly proportional to the price of the tickets and earlier publicity.
The unique character of a theatrical performance is also – or, rather, most of all
– the result of the limited time of perception and of the face-to-face encounter between
actors and audience. Within this limited period on stage, actors must get their message
across in a manner understandable for non-specialist audience. A similar phenomenon
occurs in other arts but, unlike in the theater, the recipients there can increase their
knowledge by recourse to different sources of information, which will clarify the es-
sence of a given work. An unknown word in a novel can be immediately looked up in
a dictionary; information on a particular style in painting is available in brochures or
could be elicited from a guide. In the theater speaking is not allowed and referring to
the program is made difficult by the darkness. Rapid developments of the plot do not
permit any consultations or considerations. Actors’ performance must be therefore
perfectly clear or, otherwise, the audience will get lost. The same goes for film makers,
though it does not affect actors, who can follow the comments and opinions but are not
exposed to negative reactions during the screening. Besides, in the cinema one can
leave at any moment. In the theater, however, it is not accepted to leave during the
performance, eat potato chips or talk. Actors can easily sense the growing discomfort
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and displeasure of the audience trapped in their seats and forced to watch irrelevant
antics on stage. Relevance is, after all, one of the basic factors justifying theatrical
actions.
3. METAPHOR IN THE CONTEXT OF RELEVANCE – AN INTRODUCTION
Metaphor is most often defined as a linguistic figure consisting in “an unusual lexical
combination which assumes a certain semantic effort on the part of the recipient, an
effort that stimulates by concurrently going against common phraseological habits and
justifying the deviation effectuated. The justification needs to be explicit enough for
metaphor to be understood as a deliberate effect of verbal art rather than an accidental
semantic failure” (Słownik terminów literackich 1998: 300). These requisites for meta-
phor can be presented within the framework of relevance theory, which introduces the
principle of maintaining balance between interpretative effort and the benefits it brings.
According to this assumption, the recipient will understand metaphor as a deliberate
effect of verbal art, if the difficulty of comprehending it gets compensated for by its
aesthetic and cognitive value. Thus, although even the strangest of lexical configura-
tions can be interpreted in a metaphorical manner, the final effect of such interpreta-
tions often proves unworthy of the effort put into finding the figurative meaning.
From the point of view of cognitive semantics, one primary aim determining the
reasons for creating metaphors has to do with their cognitive function and the possi-
bilities of new metaphorical interpretations are predominantly dependent upon the
scope of conventionalised popular metaphors used by the recipient. Metaphors thus
provide a developing cognitive system which makes it possible to incorporate ever new
areas of human experience. According to a theory put forward by Lakoff, metaphor is
inseparable from our understanding of the world, in which more abstract ideas are un-
derstood in terms of ideas that are closer to our direct experience of the world. That is
why metaphor is not limited to innovative constructions of the language of poetry, but
is omnipresent in our thinking as conventionalised metaphorical images. Lakoff also
demonstrates that treating such metaphors as dead ones is unfounded as they constitute
the basis for our inferences about the world. The popular character of metaphors does
make the process of their understanding an automatic and, most often, unconscious one
but it nevertheless exerts profound influence on the way in which we think about the
world. According to Lakoff’s definition, metaphor consists in “understanding and
experiencing one thing in terms of  another” (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 27).
Cognitively, metaphorical conceptualisation is thus opposed to subcategorisation. Let
us take the term “dispute” as an example. Understanding dispute as a kind of conversa-
tion is an example of subcategorisation because conversation and dispute have one
quality in common, viz. they both involve speaking. Dispute itself, on the other hand,
has all the basic characteristics of conversation. The phrase “dispute is war”, on the
other hand, is metaphorical in nature, which means that we perceive the kind of con-
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versation referred to as “dispute” in terms of a fight, as constituting a separate concept.
It needs to be noted that the lexical string “in terms of” as used here should be treated
as mental representation of a set of experiences on which metaphor is based. Similarly,
the verb “is” as used to show metaphorical conceptualisation should be understood as
a symbol indicating the process of mapping, i.e. “transferring” the set of source experi-
ences onto the image of the element being metaphorised.
As seen by Lakoff, metaphor is therefore most of all a necessary complementation
of our literal way of understanding the world in that it creates systematic structures of
metaphorical thinking which is characterised by cohesion. This can be exemplified by
a set of metaphors used to talk about death: “death is night”, “death is darkness”,
“death is sleep”, “dearth is chill”, “death is rest” (Lakoff, Turner 1989: 86). All these
metaphors make references to our knowledge about death and to our everyday experi-
ence of night, which is normally dark and cold; people sleep at night and sleep is a rest.
Similarly, dead people are cold and motionless as we are when sleeping. It is thanks to
such dependencies that the set of metaphors cited above can be deemed to constitute
a coherent whole.
Another example of sistematicity across metaphors is provided by metaphors refer-
ring to the concept of life: “life is a precious thing”, “life is day”, “life is a flame”, “life
is breath”, “life is a life-sustaining liquid”. The systematicity of these metaphors mani-
fests itself in the structures they make use of. The first of those is a cycle of three
stages: in the beginning, I did not exist – now I am a living being – I am bound to die
one day and will cease to exist again. This structure is used in the metaphors “life is
a precious thing”: I did not have anything at the beginning to subsequently gain posses-
sion of a precious object, which – bound to lose one day – I should take advantage of;
“life is day”: at the beginning there was night, then comes the day, which, however,
will at some point come to an end; and “life is a flame”: at the beginning the candle
was not lit, then someone lit it up; when it burns out it will go out again. The two re-
maining metaphors make a reference to the scheme “life is a substance filling up
a container”: “life is breath”– we are filled up with divine breath, which leaves us by
the end of our lives; “life is a liquid”– we are filled up with life-sustaining juices which
we can lose or acquire. It needs to be remembered, at the same time, that sets of mutu-
ally coherent metaphors are not determined in an unequivocal manner. They can
change according to what sort of structure or experience we make a reference to. The
important thing is that making a reference to a source of cohesion will have certain
implications with regard to interpretation.
A slightly different type of cohesion is made evident when the use of one metaphor
activates other metaphors, which are necessary for creating a certain metaphorical
conteptualisation. Conventional metaphors are part of a hierarchical structure. Let us
go back to the “death is departure” metaphor. In order to understand it, we had to refer
to another conceptualisation: “an event is action”. The same happens in the case of the
“death is a reaper” metaphor, whose conceptualisation uses the “people are plants”
metaphor.
Apart from the systematicity and cohesion of metaphorical thinking, its second im-
portant characteristic is embedment in physical and motive experience of our existence
and in representations created by the culture in which we are immersed. The first of
these occurs in a situation when concepts having their source in sensory and motive
experience of the world get connected with subjective perceptions. And so, for in-
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stance, the subjective perception of failing to understand an element of reality is sig-
nalled by means of the phrase “I can’t grasp that”, which is based on concepts coming
from sensory-motive experience.
Embedment in representations created by culture, on the other hand, occurs be-
cause, as Lakoff elucidates “the most fundamental values of a given culture are coher-
ent with the metaphorical structure of the most fundamental concepts present in that
culture” (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 45). Lakoff exemplifies his observation with some
values present in the consciousness of American society and notes how these are in
agreement with spatial metaphors based on the top-bottom relation:
“More is better” is coherent with “more is up” and “good is up”.
“Bigger is better” is coherent with “more is up” and “good is up”.
“The future will be better” is coherent with “future is up” and “good is up”.
“In the future there will be more” is coherent with “more is up” and “future is up”.
“Your status should be higher in the future” is coherent with “high status is up” and
“future is up”.
These examples of cohesion demonstrate how deeply rooted typical spatial meta-
phorical representations are in American culture, within which the sentence “The fu-
ture will be better” expresses the concept of progress. The expression “In the future
there will be more” is connected with such situations as pay rise and acquisition of
more and more goods. “Your status should be higher in the future” is an expression
referring to making a career (ibidem). One of the sources of our metaphorical percep-
tions is therefore the experiencing of the culture in which we are immersed.
The characteristics of metaphorical thinking presented so far lead to a situation
whereby the popular assumption that understanding metaphors is very difficult can
only be applied to some of the metaphorical uses, namely those created within aesthetic
systems that value most of all the artistry of composition and surprising consequences
of unlikely combinations. Metaphor, however, most often fulfils a cognitive function,
helping the recipient understand the message; this is so because we base our thinking
about the metaphorical concepts being presented on our knowledge of the element of
the source metaphor. The embedment of this element in our sensory-motive as well as
cultural experience also means that a metaphorical concept becomes more familiar to
us and as such of more significance to our life, thus raising the degree of relevance of
the message being communicated. This function of metaphor seems even more impor-
tant in the process of reception of a theatre performance, whose task it is, as has been
pointed out above, to convey serious messages that could at the same time be easily
understood by the audience.
Before we embark on a thorough discussion of metaphor in theatre, let us comple-
ment our synopsis of Lakoff’s theory with a presentation of his classification of meta-
phor, without which a full appreciation of the systematicity of metaphorical structures
is not feasible.
The first type that Lakoff proposes are so-called primary metaphors. They are
a product of the combination of sensor-motive experience and subjective impressions.
They provide fundamental schemata for more complex metaphors. As they are struc-
tured on immediate meaningful concepts, they form a physical logic basis for meta-
phorical motivations. For the most part, they make use of imagination schemata, e.g.
“happy is up”, “categories are containers”, “organization is physical structure”. How-
ever, Lakoff opines that less clearly structured experiences can also result in primary
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metaphors; examples here are: “action is self-propelled motion”, “affection is warmth”,
“purposes are destinations” or “causes are physical forces”.
A second type of metaphor, viz. conceptual metaphors, is more complex. Concep-
tual metaphors project the intricate structure of the source element onto the meta-
phorized element. They are also rooted in our sensory-motive (and not infrequently
cultural) experience, and make use of primary metaphor concepts. Lakoff brings up an
oft-quoted example that is universal across a number of cultures, viz. the metaphor of
life as “journey”. It starts at birth and goes on along a road that we choose, hoping it
will take us where we head, that is our goal in life. Having no such goal means you are
“lost”, “your life has taken an unknown turn” or “you don’t know which way to go”. If
you do have a purpose in life you can try to achieve it “in various ways”, “planning
each step along the way”, trying to overcome possible obstacles “in the way”, etc. Thus
what we are dealing with here is a complex concept that can metaphorically be formu-
lated as “life is a journey toward a goal”; the metaphor is founded on the simple image
schema: source – path – goal. It arises as a result of the widespread belief that everyone
should have a goal in life and that they should take action in order to achieve the said
goal.
Since “action” can be metaphorically understood as “motion” and “destination” can
be “points in space”, the principle of having a purpose in life can be reformulated as
“Every person should have a point, a goal in life, which to reach by a chosen road”.
This conceptualization brings about a number of metaphorical expressions, whereby
“life is a journey toward a destination”, “man is a traveller”, “life goals are destina-
tions”, “life plan is an itinerary”, “experience is baggage” or “time flow is the distance
covered”.
The significance of the metaphorical images we call to mind in relation to our func-
tioning in everyday reality stems mainly from the fact that thinking about life we often
apply the knowledge of traveling that we have; thus:
“A journey requires planning a rout to your destination”.
“Journey may have obstacles, and you should try to anticipate them”.
“You should provide yourself with what you need for your journey”.
“As a prudent traveler you should have an itinerary indicating where you are sup-
posed to be at what times and where to go next. You should always know where you
are and where you are going next”.
This line of thinking not only enriches the mental image of the concept of “life”, but
also impinges on our social behavior. Thus we tend to be impressed by those who go
far in a short time and we sympathize with those who have not reached the goal as
planned. We see those who are going in an indefinite direction as “lost”, in need of
a guide through life. We commiserate with those who “missed the boat”. A “late start”
is another mishap that life has in store for us (ibidem: 60–63).
The examples do not exhaust the selection of conclusions that can be derived if life
is metaphorically understood as a journey. However, they are indicative of how under-
standing based on the metaphorizing image is transferred onto the metaphorized one.
A significant aspect of the process is the aforementioned systematicity of metaphors.
Firstly, primary metaphors are used in compound conceptualizations, as “life is a jour-
ney” is based on key metaphorical concepts: “action is motion in space” and
“destinations are points in space”. On the other hand, complex metaphors (e.g. “death
is passing”) complement more general concepts, such as “event is action”. As we can
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see, metaphors are not based on random connotations and accidental associations but,
like understanding in general, are subject to constraints. Thus metaphorical conceptu-
alizations, natural to the process of thinking, largely determine the procedure of draw-
ing relevant conclusions. By shaping patterns of proper comprehension that is in accord
with the logic of the source element, they become subjected to the principle of avoiding
trivial conclusions.
4. VISUAL METAPHOR
Lakoff’s theory of metaphor as an element omnipresent in human thinking seems to be
more appropriate for the theatre situation than the classic approach, stressing most of
all the uncommonness of metaphorical expression as a stylistic means. The nature of
theatrical performance normally makes it impossible to ponder over the meaning of
a complicated metaphorical image. It is possible to do so only when the metaphorical
meaning is present in greater parts of or even throughout the performance. This work is
nevertheless concerned with the process of interpretation of particular acts and stage
images, which last short enough for their interpretation to happen mostly automatically,
as if outside the recipient’s consciousness. This is not to say that a theatrical production
can only make use of conventionalised metaphors, whose interpretation has been une-
quivocally defined within a given culture. Stepping outside the popular metaphorical
images does not have to be on a par with the necessity to spend a long time to compre-
hend over the meaning of the new image. Supporting this argument, Lakoff provides
yet another example of a popular metaphor – “love is a journey” – and of an expression
based on it, one coming from the lyrics of a song entitled “We are driving in the fast
lane on the freeway love”. According to Lakoff, “most people will surely have no
problem with an immediate understanding of the meaning of this metaphor, despite the
fact that it constitutes a poetic development of the concept »love is a journey«. They
will surely not notice that in order to understand this expression, one needs an inter-
pretation. The perception of a love relationship as a fast drive on the highway quite
automatically leads to the conclusion that the relationship is progressing at a very fast
pace. This in turn means the danger of an accident, which could destroy the relation-
ship in an instant. And the pace of the events and the accompanying danger are for the
lovers a kind of an alluring stimulus” (ibidem: 66–67). This example proves that a huge
part of our reasoning (about 95%, as relevant research shows) takes place outside of
our consciousness in an automatic way; it nevertheless uses the same source patterns as
conscious reasoning.
The unconscious nature of many processes of metaphorisation taking place in the
human mind means that the interpretations and conclusions based on them are suffi-
ciently quick. It can then can be safely assumed that metaphorical conceptualisation
constitutes an important part of the reception of even short fragments of a theatrical
performance. However, defining the nature of metaphorisation in drama is not an easy
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task, a state of affairs made evident by a number of theoretical studies that associate
metaphor with natural language only. According to Mayen, the iconicity of an artistic
sign is an impediment to the birth of a metaphor, which constitutes “a conscious
metalinguistic act consisting in the association of distant concepts and in the interpre-
tation of meanings” (Wysłouch 1994: 64) A similar perspective is adopted by Ziomek,
for whom “the transformation of a name into an image of the signified destroys the
principle of each metaphor, it is a game between the disappearance of one part of the
connotation and the accentuation of another” (ibidem).
A slightly different approach is taken by Lotman, who, analysing Eisenstein’s Oc-
tober, sees as metaphorical the scene based on the parallelism between the image of the
Mensheviks delivering speeches and the musical instruments. Similarly metaphorical is
according to Lotman another scene in Eisenstein’s movie – that of Kierenski climbing
the stairs. In this case, however – as the author emphasises – “the meaning is the result
of playing with the double lexical meaning of the phrase »to climb up«” (Lotman
1983). Within Lotman’s approach metaphorical meaning is thus mediated by language;
this approach has been best verbalized in Eichenbaum’s claim, whereby “the audience
can only understand a film (visual) metaphor if a given metaphorical phrase is part of
their lexical repertoire” (Helman 1992).
Understanding metaphor as a construction limited to natural language is rejected in
a work by Wysłouch, who proves by means of several illuminating examples that
metaphor can exist also within an image and without the slightest support of words.
The author questions most of all the solely signifying character of an iconic sign; she
emphasises its conventional aspect, making it possible to simplify and schematize the
sign. Iconicity does not then preclude ambiguity, which is the basis of the metaphori-
zation process – ambiguity makes it possible “for an image to designate an object, but
at the same time imply characteristics, which do not belong to this object, being unfa-
miliar to its nature” (Wysłouch op.cit.). One of the examples Wysłouch uses to explain
the process of shifting connotation (which leads to the birth of a metaphor) is Linke’s
painting Houses-Soldiers. It shows destroyed and burnt-out tenement houses whose
contours have the shape of soldiers. This visual identification of houses with soldiers
leads to the personification of houses, which suffer and fight just as people do, as well
as implies such soldierly virtues as perseverance, heroism and sacrifice.
Metaphor can thus exist within an image, thanks to predominantly “the simplifica-
tion and schematization of the sign”, acts enabling ambiguity of the message. Accord-
ing to Wysłouch, simplification and schematization allow metaphor to appear in the
image under one condition. Namely, the signifying (referential) function of the objects
being presented needs to be attenuated. A similar way of explaining the issue of ambi-
guity of an image is offered by cognitive semantics, the difference being that – in line
with the assumptions of cognitivism – the presentation of particular objects in a simpli-
fied form is not only based on the convention adopted, but springs from the very nature
of understanding the reality that surrounds us. Defining relevant features of a given
object, convention is secondary vis a vis the general rule of metonymic representation,
based on a relation of a part instead of a whole. We recognize a lot of animals on the
basis of the shape of their head or a distinctive fur pattern, without the need for looking
at their body as such. When we see a lion from the front we do not forget that it also
has got a tail. It is through such fragmentary perception of the world that creation of
ambiguous images (on which metaphor is based) is made possible.
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However, the principle of metonimy itself explains only the way in which metaphor
can be embedded within an image. It does not explain the meaning-creation processes
that it will trigger, or, in other words, the rules that could help one to define the mean-
ing of a given metaphor and to determine whether every unusual combination should
be interpreted as a metaphor. In his paper Can metaphor be seen? Porębski, question-
ing the visual existence of metaphor, stresses the lack of any semantic rules, which
means that at the level of connotation it is possible to come up with any interpretation,
provided that we are intent on doing so. It would not be unfounded to accept Porębski’s
remark, if the meaning of metaphor were the result of an unrestricted sequence of asso-
ciations conjured up by an image. The interpretation of metaphor is however subject to
the rule defining the meaning that is at a given moment of significance to the recipient.
This rule provides that the information contained in the metaphorical image remains
relevant when referred to a concrete context, created by the recipient on the basis of the
maximum effect/least effort principle.
In order to see how this principle works in practice, let us consider Okun’s painting
Woman-Flame, which appeared on the cover of “Chimera” in 1902. What we see there
is the shape of a human being: face, breasts and arms stretched forward. The other parts
of the body: hair, legs and toes are turning into flames. The former attributes suggest
that the human being is a woman, and the latter allow us to identify her with fire. Is this
a metaphorical image, though? If the painting appeared in a comic strip, we would treat
the woman as another sci-fi hero of supernatural power. The body parts/flames would
tell us about her exceptional properties, which, in the fictitious world of comic strips,
would be nevertheless entirely literal as opposed to metaphorical. Okun’s painting,
however, appeared on the cover of Chimera, a literary-modernist journal. In this con-
text the unlikely combination of woman with fire calls for a metaphorical interpreta-
tion. One of the possible explanations imposing itself is ascribing to the woman such
characteristics of flames as ephemerality, warmth or ability to destroy. Importantly,
ascribing qualities characteristic of fire to a woman does not happen arbitrarily. The
red or yellow colour of flames is rather meaningless in the case of this metaphor. An-
other feature of flames is their purifying power. Can it be applied to a woman as well?
Provided that we make an interpretative effort, we can justify an affirmative answer to
this question. All it takes is to treat the woman as a symbol of love, and to present love
as a purifying flame which can be metaphorically ascribed the ability to purify human
soul. Such an interpretation nevertheless seems less relevant than an explanation as-
cribing ephemerality – which is characteristic of flames – to a woman. True to fact, the
metaphor facilitates in both cases the comprehension of abstract concepts (the purify-
ing power of love and woman’s ephemerality) though their visual presentation, but the
interpretative effort is different in each case. This is so because the ephemerality of
flames is ascribed to the woman on the basis of two highly conventionalized cognitive
operations, and as such easy to grasp. The first of these operations establishes me-
tonimically a relationship between appearance and nature of a given human being, the
second on the other hand uses the culturally deeply-rooted metaphor “nature is an ele-
ment”.
It took three cognitive operations (less conventionalized, at that) to identify the
“purifying power of love” metaphor in Woman-Flame. Thus in relation to Okun’s work
the feature of volatility that a woman can have (as symbolized by the flame) is more
relevant than the interpretation that stresses the “purifying power of love”. The Principle
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of Relevance makes it clear why the source element of the metaphor is in this case the
flame rather than the woman. Although the cognitive operations that lead to the per-
sonification of flames are not beyond most people’s mental capabilities, they are likely
to attach more importance to information concerning female nature than to conclusions
that can be drawn from personification of fire. Thus the Principle of Relevance does
not unequivocally determine metaphorical meaning, but it does establish certain rules
to apply in the pursuit of the metaphorical meaning of an image.
What we can conclude at this point is that the concept of visual metaphor as inde-
pendent of natural language system is only feasible under the following conditions:
1. Metaphorical thinking induced by perceived images manifests itself beyond di-
rect verbalization.
2. Metaphors expressed by visual means lack satisfactory verbal counterparts.
3. Interpreting a metaphor is not about juxtaposing two concepts but about investi-
gating the specificity of the resulting image by making the recipient re-evaluate his
stereotypical perceptions.
Metaphor in theatre should be subject to similar conditions. Stage performances do
contain language metaphors, but they can only be interpreted in relation to the whole of
the mise en scène. Therefore the examples below will serve mostly to analyze visual
aspects of metaphor in theatre.
To exemplify the first of the conditions above, let us bring up a scene described by
Aleksander Tairow to depict the theatrical metaphors put together in the director’s
mind.
“Imagine a hero on stage. He wants to rebel against God. He leaves the Earth to face him and
to challenge him. He is climbing up a heap of daises – nothing can stop him. He has reached the
top; just one daring leap and there he is, facing God. But the leap is a tremendous effort, one that
not even the best of actors can make. Imagine then, that just at that very moment […] this special
stage atmosphere comes into play, magnifies his action a thousandfold, at one with the actor – one
inseparable, theatrical whole. And here he is, not just a man, but a giant, […] and he can be
trusted [emphasis – W.B.] to fearlessly face even the awe-inspiring gaze of Deity or Destiny”
(Tairow 1978: 121).
The fragment seems to suggest that the driving force behind the character’s action is
the metaphoric arrangement of the set upward; together with his ultimate endeavor, it
magnifies his symbolic gesture a thousandfold. Moreover, Tairow’s emotional in-
volvement in the described fragment should ideally bring about a similar contribution
on the part of the audience. The involvement, though, is not merely due to the transpar-
ency of the metaphor (“up is more – more power, more might, strength, divinity”). It is
the very set, the stage arrangement that magnifies the character’s action, making the
audience conjure up an image that has them feel and trust  the might of the character
they are facing. The protagonist becomes a giant not by means of ready-made applica-
ble linguistic metaphors, but through the feelings one is apt to have watching the stage
events.
This description also exemplifies the second condition. No natural language can ex-
press a situation whereby stage actions bring to mind numerous associations that lie at
the source of the metaphor. It is so because languages are linear in character, so any
possible description is analytical and cannot be equated with stage images. The simul-
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taneity of a theatrical performance allows for the co-existence of many elements of the
same metaphoric image, a phenomenon that is hardly feasible in language.
To exemplify, let us study the way a popular metaphor – “life is theatre” – was de-
picted in the XVI century. At that time performances were meant to present the world’s
order as consistent with the teaching of the Catholic church. Thus the set for Cal-
deron’s The Great Theater of the World emphasized certain aspects relevant to that
belief. As described in one performance, “two spheres open simultaneously; one con-
tains a throne for the Author, the other a stage with doors to the left and to the right”.
On one door a cradle is painted, on the other a coffin. The stage elements clearly de-
termine which components of the metaphoric image are stressed. Emphasis is put
mainly on the beginning and end of life, understood here as entering the stage and
leaving it. The cradle and the coffin never leave the stage; thus the brevity of life and
the inevitability of death are symbolically represented. The Author, who is always
there, overseeing the human actors, signifies the existence of a complete script. Thus
all the human actors have to do it to appropriately play the roles they have been as-
signed.
In Calderon’s “theatre of life” the omnipresence of the Author and the symbols of
beginning (cradle) and end (coffin) is of paramount importance to understanding hu-
man fate. Both concepts are theoretically translatable into verbal expressions, yet as the
literary plot develops the reader has to be reminded of them every now and then. It
would take quite a skilled writer to do so in a way that would not be irritatingly repeti-
tive. In theatre, on the other hand, the audience develop natural awareness of the
Author’s presence, a God overseeing the stage, and of the two most significant mo-
ments in every man’s earthly life symbolically represented by the two images painted
on the doors: the cradle and the coffin.
The last stipulation conditioning the introduction of visual metaphor is almost
missing from theoretical approaches and frequently neglected in published interpreta-
tions. This fact is due to a belief that a metaphor is based on perceiving an unexpected
relation between two images and that it is interpreted on the basis of an unconstrained
chain of random associations. However, as we have already said, it is in contrast to the
principle of meaning as relevant in a context. The context is structured by the recipient
on the basis of the “maximum benefit optimum effort” principle. The relationship be-
tween the input in an interpretation (the effort) and the resulting output (the benefit)
can again be exemplified by Woman-Flame. However, meaning is by definition struc-
tured against a context, therefore a theatrical metaphor is only feasible when the rele-
vance-forming process of thinking refers to visual aspects of a theatrical image.
To see how it works in practice, let us analyze how our mind conjures up a possible
interpretation of a selected scene from Rudolf Ziola’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream.
The scene is at Theseus’ court. The court and the retinue form an uneven semi-circle,
open toward the audience. In the center of the circle there is Hermia, lying on the
ground, cast there by her father Egeus. Such an image leaves no doubt as to the fact
that Egeus’ daughter is the protagonist in the scene, especially that all the other char-
acters are facing her. Still, Hermia is in an unenviable position. We know it not only on
the basis of Shakespeare’s text, but also looking at the stage arrangement. Hermia is
lying while all the other characters are standing. The recipient can therefore infer that
the girl is somehow subordinate to the others as, metaphorically speaking, less  im-
portant  is  down.
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Those familiar with the play will recognize the scene as the one when the king is
supposed to decide whether Demetrius is to marry his daughter. The audience can thus
identify the situation as testing a future son-in-law. They will consequently invoke
a series of conventional metaphors to conceptualize the scene they are watching. How-
ever, it is only through a single stage detail that the relevant metaphoric image around
which conceptualization centers can be identified. In the play under analysis it is the
spatial arrangement of characters; it can suggest another metaphor, viz. matchmak-
ing a daughter  is  t rade, just like in the case of a regular commodity at a market
place. Theseus, standing to the right, is the seller, as the fate of the girl is in her hands.
Demetrius, facing him, acts as the buyer. The semi-circle of other characters acts as
a crowd of onlookers watching the transaction. Hermia, the most important element of
the arrangement, is the commodity. Thus there are two facts to suggest Hermia’s prime
position in the scene – the spatial arrangement of characters and her function in the
deal depicted on stage.
The girl’s role in the transaction is of far-reaching significance to her. As the sub-
ject of a deal, she is void of any influence on her future. Thus, reference to a mental
image based on a complex conceptual metaphor can reinforce suggestions derived from
primary metaphors and from the very plot. Oftentimes it carries additional meaning,
adding another dimension to the situation in question. When Lysander, Hermia’s lover,
rushes onto the stage, he is stopped by the guards who will not have him enter the
semi-circle of actors. In accordance with the metaphor adopted for this scene, Lysander
is debarred from the transaction under process. This gives the whole scene an extra
dimension of double crossing. The auction is a one-buyer-only event; any other com-
petitors are removed by force.
In many ancient cultures the father was given the right to decide who his daughter
should marry, so in fact Egeus’ behavior is nothing out of the ordinary. However, pre-
sented as a commercial transaction, the father’s deed is seen in quite a negative light.
Still, the audience cannot assess Egeus merely on the basis of a metaphor (here:
matchmaking a daughter is  trade). It is so because certain conclusions that can
be drawn from the metaphor are not confirmed by the acting. One would be hard put,
for example, to try to interpret Egeus as a greedy old man. His behavior does not at any
moment suggest that he would like to be remunerated for his daughter. Such a conclu-
sion would be clearly far-fetched. The logic of image unity has it that Hermia’s objecti-
fication is the key issue, not the greed or cruelty of her oppressors.
Thus interpreting a metaphoric image is subject to certain regulations in line with
the systematicity of reasoning. It proceeds in accordance with metaphoric images es-
tablished in the mind; they are manipulated so as to account for stage events. There is
always room for freedom of interpretation, but it is not justifiable in the light of our
knowledge of conceptualization. This rule is also present in the model for the process
of building up visual metaphors, structured on the foundations of cognitive semantics
and Relevance Theory.
1. Metaphors occur on the basis of acts of ostension that focus the audience’s atten-
tion on a single element of a given mise en scène; these elements are at the source of
the given metaphors.
2. In line with the cognitive principle that ostension implies relevance, the recipient
attempts to add meaning to the element highlighted by the act of ostension. The as-
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signed meaning should be relevant in a context structured by the recipient on the basis
of the “maximum benefit optimum effort” rule.
Thus a metaphoric image that the recipient conjures up is the most relevant inter-
pretation of the act of ostension. It holds that a given element is highlighted with
a view to making the audience interpret other stimuli within the framework of the
stimuli represented by the source element, i.e. the one that catches attention.
3. The metaphoric image that the audience conjure up is confronted against what
they actually see on stage.
 The metaphorization model proposed in this dissertation merits a few words of ex-
planation. The first assumption holds that a single element in a given mise en scène is
highlighted; it proscribes juxtaposition of two elements. At the root of such an ap-
proach lie individual cases whereby metaphorical meaning is structured without any
clear delineation of two independent stage stimuli. Let us refer back to Lotman’s ex-
ample of Kierynski from Eistenstein’s movie October. The character’s upward mobil-
ity in quest of power is symbolized by his climbing a flight of stairs. Here the meaning
is clearly the result of interpreting a single image (going upstairs) rather than a unique
concurrence of two images. If two images are put together, it is primarily an act of
ostension based on the principle of estrangement, whereby the audience have to inter-
pret the extraordinary concurrence. Only when the audience’s attention is directed
toward one of the images, which consequently becomes the source element, can we
speak of metaphor. In an attempt to understand Okun’s work (see earlier), one has to
decide whether to approach it in terms of metaphoric objectification (“woman is
flame”) or metaphoric personification (“flame is woman”). Focusing on the source
element of a metaphor is a result of its cognitive value. In order to “interpret a stimulus
within the framework of other stimuli”, the stimulus to be interpreted has to be in the
center of attention as a source of our reasoning.
The second premise of metaphorization holds that metaphor entails interpretation,
that is to say assigning relevant meanings to selected images or actions. An unexpected
element on stage, or an unexpected concurrence of two elements, is not the sole guar-
antee of a metaphor. Let us imagine a father, the head of a family, sporting a royal
crown. The focusing element in this case is the rather original headgear. The situation
is explicable in metaphoric terms once we assume that the father purports to be the
king in his family, but it does not exclude other interpretations. The father may simply
be playing with his children and acting as a king in a family game; he may just as well
be terribly absent-minded, trying to go out wearing a paper crown rather than a hat.
Neither of the alternative interpretations is metaphorical; they are interpretable within
the framework of a situational context composed of world knowledge, past experience
and interpretations thereof, and immediate observational data.
Finally, the third assumption that we postulate for the process of metaphorization
underlines the necessity to confront metaphorical images in the recipient’s mind and
the actual, observable stage events. A metaphorical image that is not supported by
actual actions taking place on stage loses its visual dimension. It may be explicable in
another context, but freedom of interpretation is largely constrained by consistency
with observational data. To return to A Midsummer Night’s Dream (for analysis see
earlier): the audience could clearly see Egeus casting his daughter to the ground, where
she lay, among the crowd surrounding her. When interpreted in line with the suggested
metaphor (“matchmaking a daughter is trade”), the conclusion that Hermia becomes
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a mere object is strongly founded. The father’s behavior clearly suggests that for him
his daughter is little more than a commodity. Nothing indicates his greediness, though
such an interpretation is theoretically plausible when we analyze the metaphor in ques-
tion. There is no indication that Egeus expects to be paid or otherwise rewarded for
selling his daughter.
On balance, the outcome of the model for metaphorical conceptualization put for-
ward in this thesis is that the recipient structures the metaphor rather than identifies it.
Assigning metaphorical meanings, in essence, proceeds according to the same princi-
ples as any other meaning-creative process. Acts of ostension imply relevance and
trigger interpretation processes leading to highlighting individual elements as relevant
in a context. If it is metaphorical meaning that turns out to be the most relevant in the
context, we can speak of metaphor. Whether or not a metaphor is theatrical depends on
its source, the perceivable element of a mise en scène, and the necessary confrontation
of a metaphorical image in the mind and the actual stage events.
5. ASPECTS OF INTERPRETATION CHARACTERISTIC OF METAPHOR IN THEATRE
Visual metaphors do not fully do justice to the situation of a theatrical performance,
which most often draws also on natural language. However, the proposed model makes
it possible to allow for words spoken on stage by defining them as one of possible
ways to activate actual conceptualizations in the recipient’s mind. The conceptualiza-
tions are then confronted with conceptualizations originated through visual perception.
For instance, a metaphor realised explicitly by means of words may be verified or de-
veloped by an accompanying picture. Despite that, a metaphor cannot be defined as
theatrical by specifying its characteristic features, for instance, as originating in the
interaction between spoken language and an image. Just as with ostension and con-
ceptual structures, theatricality can be only treated as a characteristic context juxta-
posed with general rules of forming metaphoric conceptualization. This context, on the
one hand, will fit in with the principles of perception but on the other, it will constitute
knowledge about theatre derived from stereotypical beliefs and commonly accepted
conventions. The description of a context thus understood, shows that one has to resort
to a specific tradition to speak of metaphor theatricality. The tradition determines, at
least in part, the essential components of a theatrical performance. This task goes well
beyond general theoretical considerations, yet given the necessity to specify certain
essential aspects which have to be taken into account whilst characterising theatrical
metaphor, I shall resort to the practice of the theatre of illusion of the XX century
Europe.
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Types of Theatrical Metaphors
In a model of visual metaphor – as already emphasised – the source component is most
powerfully embedded in the sensually-perceived theatrical matter. Likewise, according
to the “part – whole principle”, it can be brought down to a single aspect: a relation, an
object or a gesture. The entirety of a metaphorical image is, however, complex and, to
a larger extent dependent on features concerning mental representation than the con-
ventions of stagecraft. That is exactly why any classification of theatrical metaphors
should be based upon various precisely designated types of source components. Such
a division, though, depends on particular theatrical conventions, which highlight the
significance of particular aspects of staging. It appears, though, that classifying meta-
phors into those originating from spatial structures, the presented objects or gestures is
commonly accepted and very well serves the purpose of being a model classification
for theatrical metaphors.
1. The metaphorical character of spatial structures could be seen, among others, in
the production of Balladyna in which Iwo Gall (Teatr Wybrzeże, Gdańsk, premiera 27
X 1974) designed one stage space for all acts of the performance in order to avoid in-
termittent intervals caused by changing the scenery. The solution, proposed by this
excellent scenographer, had nothing to do with using the simultaneous stage, where all
locations are crammed for the sole purpose of a swift movement of characters, without
having to change the setting. This solution often strikes as artificial and relies on the
audience to agree for this type of convention. Through the use of the metaphoricity of
space, Iwo Gall assigned a number of senses to his scenographic solution, which were
essential for interpreting the play, and he hid the practical function of a simultaneous
presentation of several locations. Let us see how the stage space in Balladyna was
described by Konstanty Puzyna:
“The upper storeys in the form of inclined planes meeting in the middle were covered by
a wood-like decoration. […] On the lowest level, Gall placed a hermit’s grotto. Two other pieces of
decoration: the portal of the castle and an exquisite fragment of the Widow’s cabin were arranged on
either side of the stage […]. This arrangement of the stage placed the stage action within two worlds
each of a unique autonomy but pieced together: in the kingdom of Goplana – on the upper storey
– and in the world of common people – on the lowest level” (Puzyna 1947: 6).
This configuration of stage space enabled the audience to interpret the relations
between both the individual characters of the play and groups of characters. The her-
mit’s grotto was placed in a central position of the stage action. It is, however, situated
on the lowest level – the level of man’s world dwarfed by Goplana’s kingdom from the
higher storey. Gall, thus, showed the superiority of the supernatural world over man’s
fate. Such an interpretation of spatial relations was reflected in the arrangement of
scenes. Contrary to the text of the play, in the first scene, there was a dialogue between
Goplana and the gnomes. The change of the sequence of events led to Goplana telling
Skierka to stop the Kirkor’s carriage in front of the widow’s cabin before young Kirkor
set out on his journey. The power of the supernatural world was magnified in the play
“at the expense of the legendary and the historical” (ibidem).
Another staging device was to place the Widower’s cabin and the castle on two op-
posite sides of the stage, which, as Puzyna wrote in his review – “placed the action
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within two worlds each with its unique autonomy”. In the scenic image one can see
a gap between the simple and carefree life of the common people and the false, insidi-
ous life of the court. The common ground for the inhabitants of both worlds is Go-
plana’s kingdom and the region of Goplo as part of it. On each occasion a character has
to choose which world they want to return to because the worlds are divided (literally
– physically on stage) which prohibits any form of cohabitation. It is significant that
the Widow’s cabin was located on the left side of the stage and the castle on the right.
Thus, the space adjacent to the respective buildings became characteristically marked:
in the positive manner in the case of the Widow’s cabin on the r ight  side and nega-
tively for the castle positioned on the lef t  side of the stage.
2. One of the more straightforward examples of the metaphor of objects is the father
with the gold crown which is indicative of his unlimited royal power. In the theatrical
practice one can notice much more interesting images, for example, the scene from
A Midsummer Night’s Dream directed by Rudolf Zioło.
In the first scene of act IV the action takes place on a glade in a forest where Titania
tries to seduce Bottom, who was transformed by Puck. In Zioło’s production, however,
this place reminds one of a room for smoking opium. The stage is enveloped in fumes.
Pale figures move about listlessly while one of the ghosts smokes a cigarette with
gusto. An element of sexual deviance is also present in the form of the master of cere-
monies, whose ballerina costume is a copy of a transvestite outfit photographed during
a fancy dress party in New York. As a result, the meadow in the forest becomes a for-
bidding and dangerous place. The space of a dream embracing the whole forest be-
comes increasingly dense posing a threat for anyone who dares to enter the area of
stupefaction and unbridled instincts. There might be no return from the world of opium
stupor to the world of reality and order.
Showing a glade in the forest as an opium club leads to a metaphor which enables
us to see the place where Titania courted Puck as suspicious and dangerous. An addi-
tional advantage of this particular solution lies in the director’s reference to the audi-
ence experience. The atmosphere of a room for smoking opium is universally known,
fortunately, in most cases only from the cinema screen or the television. The threat
posed by the growing popularity of drugs is perceived by contemporary audience to be
more real and frightening than the magic rituals of ancient elves.
3. The “father is king” metaphor was mentioned as an example of a metaphor of
objects. The metaphor was suggested by the gold crown on the king’s head but the
“kinghood” could be also reinforced by adequate gestures not necessarily performed by
the father himself. A good example is provided by the protagonist from Gombrowicz’s
Wedding; he kneels in front of his father and thus bestows his parent the kingly dignity.
This type of metaphor seems particularly characteristic of theatrical practice for two
reasons. First, it emphasises the actor’s role in assigning meanings to other stage ele-
ments (not necessarily to the characters). Second, it uses, in a natural way, the relation
of a conceptual structure: part – whole to build a metaphoric image. This process is
based on placing an object in a context that will change its meaning. A crown on the
head of an ordinary father creates surprise and, as a metaphor, it defines his relation
towards other members of the family. The son kneeling in servile obedience in front of
his father in Gombrowicz bestows kingly dignity on him in a manner somewhat less
controversial.
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It can be safely assumed that in some cases we shall not be able to determine une-
quivocally the character of the metaphor’s source component within the framework of
the classification proposed. However, identifying the source of metaphor is indispensa-
ble in view of ensuing interpretative consequences. In the scene showing marrying
Hermia as if it was a buy-sell agreement, audience attention is drawn both by Egeus’
gesture when he pushes her into the middle of the stage, and the way in which the other
characters are spatially arranged, which suggests the girl’s subservience to them. Both
the instances fitted the framework of the same metaphor: “marrying one’s daughter is
a trade”. In the first one, though, the metaphor defines, first of all, the relations be-
tween father and daughter, but in the second, it highlights Hermia’s plight in relation to
the entire situation: her inability to make her own decisions.
Metaphorical systematicity: highlighting and hiding
The meaning-related process of highlighting and hiding is possible due to the system-
atic nature of metaphors. Lakoff explains that:
“the very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a concept in terms of another
(e.g. comprehending an aspect of arguing in terms of battle) will necessarily hide other aspects of the
concept. In allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept (e.g. the battling aspects of arguing),
a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the concept that are inconsis-
tent with that metaphor. For example, in the midst of a heated argument, when we are intent on at-
tacking our opponent’s position and defending our own, we may lose sight of the cooperative as-
pects of arguing. Someone who is arguing with you can be viewed as giving you his time, a valuable
commodity, in an effort at mutual understanding. But when we are preoccupied with the battle as-
pects, we often lose sight of the cooperative aspects” (Lakoff, Johnson, op.cit.: 11).
Therefore it becomes easier to see the pros of an argument if it is understood within the
framework of another metaphor, for example “arguing is exchanging opinions”.
Thus, by altering the metaphor which shapes our understanding of a concept, we
can highlight or hide its aspects. If the matchmaking procedure in Midsummer Night’s
Dream is understood as selling the bride-to-be, the image is different than if she were
“given away as a present”. A wedding ceremony where the bride is a human sacrifice,
meant as beneficial for her society, takes on yet another meaning.
Interestingly, shifts in highlighting or hiding the aspects of a concept can take place
within the same metaphor, along with cultural changes. The XVI century image of “the
grand theatre of the world” is presented differently in the comedy of manners, a later
phenomenon. “The great stage of life”, which spans one’s lifetime from birth till death,
is here replaced by a bedroom, a boudoir, or possibly a park. Such a space cannot
highlight the fact of going on and off stage in any particular way. The appearance of
a character on the stage of life is structured by their ability to take part in parlour
games. The game itself, decisive in whether a character shines socially or not, is to be
seen as putting on a mask, dictated by social conventions, or assuming a role to achieve
a particular purpose. Maskaryl, the servant in Amusing Dandies, has a telling name.
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The comedy of manners lacks a pre-conceived scenario which would be overseen by an
omnipresent Author. Good acting simply means being able to hide under the umbrella
of the part one is playing. Molière’s Tartuffe, for one, is expert at doing so. A perfect
hypocrite for most of the play, he tricks Orgon into leaving him all his possessions in
his will. Only then does an external reaction take place. It is the king who acts as the
omniscient Author this time, by exposing Tartuffe as a notorious villain who should
have been beheaded long before. Thus, the double-dealing is condemned. Still, Tartuffe
acted splendidly. His encounter with Orgon’s family ends in his indisputable victory;
also, his tragic end does not result from a mistake on his part, but rather serves Molière
as a commentary.
Such a shift inside the same metaphorical structure stems from conjuring up partial
metaphors that make up the complete metaphor. “The grand theatre of the world” fo-
cuses on going on and off stage and directing human activity in the world, whereas the
parlour concentrates on the game, the acting that is supposed to guarantee social suc-
cess and popularity. Thus, in the case of in-metaphor shifts, highlighting or hiding
certain aspects is also based on systematising partial metaphors which together make
up the more general metaphor.
Experience as metaphor’s interpretative context
Our description of the rules that obtain in interpreting metaphors merits at least a men-
tion of the cognitive context, which the theory of relevance describes as experiential
knowledge stored in memory. Lakoff argues that
“no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately represented independently of its ex-
periential basis. For example, »more is up« has a very different kind of experiential basis than
»happy is up« or »rational is up«. Though the concept »up«is the same in all these metaphors, the
experiences on which these »up« metaphors are based are very different. It is not that there are
many different »ups«: rather, verticality enters our experience in many different ways and so
gives rise to many different metaphors” (ibidem: 19).
Thus, by identifying the experience that a metaphor is based on, one can interpret it
adequately and, as far as possible, unambiguously.
A student’s dissertation, written within the framework of cognitive semantics, dis-
cussed the set prepared for the staging of Balladyna, which was based on an up-down
metaphor. Unconventionally, however, “up” had negative connotations, having to do
with the spiritual world. Taking into account only the conventional understanding of
verticality that our culture has adopted, it might be said that the performance under
analysis here inverts the prototypical association of “up”. The set, however, points to
the source of the metaphor, thus justifying the suggested association. Let us look at
a fragment of the interpretation that the dissertation contains:
“The scaffolding placed on the stage, partially wrapped in plastic, through a simple, down-to-
earth association suggest that the place has an unfinished, temporary character, possibly being
subject to further processing. This is not really »refurbishing« or »reconstruction« – these imply
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the existence of an inspecting body overseeing the process and have positive connotations – but
rather chaos, disturbance of order, uncertainty. This arrangement allows for a clear-cut division
between human beings and spiritual characters. The upper levels are the area where spirits oper-
ate. The multidirectional reality of Goplana, Skierka and Chochlik deprived of a tangible centre
and gravity, tends to expand and destroy existing structures. The area where people dwell, in turn,
is marked by the horizontal floor, bringing to mind the image of a stable ground, a foundation”.
The final comment from the student clearly indicates the source of the metaphor,
that is the feeling of stability. The feeling we get supporting our feet on the ground runs
counter to the feeling of instability and uncertainty that floating in space brings about.
By identifying the source of the metaphorical image that describes the stage area one
can draw further conclusions. When Balladyna acquires power she moves upward on
the scaffolding. The upward mobility is not to be understood in a positive light as
walking up a ladder of professional success, though; it is rather a form of protest
against human nature, and as such causes fear and uncertainty. In the interpretation
quoted here the student says that “Balladyna tries to impose her own rhythm upon an
unfamiliar area, but her proud strutting, instead of the intended self-assurance, shows
imminent realisation of unnaturalness; fear of heights, if you will”.
The above comments about staging of Balladyna show that the logic of metaphori-
cal interpretation is rooted in the experience that underlies a metaphorical image. The
up-down relation is merely an isolated cognitive schema that becomes meaningful only
through experience. Thus, “up” can have both positive and negative connotations. The
ambiguity can only be clarified if additional information about the experience that
forms the source of the up-down metaphor is obtained.
The audience’s individual experiences as a source of metaphorical conceptu-
alisations.
As experience becomes a factor in the analysis of constructing metaphorical meaning,
the individualised character of context as a reflection of our world knowledge comes to
the foreground. Schemata that are universal in character become filled with meaning
that stems from individual human experience. By saying “up is good” we all use the
same spatial schema that has to do with the vertical way we are built, but individual
experiences behind this generic observation may differ. For instance, human posture
always shapes the “up is good” metaphor in the same way. A sick man is bed-ridden
and thus horizontal; getting over an illness means getting up and reassuming the verti-
cal position. However, not all of us have experienced mountain climbing, which is
a frequently cited source for the “up is good” metaphor. Cultural differences are even
more striking. Some will associate upward mobility with coming closer to God, others
will express envy at the freedom that birds can enjoy up in the sky. All of these exam-
ples deploy the same idea of expressing “good” by going or being “up”, but the range
of individual experiences to do with the metaphor can help spot differences in its un-
derstanding once more detailed research into its character is done. In the reception of
a theatrical performance, it does matter whether the upward movement of a character is
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understood as going toward freedom or toward God. In Iwo Gall’s staging of Bal-
ladyna a clear-cut stage division is perceptible: the right-hand part carries positive
associations, whereas the left-hand side has negative connotations. In his interpretation
Konstanty Puzyna argues that there might be several reasons for that division. In mira-
cle plays, he says, the right-hand side represented heaven, the left-hand side being re-
served for hell. He also mentions the dichotomy between “right” as “sunrise, birth,
beginning” and “left” as “sunset, dusk, expecting the end” (Puzyna 1947: 6).
These concepts build up a metaphorical image that is necessary to appreciate the
idea behind a given mise en scène. When Goplana conspires with Kostryn, mischief is
brewing, as their talks take place to the left of the stage. Goplana’s retreat from her
kingdom (again, she goes to the left of the stage) brings to mind end-of-day associa-
tions; we feel as if her grandeur was becoming a thing of the past. If hell is the focal
symbol, the metaphorical image loses its profundity; we are left with a somewhat
shallow and literal conclusion that Goplana goes back where she came from, that is to
hell. Thus, on the one hand, there is the coherent image of death being automatically
linked with hell (with a certain degree of approximation), and on the other, with respect
to individual staging solutions it does matter which of the source images is conjured
up. If our interpretation is generalised at the level where “left” simply means “bad” and
“right” stands for “good”, we depart from the images suggested in Gall’s staging.
Another reason why “left” is essentially negative is the phenomenon of right-
handedness. The left hand is normally not as dextrous as the right one, which makes it
inferior. “Right” is a polysemous word in English, meaning “opposite of left”, but also
“correct”; thus “right” evokes positive connotations. On the other hand, “having two
left feet” means being clumsy. Polish has a number of expressions where the right hand
appears to be clearly superior to the left one. However, this reason behind discriminat-
ing “left” does not apply to Gall’s performance. When Goplana leaves her kingdom
going left, she heads for her declining days, death, possibly hell. Without a shadow of
a doubt, though, her action has nothing to do with having two left feet and therefore
being unable to rule. In the context of the play a conclusion like that makes no sense at
all. On balance, any interpretation must refer to metaphorical meaning. Generalisations
like “left is bad, right is good” do not always give us a complete image of the meta-
phorical meaning of the reality shown on stage.
However, even if experience founding a metaphor is clearly determined, the meta-
phor can still be interpreted in a variety of ways, depending on the recipient. A meta-
phor is not seen directly through the prism of its experience, but rather through the
mental image that the audience have developed on the basis of that experience. These
images are varied. To return to the metaphor from King Lear, where the kingdom is
likened to a “sheet” washed by Regan and Goneril – bringing the concept of homeland
low to the level of a household article handled in a usual, indifferent way is a feasible
interpretation, but not the only one. A recipient who sees washing as a difficult and
arduous chore will interpret the daughters’ actions as an attempt at an exhausting, but
unavoidable job. Alternatively, washing can be seen in a positive light as bringing dirty
clothes back to their preferred, clean state; in this interpretation, the sisters would be
taking on a laudable task of bringing back order in the whimsical king’s realm. All
these interpretations are verified by the plot, where eventually Regan and Goneril turn
out to have meant mischief. However, watching the scene where the cloth is being
folded, the audience are not yet ready to decide about the daughters’ character, so the
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metaphor is open to multiple interpretations. The ultimate interpretation of Regan and
Goneril’s behaviour, therefore, depends on the plot; in the course of the action one of
the hypotheses that explain the metaphorical meaning of “washing the kingdom” will
be confirmed.
Taking into account the individual character of experiences used in metaphorical
conceptualisations does not have to lead to a subjective reception of the play. Individ-
ual experience of the recipient is subject to principles of relevance. If a given mise en
scène focuses on the vertical ordering of the set, the audience will develop a mental
image based on the same ordering. The meaning that the metaphorical image carries
has to be justifiable in the context of the mise en scène, here – the characters’ actions.
In Gall’s Balladyna the negative connotation of “up” was due to the hesitancy with
which characters moved up the scaffolding. Thus interpreting a metaphorical image is
far from being subjective. However, as the experience shaping a given metaphor is
individualised, the audience can not only interpret the metaphor correctly, but also
appreciate what they are watching in a more personalised way. Although not everyone
has experienced the feeling of uncertainty which accompanies dishonest attempts at
assuming power, all of us know what it is like to lose balance and what may happen if
we fall down to the ground. Thus Balladyna’s lot becomes considerably more familiar
to the recipient, who, thanks to the use of a metaphor, can experience the bumpy road
to power against the laws of nature.
Conclusions
In this chapter I have tried to present metaphor primarily as a significant mechanism of
cognition, in line with the very nature of appreciating a theatrical performance, a type
of entertainment in which the audience can hardly stop to think about the meaning of
events. Images come and go, so they can only be analysed post factum, and memory
permitting. The audience cannot reconsider past events, as the plot goes forward and
new events take place. This is not to say that theatrical metaphor is not interpretable in
terms of aesthetic values, structural beauty and profundity of meaning. Such interpre-
tations, though, only apply to mises en scène where events that are presented meta-
phorically span a longer period of time. For instance, all the actions of a character dur-
ing a particular play have a metaphorical dimension. Also, if a metaphorical image is
repeated a number of times, the audience can appreciate its complexity better. Kantor’s
and Mądzik’s mises en scène, with repetitive or long-lasting metaphorical images,
exemplify this issue quite well.
In drama, though, metaphors appear to serve but one purpose – to bring the ficti-
tious world nearer the audience. This “approximation”, understood as facilitating re-
ception, does not preclude the existence of aesthetic values, which make the potential
recipient interested in a work of art. According to what cognitivists say, conceptualisa-
tion is largely a subconscious process; therefore metaphors cannot function as concepts
enhancing the pace of theatrical comprehension. A theatre researcher has to analyse
conceptualisation in order to arrive at the motivation which ultimately shapes a given
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interpretation. Thus relations between measures taken for a particular mise en scène
and meanings which the audience assign to these measures can be determined. It is so
because metaphorical images develop as the audience contrast what they see on stage
with what they personally believe and know.
In line with Lakoff’s model and analyses of metaphors presented in this disserta-
tion, the following aspects of metaphorical conceptualisation can be singled out:
Metaphors form part of cognitive domains, in that they make up a network of inter-
relations. As this network is coherent and logical, a set of metaphors can be singled out
to serve as a basis for everyday reasoning.
Metaphors are coherent because they are rooted in human experience by means of
a source element. Due to that one can reason about more abstract concepts.
Metaphorical conceptualisation stems from contrasting cognitive contexts that make
up cognitive domains in line with the principle of relevance. The following contexts
are relevant to theatrical reception: stimuli received during performance, experience
gained through everyday interaction with the outside world or knowledge acquired
outside direct experience, as well as familiarity with theatre conventions.
In order to fully characterise theatrical metaphors one has to stress the fact that they
can help broaden the range of ways in which a mise en scène can affect the audience:
 By presenting the same concept with the help of different metaphors certain as-
pects can be highlighted whereas others remain hidden.
 The possibility to make abstract meanings perceptible is quite particular to thea-
tre, where a conventional code of visual signs corresponding to abstract mean-
ings is a relative rarity.
 Referring to the audience’s experience can help them comprehend unfamiliar or
difficult matters.
Rooting the communicated message in the recipient’s experience plays a significant
role in terms of relevance, which here has to be balanced on a cost vs. benefit scale. By
referring to experience, metaphor reduces the cost of comprehending events and im-
ages. The audience can thus make use of familiar knowledge, which is almost like
home territory. Speaking of costs and benefits, it is worth mentioning there that the
recipient assesses the potential difficulty in interpretation prior to conceptualisation, or
at the very beginning of it. If, then, the content appears unfamiliar and complex, the
audience may never try to comprehend it, as the expected intellectual effort may be too
hard. An image which refers to an individual experience, in turn, appears more familiar
an so easier to understand and encourages the audience to at least try to interpret it. The
artistic dimension of metaphor makes the audience hope that the aesthetic experience
will compensate for the effort they put into interpretation. However, individual meta-
phorical images should not be too difficult to interpret, even if the holistic meaning of
the metaphor appears too complex. Plot developments require constant attention on the
part of the audience, so pondering over a particular image may lead to overlooking
some details that are of direct relevance to the overall meaning of the performance.
Thus, metaphor in theatre has to be interpreted in line with the principle of rele-
vance and the calculation of costs and benefits. As Mieczysław Porębski aptly puts it,
“in terms of connotation, everything is interpretable as long as you try hard”. However,
not all interpretations are worth the time and effort that the audience put into compre-
hending unexpected turns in the plot or strange objects and characters that appear
on stage.
DOES THE THEATER NEED A COGNITIVE
REVOLUTION?
Cognitivism is sometimes referred to as a “revolution” that has created a new paradigm
in science. A basic precept for the present thesis, Langacker’s definition of meaning is
evidence enough of a fundamental change in the treatment of semantics. To reiterate,
Langacker “equates meaning with conceptualization, which he broadly defines as
a mental experience comprising both »new concepts and already existing ones, sensual
and kinetic experiences, emotions, the ability to recognize an immediate context,
social, physical and linguistic, etc.«. Conceptual content is thus only one element of
meaning, which is complemented by the way in which the author of a concept
formulates the content” (Tabakowska 1998: 168). Langacker’s definition is
revolutionary not because it rejects its predecessors, but because it broadens
significantly the scope of issues to do with the category of meaning. It thus seems that
the nature of the new methodology is better captured in Tabakowska’s definition
– cognitivism as a “rationalized intuition”. A great many cognitive and communicative
processes are too elusive for strict formal analytic frameworks and in their description
one has to make use of intuition as the source of the assumptions made. Thus
established facts concerning the mechanisms of human perception, mental processes
and their expression (e.g. verbal) transgress the boundaries of linguistic correctness or
of any other code. It is fairly easy to see why cognitivists’ ideas are attractive for
scholars interested in the reception of a theatrical performance, which, after all,
transgresses the boundaries of what is proper or correct to an even greater extent than
language. All this does not mean that that the meanings given to a performance by the
audience are accidental and unpredictable. This is so because the motivation behind
cognitive processes lies not only with the norms determined by a given system (code),
but also with human cognitive capabilities, which become evident in the comments on
or reactions to the events on stage. And that is exactly why I have so far analyzed other
authors’ critical texts rather than used my own examples of interpretation – the main
objective of the examples introduced has not been to demonstrate the possibilities the
use of cognitive categories brings to the analysis of theatrical performance, but to
prove that they constitute the basis on which every member of the audience draws
his/her own interpretative conclusions.
The general nature of the signification model presented in this dissertation is also
the result of the fact that the approach does not exclude the possibility of drawing
conclusions on the basis of other models of interpretation. Semiotic analysis constitutes
the part of the cognitive process whereby the recipient uses his/her knowledge stored as
models and cultural code. In turn, Ingarden’s division of a theater play into layers
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results from scholars’ and hence recipients’ practical need connected with the use of
the phenomenological model. We could provide more examples showing how
cognitivism interprets other theories of cognition. However, far more significant for
a summary of the present considerations is pointing to the differences between the
categories of the proposed model of the cognitive process and the akin semiotic and
phenomenological issues.
Let us begin with reminding ourselves that cognitivism rejects communication
models limited to decoding meanings and considers also such aspects as “new concepts
and already existing ones, sensual and kinetic experiences, emotions, the ability to
recognize an immediate context, social, physical and linguistic, etc.” (ibidem). Within
such an approach, the reception process begins not with the recognition of the sign, but
with an ostensive activity consisting in focusing the recipient’s attention, as a result of
which he/she begins to look for relevance. Attention itself as an important
communicative factor was also discussed by semioticians and structuralists, but within
their approach attention was invariably connected with the selection and so
hierarchization of signs. An act of ostension is however not always connected with
pointing to a specific sign. In many cases the recipient’s attention is drawn to a vague
phenomenon in need of an interpretation, i.e. receiving a meaning. The nature of
ostension thus allows to go beyond simple decoding and move towards constructing
meanings, as well as to create new concepts and capture so far unknown phenomena.
At the same time, ostension acts are not limited to instigating the audience’s
cognitive activity but also actively impact the process of the origination of conceptual
structures. Due to focusing the recipient’s attention on chosen elements of the
performance, ostensive activities to a large extent determine which conceptual
structures become emphasized in the process of conceptualization as a profile against
the cognitive base. Still, it needs to be remembered that the role of the recipient does
not only consist in an automatic translation of the information reaching him/her from
the stage, but also in its interpretation. The profile-base structure taking shape in the
recipient’s mind and responsible for the meaning of a given part of the performance,
depends on both the arrangement of the dramatic elements and the spectator
him/herself: his/her knowledge, way of reasoning and mental attitude. Profiling thus
constitutes a basic dimension of scene construal; it defines the human “ability to
»perceive« things in different ways and therefore to construct different
conceptualizations” (ibidem). In Ingarden’s theory a similar function is fulfilled by
wyglądy wyobrażeniowe. To clearly differentiate both categories it is thus necessary to
explain that they constitute different dimensions of scene construal. Whereas
Ingarden’s wyglądy define the perspective from which a given thing is “perceived”,
profiling defines the relation between the object of cognition and those elements of the
semantic structure that are directly relevant for the characterization of a particular
concept. The process of highlighting the profile against the base is also quite different
from structuralists’ hierarchical construction. The domination of an element of
a performance over the other elements makes it possible to define an axis around which
all the remaining signs are arranged in an order connected with the aesthetics of the
play. Profiling in contrast is a mechanism of conceptualization as a part of the
cognitive process.
The treatment of meaning as a process of constructing senses by the recipient
requires the definition of an end towards which his/her efforts are geared. Within the
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classic semiotic approach, the final result of the process of semiosis is the notion
established by a convention. A proper analysis of relations between particular signs is
bound to lead to the right meaning of an utterance or text. Yet, this idealized model
does not reflect the actual process of interpretation. The same element of the
performance can be interpreted thoroughly or only superficially, or looked at from
a narrow or broad perspective. The strategy applied depends on the needs of the
individual recipient. Explaining the same phenomenon to a child and adult we often
characterize it differently, at the same time assuming that the meaning has been defined
effectively. That is why, examining the way in which meanings are given to particular
parts of a performance, one has to remember about relevance, based on the effort
involved in advancing an interpretation and the benefits it brings. According to
relevance theory, the process of constructing a meaning stops when the degree of
understanding the phenomena being watched seems to be satisfactory for the recipient.
This mechanism also explains why a more thorough analysis will not always be better.
At some stage to achieve a deeper understanding requires much more involvement,
which is unjustified in the context of the potential benefits of discovering new content.
Summing up, it needs to be pointed out that, embracing mental and individual
aspects of reception, cognitivism in principle opposes the conceptual frameworks
proposed by semiotics and phenomenology. It concurrently offers a solution
intermediate between extreme subjectivism and objectivism. Meanings are born as
a result of confronting by the recipient the information he/she gets with his/her ideas
and convictions. The final effect therefore depends upon both the observed data and the
cognitive capabilities of an individual. Total subjectivity of reception has been limited
also because members of particular communities share a lot of the ideas and
convictions used for individual interpretations. This is a natural consequence of
universal rules of perception, as well as the process of social communication that
allows to agree on (negotiate) a common set of conceptual devices defining relevant
phenomena. Different spectators’ interpretations are thus in a sense based on the same
cognitive contexts, which makes it possible to compare individual ways of reasoning
and, potentially, to work out a common interpretation, relevant for a given part of the
performance.
Despite the clear differences between cognitivism and semiotics or phenomenology
when it comes to characterizing conceptual categories, the approach towards analyzing
the process of signification offered in this dissertation, an approach based on ostension,
conceptualization and relevance, does not seem particularly novel. Numerous studies
of the reception of theatrical performance make a different use of those very same
categories in order to answer the following questions:
A – What does a particular recipient find as the most important?
B – Which elements of the performance does his/her attention focus on?
C – In what way does he/she interpret those elements?
D – What emotions do the events on stage evoke in the recipient?
E – In what way does he/she evaluate particular elements of the performance as
well as its whole?
(Martin, Sauter op.cit.: 30)
At the cost of oversimplification it can be stated that questions A and B are
connected with ostension, C and D with conceptualization, and D and A can be linked
to relevance. One advantage differing the cognitive model from the earlier approaches
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lies with the fact that it points to the interrelations linking particular aspects of
reception. And that is why research into perception and emotional reactions can be
related to the interpretations presented by the theatergoers. It thus becomes possible to
move from empirical data to the world of meanings. Equally important for the theater
scholar prove to be the findings of cognitive linguistics, a discipline concerned with
identifying in linguistic forms reflections of the largely unconscious mental processes
forming our way of reasoning and feeling. The analysis of the recipient’s spontaneous
utterances thus need not be limited to the immediate content of his/her statements, but
can reach the motivation and strategies of reception that he/she is unable to describe or
is unaware of.
The idea of examining the issue of meaning in the theater from the perspective of
cognitive semantics is not meant only to satiate theater scholars’ curiosity. The
knowledge of strategies of reception allows to provide a more convincing interpretation
of a theatrical performance. The explication of particular elements of the performance
should not limit itself to defining meanings arbitrarily, but has to be geared towards
making the listeners accept the interpretations as compatible with their own feelings,
ideas and convictions arising after watching a play. That is the only way in which
considerations about the meaning of a performance become an important part of the
theatrical experience. And that is why the cognitive approach seeks not only to identify
the subjective processes of the understanding of a theatrical performance by the
recipient, but also makes it possible to link up the discourse used by theater scholars
with a regular theatergoer’s individual experience and emotions.
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